Mon, 07 May 2012

Protection of Freedom Act, a step forward for DNA retention

Protections of Freedom Bill 2011

The Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA), which lays out new laws on DNA retention and the use of individuals' data in a variety of contexts, including in relation to biometrics in schools, CCTV and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), received Royal Assent on 2012-05-01. Out-Law.com sums up the announcement:

[...] The Home Office said that "commencement orders" would be issued from July to enact some of the measures in the PoF Act.

The PoF Act also sets out new laws governing the retention and destruction of DNA and fingerprint profiles of suspected and convicted criminals. Last year the UK's Supreme Court ruled that police guidelines that allowed DNA samples taken during criminal investigations to be retained indefinitely were unlawful because it violated individuals' rights to privacy as guaranteed by human rights laws.

DNA and fingerprint samples can be retained "indefinitely" under the PoF Act in select circumstances, including where arrested suspects have been guilty of a serious crime previously. If those arrested suspects have no such previous conviction, their data must be destroyed after a three year period. Police can ask a district judge to issue an order enabling them to retain the information for a further two years, although this request can be appealed against.

The PoF Act requires that DNA or fingerprint samples must be destroyed if "it appears to the responsible chief officer of police that" it has been gathered unlawfully or from a third-party person in connection with a suspected criminal's arrest where the arrest was unlawful or based on mistaken identity.

However, DNA or fingerprint profile details can be retained beyond the expiry of retention periods for national security purposes unless a Biometrics Commissioner decides that it is "not necessary" for those purposes that the information is retained. The Human Rights Joint Committee had criticised this clause in its scrutiny of the draft PoF proposals.

The Committee had said the clause would "create a broad 'catch all' discretion for the police to authorise the retention of material indefinitely for reasons of national security." There had, at that point, been no "justification" why the power was "necessary and proportionate", it had said. [...]

At the beginning of the year, there was an estimated 5,882,724 total number of individuals whose DNA profile was retained on the National DNA Database (NDNAD). Already by 2010-03-31, there was an estimated total of 1,083, 207 innocent individuals whose DNA profile was on the NDNAD. Analysis of the English and Welsh approach so far, of indefinite retention of the DNA samples and profiles of all those arrested, has shown time and time again that retaining the DNA profiles of as many individuals as possible, many innocent, is ineffective and does not increase crime detection rate.

The PoFA's section on DNA retention is modelled on the Scottish approach. Once the law comes into force, from July according to Out-Law, six month-old DNA samples retained will be destroyed and most three year-old derived DNA profiles (and fingerprints and palm prints) of those not convicted or convicted of a single minor offence will be deleted as well.

This is clearly a welcome step by many whose personal data is on the National DNA Database. There are plenty of reasons, including stigma, discrimination, visa or job refusal, loss of personal data and higher risk of being falsely linked to crime, to want to be off the National DNA Database, especially for innocents and those convicted for some trivial matter.

It is a success for all the privacy activists and victims who campaigned to restore the presumption of innocence and the rehabilitation of offenders having been convicted of a minor crime. GeneWatch UK –as an indefatigable organisation at the forefront of the campaign to change the law to make the National DNA Database much smaller and more carefully controlled, and to safeguard privacy and rights without compromising the use of DNA in fighting crime– deserves much credit in this success.

Celebration will happen when the DNA sections come into force and DNA samples are destroyed and DNA profiles, fingerprints and palm prints are deleted. As no deadline has been issued for the enactment of all the DNA sections of the PoFA, if you are an innocent person with a record on the DNA database you may want to contact your MP without further delay. Help is offered at Reclaim Your DNA.

Two step backwards

The PoFA has limits, such as the national security exemption criticised by the Human Rights Joint Committee and highlighted in the excerpt from Out-Law.com above, and even removes some of the benefits of the earlier process. In the system that had been in place until now, very few individuals succeeded in getting off the NDNAD, but those that did manage to go through the exceptional case process had not only their DNA sample destroyed and their DNA profile, fingerprints and palm prints deleted, but also their associated Police National Computer (PNC) record deleted. There's no such requirement in the PoFA. And nothing is said either of photographs retained by the police. The retention of photographs has not been reviewed by judges in the court cases about DNA retention so it is likely that once PoFA is enacted, a test case on this specific issue will come to court.

Vigilance is required to ensure that ameliorations made to the rules for DNA retention by the police are not lost by worse data sharing initiatives elsewhere. At the end of 2011, the government unveiled plans to change the NHS Constitution to allow patients' records and other NHS data to be automatically shared with science companies. Dr Helen Wallace, Director of GeneWatch UK, warned about some of the potential risks: 'Every adult and baby with a blood or tissue sample stored in the NHS could end up with details of their genetic make-up stored in a cloud-based DNA database built by stealth within the NHS.'

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Sun, 22 Jan 2012

Visiting London's police custody suites

When the police arrest someone they usually detain him or her in a cell in a station's custody suite. To ensure detainees are treated well, local community members –known as Independent Custody Visitors (ICVs)– volunteer to conduct unannounced visits of police custody suites and speak with detainees (with their consent) about their experience from the time they arrived in the custody suite. The visits are always done by a pair of ICVs and often last a couple of hours. At the end of each visit, the ICVs discuss with the custody staff any immediate concerns and write notes about the visit and any issues they feel need further answers from the police for follow up at the next quarterly ICV panel meeting.

Data obtained from Freedom of Information requests sent to the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) and the Metropolitan Police Service (Met) shows that there are 82 custody suites in London with a total of 1,057 cells. The Met explained they have a total of 992 operational cells contained within 72 custody suites across London, however ICVs also visits custody suites of the British Transport Police as well so these are included in the MPA data and my analysis.

Over a period of 29 months, they were 4,834 visits by ICVs. During that period, custody suites opened 24/7 were visited on average three times a month, 23 months out of the 29. On average, during a visit there were just over six detainees held in the custody suite and more than three of them where in their cells and accepted to talk to the ICVs.

ICV visits in London's custody suites during the 29 months from 2009-06 to 2011-10
Type of custody suite Total # stations Total # cells Total # visits Average # months with visits Average # visits / month visited Total # det. in custody during visits Average # det. in custody / visit Total # det. spoken to by ICVs Average # det. spoken to / visit
All custody suites821,0574,834192.930,5976.315,9063.3
24/7 custody suites
528164,34823328,6486.614,8563.4
Overflow custody suites
1815995422652.81571.7
Unknown (either 24/7 or overflow)
255172681.2420.8
Closed custody suites
10823361321,6164.88512.5

It would have been interesting to find out how many persons are detained in each custody suite every month and for what reason, but that data is currently not collated by the Met. Ironically, even though this historic data is not held by the Met, some of it is held by the MPA as it is written down by ICVs during their visits. Stephen Bloomfield, Head of TP Criminal Justice, Territorial Policing Headquarters explains that 'The current NSPIS [National Strategy for Police Information Systems] Custody system does not store historic data regarding cell usage. It is designed to be a live system with a capacity to store custody records and not which cell was used or when a custody suite was full. No information is held centrally as to which custody suite is open on a monthly or daily basis although this has been identified as an area which requires work and it is hoped that this information will be held in the future.'

Marylebone and other overflow custody suites

After the United Friends and Family Campaign (UFFC) annual march at the end of last year (see Police provocations at peaceful march against deaths in custody and Question to the police authority about police provocations at peaceful march and Met's response to the 'Protecting the innocent' review on DNA retention), a small group of those that participated in this demonstration went to Marylebone police station to wait for the release of the man who had been arrested at the end of the march and was detained there. This station has an overflow custody suite that is only occasionally used, in particular for public order situations. Several of those present wondered if Marylebone and other overflow custody suites are visited by ICVs.

Overflow custody suites are mainly used as charge centres for major public or sporting events such as football matches, for local policing operations, for bail to returns and temporarily while another suite is closed for any reason e.g., cleaning, maintenance, upgrade work. In the couple of days it takes to plan the opening of an overflow custody suites, the police have the duty to inform ICV panels who can then schedule visits to custody suites that are not opened 24/7. Protocol 7 of Appendix G of the London ICV Handbook (pdf) specifies that 'A single point of police contact on the borough should be identified to inform [ICV] panels promptly of any intended changes, closures or additions to custody facilities'.

As can be seen in the summary table above, there are 18 overflow custody suites with a total of 159 cells. The average number of months visited during the 29 months surveyed period is low: four. This could indicate either that these overflow custody suites are not open often or that they're not visited even when opened; there's not enough information available to clarify this point. During the visits, there tends to be fewer detainees held in cells with an average of close to three, consequently ICVs on average spoke to fewer detainees in overflow custody suites than in those open 24/7.

The UFFC march was on Saturday 2011-10-29, Mike Lyng, Quality and Assurance Advisor, on behalf of Territorial Policing and Central Operations, 'advise [...] that Marylebone Custody Suite was not opened [on that day] in order to target any specific public order operation. However on the day in question there were a number of events taking place in central London including The United Family and Friends Campaign annual march, Amnesty International solidarity to Syrian protestors march and Syrians love Syria counter demonstration. In order to ensure sufficient facilities were available on this day, a charge centre in close proximity to the marches was requested. In this instance Marylebone Custody suite was selected as the dedicated charge centre. There was no specific request for the charge centre to be Marylebone. It was selected due to its proximity to the events taking place. The officer with the responsibility for this task was a sergeant from Kensington and Chelsea borough police working under the direction of Commander Michael Johnson from Public Order and Operational Support (CO11).'

Met searches reveal that during the period September to November 2011, the Marylebone custody suite has been opened on 18 days and received 137 detainees:

Detainees held in Marylebone custody suite
from September to November 2011
Arrest date Total held in Marylebone custody suite
2011-09-115
2011-09-239
2011-09-2413
2011-09-259
2011-09-3013
2011-10-0115
2011-10-0212
2011-10-078
2011-10-0815
2011-10-092
2011-10-153
2011-10-259
2011-10-262
2011-10-291
2011-11-093
2011-11-118
2011-11-131
2011-11-309
Total137

The spreadsheet from the MPA does not list any ICV visit to Marylebone custody suite for a 29 months period including September and October 2011, and the latest published annual report of the Westminster ICV panel, for 2009, does not mention the Marylebone custody suite at all.

The system works for some overflow custody suites as for instance Tooting and Hackney were visited respectively 31 and 15 times during this 29 months period, however, like Marylebone, the Brentford, Orpington and Harrow Road custody suites didn't receive any ICV visit during that period.

Becoming an ICV

ICV panels are regularly recruiting new members. The ICV scheme was created following a recommendation of Lord Scarman in his report on the 1981 Brixton riot. It became a statutory scheme with the Police Reform Act 2002 and is managed by Police Authorities. To volunteer, contact the police authority local to where you live or work. In London, the ICV scheme was managed by the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) until earlier this month, and now by the new Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPC). Note that the wealth of information about the ICV scheme has not yet been moved from the MPA website to the MOPC one, so for more details follow the MPA link.

Bootnote 1 See the table below for a more detailed summary listing all the London custody suites:

Analysis of ICV visits in London's custody suites during the 29 months from 2009-06 to 2011-10
Borough Station Type of station
(Met data)
Type of station
(MPA data)
# cells
(Met data)
# visits # months with visits Average # visits / month visited Total # det. in custody during visits Average # det. in custody / visit Total # det. spoken to by ICVs Average # det. spoken to / visit
Barking and DagenhamFreshwarf New Build24/727/7300
Barking and DagenhamBarkingOverflow7431.3307.5143.5
Barking and DagenhamDagenhamOverflowClosed930122.51304.3612.0
BarnetColindale24/724/721213297.32,15310.11,2706.0
BarnetBarnetOverflowOverflow5531.761.261.2
BarnetWhetstoneOverflowClosed4
BexleyBexleyheath24/724/720125294.38016.43993.2
BrentKilburn50% Overflow24/71790293.14374.92763.1
BrentWembley24/724/72593293.21,04911.35896.3
BrentWembley Park (BTP)24/71018121.5100.650.3
BromleyBromley (PFI)24/724/730127294.49137.24653.7
BromleyOrpingtonOverflowOverflow80
CamdenHolborn24/724/71690293.15145.72893.2
CamdenKentish Town24/724/71190293.14344.82843.2
CamdenTottenham Court Road (BTP)24/71091293.13363.71972.2
CamdenAlbany StreetOverflowOverflow9951.8394.3293.2
CroydonCroydon24/724/714104293.67287.04484.3
CroydonSouth Norwood24/724/711103293.65605.43373.3
EalingActon24/724/722133294.61,34610.16424.8
EalingSouthall24/724/711123284.45084.13002.4
EnfieldEdmonton24/724/714222297.71,9768.96342.9
EnfieldEnfieldOverflowOverflow7623.0213.591.5
GreenwichPlumstead24/724/72499293.41,02110.35555.6
GreenwichGreenwichOverflowClosed8221.02211.0105.0
HackneyShoreditch24/724/7986263.33554.12002.3
HackneyStoke Newington24/724/716102283.67667.54884.8
HackneyHackneyOverflowOverflow51572.1342.3201.3
Hammersmith and FulhamHammersmith24/724/718431.3184.5102.5
Hammersmith and FulhamFulham24/7Overflow9961.5283.1161.8
Hammersmith and FulhamFulham Place Road (BTP)33152.2451.4260.8
Hammersmith and FulhamShepherds BushOverflowClosed9
HaringeyHornsey24/724/711112293.96275.62822.5
HaringeyTottenham24/724/77103293.65765.62722.6
HaringeyWood GreenClosed428122.330.120.1
HarrowHarrow24/724/713110293.85434.92472.2
HaveringRomford24/724/713102293.56956.83443.4
HaveringHornchurchOverflowClosed8221.094.552.5
HeathrowHeathrow Polar Park24/724/730116294.03823.32512.2
HillingdonUxbridge24/724/711120294.16575.53603.0
HillingdonWest Drayton24/724/79116294.03352.92151.9
HounslowChiswick24/724/7790273.32412.71221.4
HounslowHounslow24/724/712115294.06325.53382.9
HounslowBrentfordOverflowOverflow50
IslingtonIslington24/724/724133294.61,39210.57105.3
IslingtonBrewery Road (BTP)24/72273.1602.7261.2
IslingtonHollowayOverflowOverflow8331.041.341.3
Kensington and ChelseaChelsea24/724/781682.0452.8281.8
Kensington and ChelseaNotting Hill24/724/761682.0342.1171.1
Kensington and ChelseaKensingtonOverflowOverflow6111.011.011.0
Kingston upon ThamesKingston24/724/710112293.94153.72742.4
LambethBrixton24/724/716103293.68157.93883.8
LambethKennington24/724/7989283.23834.31992.2
LambethStreatham24/724/76101293.52642.61381.4
LewishamLewisham (PFI)24/724/73381292.81,13514.04075.0
LewishamCatfordOverflowOverflow12221.0189.073.5
MertonWimbledon24/7Closed1089263.43473.91772.0
NewhamForest Gate24/724/71590293.17027.83543.9
NewhamPlaistow24/724/71286293.05516.43414.0
NewhamWest Ham (BTP)22191.2231.0160.7
RedbridgeIlford24/724/71798293.498310.05255.4
RedbridgeBarkingsideOverflowClosed7221.073.521.0
Richmond upon ThamesRichmond24/724/752173.0512.4361.7
Richmond upon ThamesTeddington24/7Overflow5541.391.881.6
Richmond upon ThamesTwickenhamOverflowOverflow4111.000.000.0
SouthwarkPeckham24/724/71869272.66008.72934.2
SouthwarkWalworth24/724/72078292.77669.83354.3
SouthwarkSouthwarkOverflow13111.000.000.0
SuttonSutton (PFI)24/724/730126294.38576.84603.7
Tower HamletsBethnal Green24/724/7192392.61918.31145.0
Tower HamletsLimehouse24/724/7722102.2753.4462.1
Waltham ForestWaltham Forest / Leyton24/724/7300
Waltham ForestChingfordClosed1298293.46116.23733.8
WandsworthBattersea24/724/710107293.74544.22031.9
WandsworthTootingOverflowOverflow53183.9732.4421.4
WandsworthWandsworth24/7Closed1185223.94875.72212.6
WestminsterBelgravia24/724/7161061.7595.9353.5
WestminsterCharing Cross24/724/745951.89610.7586.4
WestminsterPaddington Green24/724/7141271.7675.6292.4
WestminsterEbury Bridge (BTP)24/742783.4401.5210.8
WestminsterHarrow RoadOverflowOverflow140
WestminsterMaryleboneOverflowOverflow90
WestminsterWest End CentralOverflowOverflow28331.020.710.3

Bootnote 2 For even more details, I've collated the source data and my analysis in this Excel spreadsheet.

Bootnote 3 And to check out the several Freedom of Information requests it took to obtain all the data used in this post, see:

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Tue, 03 Jan 2012

The British Transport Police (BTP) have CCTV cameras in the strip search rooms of all their custody suites in contradiction to their own CCTV in Custody Standard Operating Procedures and to the Home Office guidelines. I detailed these findings in the post British Transport Police pervert CCTV policy.

The BTP said that the contradiction with their own procedures does not exist 'as [the BTP CCTV in Custody Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)] is only a draft SOP and is still awaiting sign off'. The latest available draft is dated January 2010.

The BTP also claimed that by carrying out strip searches in rooms with CCTV cameras they are not in breach of the Home Office Safer Detention & Handling Guidelines (SDH) 'as long as the recording of the search is necessary and proportionate.'

To substantiate this claim, a BTP officer must decide before the start of the strip search whether a recording will be necessary and proportionate.I asked for the criteria they use to determine whether the CCTV recording of a strip search is necessary and proportionate. My questions was forwarded by the BTP Data Protection & Freedom of Information Researcher to Mark Leahy, Head of CCTV, British Transport Police, London. Here's the BTP's response:

The decision of whether to CCTV record strip searches is taken on a case by case basis. It is a decision that is taken by the individual Custody Sergeant and British Transport Police do not have a specific set of local guidelines that are followed. However, all decisions are carried out in accordance with PACE Code C and with the Safer Detention & Handling Guidelines.

(For relevant extracts from the SDH guidelines and PACE Code C, see the earlier British Transport Police pervert CCTV policy.)

I also asked for the relevant training material used to train BTP officers to enable them to determine whether the CCTV recording of a strip search is necessary and proportionate, what elements they must base their decision on, when they must make such decision and what kind of reporting of their decision they must make. The BTP do not hold any such training material.

Individual BTP officers are placed in an impossible situation, even if they try to act with respect to the privacy and the dignity of detainees being strip searched: CCTV cameras are installed in strip search rooms in all the BTP custody suites in contradiction to the BTP and the Home Office policies, and BTP Custody Sergeants are asked to decide on an ad hoc basis, without any training or guidelines, whether the actual recording of a strip search will be necessary and proportionate.

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Mon, 02 Jan 2012

Blog posts in 2011

2011 posts (created with Wordle)

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