Mon, 06 Apr 2015

What did the SLaM NHS Foundation Trust and the police cover up at River House

The South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (SLaM) has attempted to cover up what happened during two related incidents on a mental health ward. On the night of 2012–10–01, at its River House facility, 48 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) officers were deployed, including officers from armed and dog units, and four Territorial Support Group (TSG) officers drew their Tasers on the mental health ward. The police cannot find its own investigation report. SLaM has eventually published a version of its investigation report with many fewer redactions remaining, in response to my multiple freedom of information requests and an eventual decision notice of the Information Commissioner’s Office.

You can now find out much of what they didn’t want you to know.

The mostly underacted 105-page report, released on 2015–02–25 is available here (in case this redacted report is updated or removed, a copy, as originally published, is available here). For comparison, the extensively redacted version, released on 2014–05–28, is available here (and a safe copy of it, here)

p. 29 of the 2014 version of the report p.29 of the 2015 version of the report

p. 29 in the 2014 and 2015 versions of the report.

What follows are excerpts from the SLaM investigation report which were blacked out in the earlier more extensively redacted release.

Apparently racist behaviour by TSG officers

‘Three patients (patients A, B, and D; all black) out of the four patients involved were placed in SC [Supervised Confinement]. The fourth patient, (patient C; a white patient), was initially left on the ward, despite concerns raised by staff that this could lead to further disturbance.’ p. 11 (first incident)

‘Incident 2: followed on almost immediately from the first incident, when patient E (a black patient) approached staff demanding an explanation as to why patient C had remained on the Ward. Patient E believed that there was a racial motive which led to staff assisting the police to place three black patients in supervised confinement, whilst a white patient was treated more favourably.’ p. 11 (Emphasis added)

’The UC confirmed that patients A, B, C, and D were involved and that prominent amongst these patients was patient C [a white patient].’ p. 24

’Patient B [a black patient], had by this time, calmed down considerably and although remained verbally threatening and abusive, obeyed police instruction, sitting on the floor with his arms above his head allowing the police to handcuff him. The police placed a clear plastic cover over his head to prevent him from moving his shoulders and elbows. He was initially ignored by the police until several promptings by staff. He was escorted by the first on-call CAG [Clinical Academic Group] manager and the police to SC on Norbury Ward.

Patient C [a white patient] was left sitting in the day area, as if he had played no part in the riot, despite all earlier insistence from staff that he had been a significant player in the disturbance. He was not handcuffed, as patients B and D had been and he was not taken off the ward. He was allowed to continue to remain in the TV lounge.

Patient A was considered by staff to be a behind-the-scenes orchestrator and manipulator.

According to staff statements, the police, after entering the unit, ignored the request of staff to treat patient C (a white patient) the same way as they had treated the other three black patients.’ p. 29 (Emphasis added)

‘Just before the police finally retired staff complained again about patient C [a white patient] remaining on Spring Ward. Therefore, a decision was taken to nurse patient C in the ICA on Spring Ward and to offer him prn medication. Two staff were were deployed on 2:1 observations with this patient.’ p. 30

‘These patients asked staff why one of the main activists [sic] (patient C) in the earlier incident, was left on the unit, while three other patients (all black) had been handcuffed and taken off the unit, accusing them of being racist for transferring three black patients into SC and leaving the white patient on the ward. Patient E (a black patient) approached staff around the nursing station demanding an explanation as to why patient C remained on the ward. Notwithstanding explanation from staff, patient E believed there to be a racist motive in the way black patients had been treated, accusing staff of assisting the police.’ p. 31 (Emphasis added)

Massive police presence causing distress to vulnerable patients not involved in the disturbance

’At 2347 the incident was considered by xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx to be “otherwise so dangerous” that Trojan (armed police officers), Dog Units and London Ambulance Service (LAS) were requested.’ p.23

’At 0052 there were in excess of 20 police officers on site; some in standard police uniform and others in tactical wear, carrying Tasers, shields and batons.’ p. 24 (Emphasis added)

’On arrival of Trojan [armed police officers] (unspecified in the police log), tactical advice was given, as per standard practice, with regard to use of fire arms. However, Trojan was stood down, as was the Bromley Borough Response team, as TSG [Territorial Support Group] would take the lead in entering Spring Ward.’ p. 27

’TSG entered Spring Ward from the fire road entrance via the airlock leading to the ICA and to the main ward in “strict compact riot formation (regimented crowd control)” armed with shields, visors, batons and Taser guns. Taser guns were not used.

Comment: According to some statements, patients who were already asleep and who were in no way connected to the disturbance were forced to leave their bedrooms by police officers, even though staff kept signalling to the officers that the real culprits were in the corridor and in the TV lounge.’ p. 28 (Emphasis added)

Comment: Most patients played no part in the riot. Nevertheless they were forced to leave their rooms (with the exception of patient F who was SC) as part of the tactical intervention made by the TSG. Some patients subsequently reported their sense of distress to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx but there is nothing recorded in the notes to this effect, even though there were potential safeguarding issues at stake. Attempts to secure further and better particulars about the methods used by the TSG have been unsuccessful.’ pp. 28–29 (Emphasis added)

Communication between SLaM and Bromley Borough Police lost in translation

‘It took eight weeks to secure material from the Metropolitan Police. Requests for further and better particulars have been unsuccessful, despite several reminders on matters which were explored at interview with an Inspector from Bromley Borough Police.’ p. 15

‘Although, according to some evidence, an agreement had been reached with Bromley Police Station that there would be police presence at the point of patient F’s transfer. When this was requested on 29/09/12, it was not forthcoming.’ p. 15

’At 2317 a third call was made to request ‘riot police support’ - CAD 9864. This was recorded on the police log as three patients had started rioting in the first instance and that all thirteen (patients) had now joined in; that suspects had metal poles and were trying to break the windows where the staff had retreated for security and that if the patients broke the windows, the staff would all be killed because patients had committed murder before.

Comment: This account is inaccurate, either because of what the police were told or because it was misconstrued in the translation. Most of the patients were sleeping or at least in their own bedrooms. There were no metal poles involved, although three patients were continually throwing a large metal bin with force at the window of the nursing station.’ p. 22 (Emphasis added.)

‘When the police declared incident 1 to be a Critical Incident’ p. 80

SLaM’s staff attempts to conceal intramuscular injection from patients

’A decision was taken to prepare oral prn midazolam 10mg as well as to draw up 7.5mg of midazolam for intramuscular injection. This was because the team determined there be to be a likelihood of patient D refusing oral medication. This was based on previous knowledge of him.

Comment: Preparing intramuscular medication at the same time as oral medication falls outside the ideal standard of practice. Whilst the Trust policy does not give guidance on this matter, NMC guidance (Standard 14: Standards for medicines management (NMC 2007)) is clear. However, under the circumstances and on balance, the Independent Team acknowledge that the specific situation required a degree of flexibility and staff initiative. The Independent Team accept that in some circumstances both oral and injectable medicines can be prepared simultaneously but that the injectable form of the medicine should then be stored in a readily accessible place and not handled in front of the patient at the same time that the oral medication is handled.’ p. 17 (Emphasis added)

’patient B smashed the oral medication out of the hand of the UC, spilling all the medication and water on the floor, along with the intramuscular medication, which according to some statements was concealed out of sight when it had been taken as a contingency measure, should patient D refuse oral medication.

Patient B accused the staff of bullying patients.’ p. 18 (Emphasis added)

‘The HCA [Healthcare Assistant] told the Independent team that as the ‘triggers’ associated with incident 1 were known to staff, that arguably, it was possible to foresee what would happen, once a decision was taken to offer patient D prn medication and how patient B would react to this. Patient B is known to object to the use of medication and tends to act as an intermediary between a patient and a staff member, often to try to ‘whip’ the situation up. In the opinion of the HCA, the situation could have been pre-empted and the police should not have been called.’ p.19 (Emphasis added)

SLaM staff appears to have been confused, lost control of the situation and retreated to the nursing station abandoning some vulnerable patients

‘The UC [Unit Coordinator] advised some staff to withdraw and to assemble in the nursing station for safety, as the situation was getting out of hand.’ p. 18

‘staff retreated to the nursing station’ p.19

‘Patient F remained unsupervised in SC [Supervised Confinement] once staff in the ICA [Intensive Care Area] and the nursing station had been evacuated from the ward. The first on-call CAG manager (a Registered Nurse) saw patient F on two brief occasions, with a police escort, to establish that he was breathing and not in too much distress.’ p. 28 (Emphasis added)

‘According to a statement from an Inspector from the Metropolitan Police, numerous requests were made to ascertain the names of those involved and risk assessment details, but there were no staff on duty able to provide such information, with no contingency plan, other than calling the police for dealing with such a disturbance. There was discrepancy between this statement and the evidence given by the UC.’ p. 21 (Emphasis added)

‘The UC and three other staff retreated to the nursing station to summon help.’ p. 31

’Comment: Given the severity of the situation the presence of an RC [Responsible Clinician] would have been appropriate. There was no senior medical presence for either incident 1 or 2.’ p. 33

Eight patients, including patient I, deemed very vulnerable, were left without access to any staff or care.’ p. 34 (Emphasis added)

Operation Metallah

‘Operation Metallah, a joint BRH/RH - Bromley Metropolitan Police protocol, with an operational implementation date of 20/04/13 – document received.’ p. 84

‘Operation Metallah, undertaken with the Bromley Metropolitan Police, in recognition that a new way of working was required to ensure optimal coordination and management of resources and sharing of information when police assistance is required, whilst not directly commissioned as a result of events on the night of 1st October 2012, has been influenced by it.’ p. 85

‘Operation Metallah - Joint Trust/Bromley Metropolitan Police protocol for responding to requests for police assistance at BRH, April 2013’ p. 104

The definition of the following terms in ‘Appendix 4 – Acronyms, abbreviations and terms’ had been redacted

‘Operation Metallah - Joint Trust/Bromley Metropolitan Police protocol for responding to requests for police assistance at BRH, April 2013’ p. 104

‘SC - Supervised confinement (seclusion)’ p. 105

‘Trojan - Metropolitan Police Firearms Unit’ p. 105

‘TSG - Tactical Support Group (Metropolitan Police)’ p. 105

p. 41 of the 2015 version of the report It would have been useful to get the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) version of their intervention at River House that night, especially as from SLaM’s investigation report it would appear some TSG officers behaved in a racist way and caused undue distress to several vulnerable patients. An internal MPS email explains that ‘I have been informed that on [sic] Incident Management Log was created however despite searches on [Bromley] borough and with the senior investigating officer I have not been able to locate this document. Furthermore one document refers to a meeting in which this matter was to be discussed , again no further information could be found in respect of this meeting which may or may not have occurred.’ Following a complaint about the loss of this important document, the investigation log at an incident declared to be critical, the Information Commissioner’s Office wrote that ‘I have been advised by the MPS that searches for the log, which would be in hard copy rather than electronic, have failed to locate anything. Senior Officers connected to the event have been contacted but to no avail. The MPS have stated to me: “Unfortunately, in this instance the log in question cannot be located and is therefore, on the balance of probability not held”.’

So far, it has taken eleven freedom of information requests (to SLaM, the MPS, the Independent Police Complaint Commission, the Care Quality Commission and to Monitor), too many complaints to the Information Commissioner’s Office and a decision notice to uncover what has just been exposed that the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and the police didn’t want us to know.

Some of these revelations are shocking.

There are still some redactions, which are likely unwarranted and, if so, in breach of the the decision notice of the Information Commissioner’s Office. The only valid exemption, agreed by the Information Commissioner’s Office, is for third party personal data which explains that most names are still redacted. It is more difficult to understand how the use of this exemption can be justified to miss pp. 39–67 from the table of content (on p. 2), and that from the middle of p. 40 to the middle of p. 65 the content is still entirely blacked out. From the headings just before and after these redactions, the redacted text must concern some of the findings of the investigation.

[Update 2015-04-24] The Information Commissioner’s Office has now compared the redactions made by SLaM with the steps prescribed in the decision notice and concludes:

‘From my analysis of the redacted and unredacted versions of the report, I am satisfied that SLAM has generally acted in accordance with the Commissioner’s instructions and therefore complied with the decision notice. This finding also applies to SLAM’s decision to withhold pages 40 – 65 in their entirety.’

Bootnote

Here are my previous posts about this incident:

And also some of the internal SLaM correspondence and internal MPS correspondence about my earlier FoI requests.

First published on 2015-04-06; last updated on 2015-06-24 to add details about compliance of remaining redactions.

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Mon, 30 Mar 2015

Surveillance in Trafalgar Square and the UK

Deutsche Welle filming crew German broadcaster Deutsche Welle was filming earlier this month a segment in Trafalgar Square for its series Focus on Europe - Spotlight on People.

The topic was how pervasive video surveillance is in the UK and the opposition to it by organisations such as No CCTV:

No other European country keeps as close a watch on its citizens as the UK. For years, the government has been broadening its powers of surveillance in the name of security. In other nations, its laws would long since have been considered breaches of privacy. Now opposition has also been growing in Britain.

I was interviewed for it and briefly appear 3’10" in the short programme.

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Sun, 22 Feb 2015

Police marking of autistics

A parliamentary written answer about creating an autism marker on the Police National Computer (PNC) was recently answered:

Lord Touhig (Labour)
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what progress has been made in considering whether police marker systems used to identify those with mental health and learning difficulties can be extended to those with autism as proposed in the report Think Autism.

Lord Bates (Conservative)
Work is continuing to establish whether a separate marker, specifically for autism, can readily be added to the Police National Computer in addition to the existing mental health marker, and to assess potential impacts on police force IT systems.

A follow-up written answer clarified the implementation plan:

Lord Touhig (Labour)
To ask Her Majesty’s Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Bates on 5 February (HL4542), whether there is a deadline for completing work to establish whether a separate marker, specifically for autism, can be added to the Police National Computer […], whether the current police information technology systems are capable of accommodating an additional marker, specifically for autism, to be added to the Police National Computer.

Lord Bates (Conservative)
For the purposes of speed of implementation it is proposed to use an existing marker to encompass cases of autism rather than developing a specific marker, which would require further significant work and assessment. These proposals are expected to be considered by the Police National Computer Board within the next month.

The National Autistic Society’s (NAS) Policy & Parliamentary team provided a note titled Further information on Government proposals to establish a marker for autism on the Police National Computer. I am copying its content below and interspersing with some comments:

What is proposed?

A Police National Computer (PNC) record is created for anyone who is charged with an offence or receives a fixed penalty notice, community-based service, or caution. This may be for first time or continued offending.

This is incorrect. ‘The PNC holds details of people who are, or were, of interest to UK law enforcement agencies’. A PNC record is created at arrest and is retained until the individual becomes 100 year-old (if there are several dates of birth on record, the first one is used). See Notes on the Police National Computer for more details on the PNC.

Current Government proposals are to include a marker on these records that alerts criminal justice workers to a person’s autism. The Government’s proposal is to record autism within the “AT” marker, rather than to take longer creating a new marker: The AT marker signifies ‘Ailment’ and will remain on the record for the life of the specific record (e.g. being acquitted or the record being expunged). There is room for 60 text characters (max) to accompany the marker, e.g. “has autism, needs support”.

The NAS persists in its use of the offensive person first terminology (‘has autism’). Autism is an integral part of who we are and how we experience the world. Identity-first language should be preferred (’is autistic). Someone does not have Englishness or jewishness or left handedness, or autism, etc. One is English or jewish or left handed or autistic. This page has a good explanation of this semantical issue.

The NAS recognises that the use of the phrase “Ailment” is unfortunate. However, this will mean that information about someone’s autism can be recorded more quickly. It is important that criminal justice professionals receive training so that they can interpret this marker, know about the nature of autism and make suitable adjustments. To this end, the NAS is working with the Cross-Government group on autism and the criminal justice sector to develop training resources for professionals.

The NAS also believes that, while the recording of autism under the AT marker will provide a quick solution in the short term, the relevant authorities should continue to look to create a separate, more appropriate, marker that could record autism (and potentially other non-medical or non-mental-health conditions).

Even though the NAS finds the current proposal ‘unfortunate’ and short term, its policy advocates for the creation of a ‘marker that could record autism’ (and potentially other neurodivergences).

This is very concerning, as it is advocating for what will effectively be a database of autistics for policing purposes. That the records have to already exist to add such a marker is not as much a safety as it may look; one only has to remember the claims that Police ‘have made arrests just to get people on to the DNA database’. Such a database would criminalise and stigmatise autistics. Being autistic is not criminogenic; if anything it may increase the risk of being victim of crime.

Also there are many autistics who have not yet realised they are autistics. Would this marker apply solely to autistics having followed the medical pathway and been medically diagnosed? If the criminal justice system (CJS) became over reliant on such a marker, it would create the additional risk that the many autistics not having the marker would not be dealt with adequately.

Another unaddressed issue is what criteria would be used to decide to set such a marker for an individual? Does this imply that autistics would be forced to disclose their autism? Whether and when to disclose is an an individual right. This right to choose cannot be so lightly ignored.

What could be useful to record in a database accessible to emergency call handlers is communication needs, e.g., whether some one uses BSL as first language, is unable to make voice calls, may need an independent advocate, etc. That would still be useful only for those on this database so is a very limited solution.

What does this mean for a person with autism?

For most people with autism, this will have no effect at all as it only adds a marker to existing PNC record (i.e. there must have been a caution, charge or sanction).

If it will have no effect for most autistics, then what is the point of advocating for such a marker? What is the point of creating an ineffective, criminalising and stigmatising marker, albeit on a pre-existing PNC record? There are better solutions to improve the actions of those in the criminal justice system towards all autistics.

This PNC project is designed to make it easier for the police to know if a person has been diagnosed with autism so that they know they may need to make changes to their usual practices and make sure they are explaining what is happening so that it is understood. We believe that, on the whole, this could be useful for police and may help a number of interactions between people with autism and the police from escalating.

The NAS has heard of situations where, for example a confrontation between police and a person with autism has escalated because of the shouting of confusing/mixed instructions. While the marker will be limited to people who already have a PNC record, one possible virtue of the marker is that police would be alerted to a person’s autism and know to approach an arrest differently. This cannot replace appropriate training of criminal justice professionals, but would be intended to help those with training identify appropriate responses much more quickly

Good training is indeed essential. Some researchers, police officers and the Home Affairs Committee also agree. Police need to understand that atypical behaviour is just a different behaviour and not a sign of criminality. Some of the reasons given by the police for finding my behaviour suspicious and wrongfully arresting me were that I had avoided eye contact with them (a failure to interpret social cues appropriately) and was wearing a jacket allegedly too warm for the season, both of which are common autistic behaviours.

Training for the police and others in the criminal justice system on common autistic behaviours and sensory issues would be particularly helpful.

How can this information be used?

Given the sensitive nature of the information, it is vital that it is not used improperly – especially to stigmatise people with autism or to fuel misconceptions about them. We have asked criminal justice representatives how the proposal means the information within the marker will be used. This section summarises their response.

This is nice wishful thinking, but there are examples of the PNC, including information of a sensitive nature such as DNA profiles and photographs, used improperly. For an innocent to become an honorary criminal by being on a police database is stigmatising. If there’s an autism marker, it would be surprising for it to never be used improperly.

In data protection terms this information is classed as sensitive personal data so permission of the individual concerned should always be sought by any non-police agency seeking inclusion of relevant marker on PNC.

Police does not seek consent for inclusion of information on the PNC. If the information is to remain under the control of autistics, then a much simpler mechanism is to carry a card briefly explaining that one is autistics and possibly including some basic interaction advice. If one cannot talk to explain they are autistic, they may show their card, and if handcuffed, the police will find the card when searching the individual. The police must treat all who have special needs appropriately whether these are expressed verbally or with a card. And an autism alert card can be used in other settings as well.

As regards to data protection, databases have incorrect information, information can leak (or become lost on a train) and databases can be used for surveillance. Not entering additional information, especially in a police database, avoids all these issues. (After the police decided to take no further action in my case, they forgot to update the PNC accordingly for many months, in breach of the Data Protection Act. This is not a theoretical issue.)

The marker would be present for protective purposes. Suggested examples of (policing) decisions which it would usefully influence:

The NAS’ position

The NAS believes that the central issue for improving experiences of the criminal justice sector for people with autism is ensuring that all professionals have a good knowledge of autism and the changes that they need to make to practices and environments. We are currently working with the College of Policing to improve training for new police recruits and pushing for more training for other professionals.

Improving training is a positive step. Awareness is essential, but not sufficient. Acceptance of neurodivergences is what is needed.

In order to ensure that the right changes can be made, it is vital that the police, or other criminal justice sector professionals, know that someone has autism as soon as possible. There are a number of ways that this can be achieved: e.g. autism alert cards, encouraging people to declare their autism without fear of prejudice, improving training so professionals can identify the signs. A marker on the PNC is one other way that this could happen.

We believe that there are important safeguards that must be included, to ensure that sensitive data is used appropriately. Professionals must be sufficiently knowledgeable about autism to know that having autism is not an indicator of criminality or guilt. The marker should only be used in ways that will allow a person with autism the same protection of the law and access to justice as any person.

It is discriminatory and wrong for the police to keep markers which have nothing to do with criminality on categories of individuals for most of their lives. Police keeping tab on innocent inviduals is typical of a police state, not of a liberal democracy. Having an autism marker on the PNC will criminalise autistics. As was expressed in the European Court of Human Rights judgment in S. and Marper v. the UK: ‘Weighty reasons would have to be put forward by the Government before the Court could regard as justified such a difference in treatment of the applicants’ private data compared to that of other unconvicted people.’

By focusing on a marker identifying autistics, this discriminatory approach, rather than addressing the root causes of how traumatic encounters with the criminal justice system too often are for autistics, further legitimises the current societal attitude of blaming autistics for their poor treatment.

A much better solution to the problem this tries to address is two-fold: training of those in the criminal justice system and autism card schemes. Voluntarily carrying a card can help an autistic encountering the police to clarify that some of their behaviour may be atypical. A card is fully under the control of the individual. It is a helpful communication tool, not an ID card or get out of jail free card. And such cards can be used in other situation where communication may be difficult.

The police must serve all of society with respect and humanity. Autistics deserve equal treatment and the forced disclosure of our neurology to ensure ‘equality’ cannot be a requirement. The police need to be aware and more accepting of all neurodivergences, including of autism. An increased acceptance that many experience the world differently, would be of benefit to more than just autistics.

Hopefully the NAS will fully consider the many problems and risks of such a marker, review its policy and use its influence to help stop this proposal going any further.

This post was written in collaboration with Kabie Brook, chairperson of the Autism Rights Group Highland (ARGH). ARGH has designed an autism alert card available to all autistic people, children or adults, across the UK and carried by several hundreds autistics.

Bootnote:

Some other recent parliamentary debates and written answers about autism:

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Wed, 18 Feb 2015

Throwaway society

The Discovery programme on BBC World service broadcast an episode on the throwaway society on 2015-02-16:

Hundreds of millions of computers, mobile phones and televisions are thrown away every year around the world. In this week’s Discovery Gaia Vince will be looking at the reasons behind this rapidly growing mountain of electronic waste and asking, who is responsible? The manufacturers or the consumers? When our gadgets break, maybe we should just be repairing them. And Gaia attends a party where people are fixing stuff for themselves.

The half hour programme can be listened to on the BBC Radio Player.

Some of the interviews were recorded at a Hackney Restart Party. My interview starts at 19:21.

Bootnote: Other blog posts about The Restart Project:

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Thu, 29 Jan 2015

NHS Trust forced to publish unredacted full report about massive police deployment to mental health ward

For the past two years I have been attempting to uncover what happened during two critical incidents that occurred at the River House facility operated by the South London and Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust on 2012-10-01. I eventually exposed that 48 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) officers were deployed and that four TSG officers drew their Tasers on the mental health ward.

Using the Freedom of Information Act, I got SLaM to initially publish a redacted summary report and then to unredact it, fully. This revealed it was hiding a full report. Using that information, I got it to publish an extensively redacted version of the full report. After an internal review in which SLaM found it was justified to do all these redactions on health and safety, and third party personal data, last week, the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) disagreed and decided against SLaM:

South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust

21 January 2015, Health (NHS)

The complainant has requested a copy of an investigation report that was commissioned to investigate an incident that occurred on a ward at the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (the Trust) in late 2012. The Trust initially relied on the future publication exemption (section 22) in FOIA to withhold a version of the report. Upon its publication, parts of the report were withheld under the health and safety (section 38) and third party personal data (section 40(2)) exemptions in FOIA, although these were later released to the complainant. However, during the course of the Commissioner’s investigation it became apparent that the Trust had only considered a summary of the report rather than a version containing the complete findings. A further partial disclosure of the complete report was made with the remaining information withheld under sections 38(1)(b) and 40(2) of FOIA. The Commissioner has found that section 40(2) but not section 38(1)(b) of FOIA is engaged. He therefore requires the disclosure of the information to which section 38(1)(b) has been applied. The public authority must take these steps within 35 calendar days of the date of this decision notice. Failure to comply may result in the Commissioner making written certification of this fact to the High Court pursuant to section 54 of the Act and may be dealt with as a contempt of court. [Emphasis added]

FOI 38: Upheld   FOI 40: Partly upheld

Decision notice FS50514652

Here are my previous posts about this incident:

SLaM has to publish an unredacted version of its full report that complies with the ICO's decision by 2015-03-25.

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Mon, 19 Jan 2015

Privacy campaigners vindicated in fight to delete DNA profiles of innocents

The Protection of Freedom Act 2012 introduced more restrictive rules about the retention of DNA profiles of individuals on the National DNA Database (NDNAD) including the deletion of the DNA profiles of most individuals who are not charged (No Further Action) or acquitted. This was a change welcomed by activists who had been campaigning that keeping tabs on innocents should not happen in a liberal democracy and that it does not make policing more efficient (adding hay to the hay stack makes finding the needles harder). What would have increased the crime detection rate would have been to fund for more DNA profiles from crime scenes to be added.

As of 31 March 2014, the National DNA Database held 5,716,085 DNA profiles from individuals down from 6,737,973 a year earlier, and 456,856 DNA profiles from crime scenes up from 428,634 a year earlier. In 2013-14, 1,384,905 DNA profiles from individuals were deleted from the database. Of these, 1,352,356 of these were deleted under the provisions of PoFA; 31,690 profiles taken by Scottish forces were deleted under Scottish law. A further 6,837 crime scene profiles were deleted because the crimes had been solved.

I wrote nearly three years ago:

It is a success for all the privacy activists and victims who campaigned to restore the presumption of innocence and the rehabilitation of offenders having been convicted of a minor crime. GeneWatch UK –as an indefatigable organisation at the forefront of the campaign to change the law to make the National DNA Database much smaller and more carefully controlled, and to safeguard privacy and rights without compromising the use of DNA in fighting crime– deserves much credit in this success.

Last month the government eventually agreed with what we had said all along. Lord Bates, Lords Minister and Minister for Criminal Information, Home Office in his ministerial foreword to the National DNA Database: annual report, 2013 to 2014 recognised that:

The reduction in profiles held from innocent people has not led to any reduction in the number of matches the database produces. In the quarter from 1 April to 30 June 2014, the database produced 37 matches to murder, 127 to rapes and 6,111 to other crime scenes. In the same quarter of 2013, when the old system for retaining DNA was in effect, it produced 37 matches to murder, 103 to rapes and 6,141 to other crime scenes.
[Emphasis added.]

Chris Sims, Chair, National DNA Database Strategy Board Chief Constable, West Midlands added:

The NDNAD match rate on loading a crime scene profile reached 61.9% in 2013–14. This was the highest annual rate yet and shows the success of the NDNAD in detecting crime and protecting the public.

The NDNAD Strategy Board showed some surprise at this outcome at its September 2014 meeting, but could not find any error in the draft annual report!

4.6 MC presented a draft of the National DNA Database Strategy Board’s Annual Report for 2013–14 (Paper 4.1) to the Board. He thanked Carl Jennings for his hard work on the report. He said that this was the first report since the implementation of PoFA. The proportion of profiles from innocent people had fallen from 50% to 3%. He reported that the number of profiles on the database had fallen from 7.2 million to five million but that the match rate had had in fact risen slightly from 59% to 62%. He had checked this with KF and they could not find any errors with the figures. JA said that the increase in match rate was not expected; in fact, a decrease had been anticipated. She asked if the number of crime scene profiles had reduced. MC said that the report would be published as soon as the Board were content. CS added that it was good that we were near publication.

4.7 CS asked if we had got the chronology on the deletion of samples correct and MC confirmed that we had. Batches of deletions took place in fairly short timescales (for example over a weekend). CS said that we needed a proper review of PoFA implementation and MC added that any analysis of implementation must be independent and not carried out by the police or the Home Office. CH added that such a review would need ministers’ co-operation as well as funding and an appropriate experimental design. AP said that the scientific design committee could input into any such review.
[Emphasis added.]

Blanket and indiscriminate surveillance is not the solution. It is neither necessary nor appropriate.

Bootnote:

Retention periods for DNA profiles and fingerprints (as presented in the annual report).

1. Non-convictions:

Occurrence Fingerprint and DNA Profile Retention
Minor offence – arrested or charged None – but speculatively searched
Qualifying offence* – arrested not charged None, but in exceptional cases on application to the Biometrics Commissioner, three years retention may be authorised, plus two year extension by court
Qualifying offence* – arrested and charged Three years plus possible two year extension by court
Minor offence – Penalty Notice for Disorder Two years

2. Convictions (include cautions, reprimands and final warnings):

Occurrence Fingerprint and DNA Profile Retention
Under 18 – Convicted of a minor offence First conviction: five years (plus length of any custodial sentence), or indefinite if the custodial sentence is five years or more.
Under 18 – Second conviction Indefinite
Under 18 – Convicted of a qualifying offence* Indefinite
Adult – Convicted of an offence Indefinite

*Qualifying offences are serious violent or sexual, terrorism and burglary offences.

Where an individual has more than one arrest on their record, the longest retention period will be applied.

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Thu, 01 Jan 2015

Blog posts in 2014

2014 posts (created with Wordle)

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Sun, 09 Nov 2014

Policing of autistic suspects

Tape

Should police officers behave differently with autistic suspects? Two recent commentaries support the changes I suggested in my written evidence to the Home Affairs Committee.

Researchers found that conventional police interview techniques are not effective for people with autism:

Police find interviewing and interacting with witnesses and suspects with autism a real challenge, a study has revealed - highlighting that the ways officers have been taught to interview are at odds with what is needed in these situations. Existing interview techniques tend to focus on open questions, only later narrowing down to closed questions, but research shows that people with autism may need focused questions from the outset.

The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)-funded research studied what does, and does not, work when police interview people with autism. The researchers - Dr Katie Maras, University of Bath, and Dr Laura Crane, City University London - are calling for better training of police and criminal justice professionals as, at present in the UK, these groups currently have no standard compulsory training about autism. […]

My experience of the police interviewing process, as described in my evidence, matches this research:

10. As I was innocent and did not know any better at the time, I made the mistake to refuse to call a solicitor. During the police interview, one question particularly bothered me. The interviewing officer after asking me questions about my laptop such as 'has it got anything on there about public underground?' and 'has it got anything on there about plans for any terrorism act?', asked 'has it got anything on there that might be construed as causing a public nuisance?'. The correct answer would have been 'yes' as I have a word processor, an email client, etc that could all be useful to a terrorist and most likely can be construed to be of use for anything including causing a public nuisance. However, I also realised that answering the positive would not be helpful to me and challenged the question when the investigating officer just wanted answers.

An obvious way forward to make police encounters less damaging to autistics would be to improve training. Inspector Michael Brown, who is on secondment to the College of Policing as Mental Health Coordinator, recommends on his Mental Health Cop blog to have autism awareness training for police officers:

[…] I've argued before that I see the point of specific autism awareness training for police officers because we know that where officers deal with incidents involving someone with autism there could be considerations that wouldn't necessarily apply to other situations, if they can be accommodated. I'm not sure if that could be said of all of the above conditions, however. Would it matter to the policing of an emergency mental health incident whether someone who appeared to be in distress was psychotic because of schizophrenia or because of bipolar or because of Addison's disease? Probably not. […]

These two commentaries support the recommendations I made to the Home Affairs Committee:

12. An essential recommendation would be for all front-line police officers to receive some training about the autism spectrum. This training ideally would involve those on the autism spectrum. I understand that a few police officers have had sessions with the Asperger London Area Group (ALAG). This training should be made more generally available.

13. At the very least, front-line officers should read the ACPO-endorsed Autism: a guide for criminal justice professionals publication of the National Autistic Society.

14. With such training it is hoped that police officers realise that a behaviour different from that of a neurotypical is just different rather than suspicious; consider hyper- and hypo-sensitivities that the public they interact with may have; and use clearer interviewing questions.

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Tue, 28 Oct 2014

Profile on the Restart Project's blog

The Restart Project is publishing on its blog a series of profiles of regular restarters. I was featured in the second profile. Here's a copy of the post:

Restarter Profile: Meet David

David at a Restart Party

Tell us a little about yourself.

I am known as either David or Panda. I moved to London from Paris twenty-one years ago. I have studied computer science and criminology, and worked as a software developer, a technologist and a journalist. I am autistic and have been described as ‘calm, almost too calm’.

When did you start repairing electronics and electricals?

Before the web had been invented. A lot of my early repairs were telecoms related: RS232 cables, modems and phones, and computers as well.

Why do you attend Restart Parties?

To empower others to regain control of their devices. For more than thirty years I’ve been demystifying new technologies and software development, initially, and how to reclaim our civil liberties, later. The collaborative repairing going on at Restart Parties are occasions to demystify repair and to empower participants to fix their electronic and electrical devices. It is for this transformative process, when people realise that many repairs are accessible to them, that I am involved with the Restart Project.

What is your favourite kind of repair?

The variety is interesting, but what is most gratifying is when someone arrives hoping for a free fix and leaves having fixed their device mostly on their own. It is the process of discovery, when they realise that they are already knowledgeable: that if they have changed a fuse they likely understand the need for electric continuity; that if they have ever touched a lit lightbulb they likely realise that electric devices get hot. Fixing their device is a small step from that knowledge: when a device stops working, first steps are to check that everything is still connected, that electricity flows, and that there’s no dust or crumbs blocking any fan so the heat is not trapped inside. The next realisation is that some simple tips go a long way: how not to end up with a pile of screws, use a pill box or an egg carton to store them so it’s easy to find which screws are used at which step when time comes to reassemble things. The skills needed for such repairs are a lot of common sense, some limited experience (learnt in the process), good research skills and access to a few tools.

What do you do when you are not Restarting?

Learn, research, occasionally write. Check on the welfare of the detained persons by making unannounced visits to the custody suite of police stations. Write (too many) Freedom of Information requests. Walk.

What frustrates you (in life)?

Injustice. Noise. Surveillance. Crowds. Deaths in custody. Cars. Waste.

What gets you out of bed in the morning?

Restart Parties, Qi Gong, police custody visits, mornings of mindfulness, conferences. Though mornings are difficult and best avoided.

What’s the first thing – one material thing – that you could not live without? (besides oxygen, food, water, and shelter and medical care)

In this weather, a hat.

Share something cool with us [preferably a link]

The Horse is Technology, by Thich Nhat Hanh

Bootnote: Read an earlier post about my experience of becoming a restarter.

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Wed, 09 Jul 2014

IPCC case file eventually destroyed. Possibly. Probably.

IPCC disclosed case fileAfter my unlawful arrest in July 2005, I complained to the Independent Police Complaint Commission (IPCC) and then appealed the outcome of the supervised investigation. After deciding not to uphold my appeal, the Independent Police Complaint Commission (IPCC) closed my case file seven years ago. On 2014-06-19, the seventh anniversary of its final correspondence about my appeal, the IPCC was due to delete the electronic content of my case file and destroy its paper content.

When reminding the IPCC of this deadline, I requested to witness the occasion. This was refused:

Unfortunately, it is not possible for you to witness either the destruction of the hard copy file or deletion of the electronic file but we will send you confirmation of their destruction once this has been done.

At a time when the IPCC is trying to regain the trust of the public it is disappointing that such requests cannot be accommodated. However on 2014-06-20, IPCC's Records & Archives Manager confirmed it had all been done:

I am pleased to confirm that the documents held in the electronic file of your case were deleted yesterday morning. I confirm that four paper files were also destroyed at the same time.

I attach a spreadsheet detailing the electronic documents that were deleted. I am unable to list the contents of the paper files as we do not maintain an index of each paper document destroyed, only the fact that the file has been destroyed. Included in the spreadsheet is reference to the destruction of the 4 paper files.

The attached spreadsheet listed the creation date, record number, title and container title (the case reference number) of 32 electronic documents that had just been deleted and the box numbers of the four paper files that had been destroyed.

I found it difficult to verify whether the spreadsheet listed all the documents I knew the IPCC held. Some of the dates did not match that of the documents I had obtained with a subject access request and most of the documents I had did not have titles. I was concerned that the IPCC might still be retaining some documents and requested a review of the deletion process. The IPCC's Records & Archives Manager explained on 2014-06-27:

In 2006 the use of a Electronic Document Records Management System (EDRMS) was in its infancy at the IPCC. At this time the majority of information was filed in paper files. Your case was allocated a case number 2006/007520 and documents for your case, whether in electronic or hard copy format, were filed against this number. The whereabouts of paper files were also recorded onto the EDRMS.

Electronic documents were either scanned or saved directly to the case file and dated with the date that they were added to the system, not the date of the document. As an example of this, the document cited in your email "Final Report Minute - Supervised Investigation' from the Casework Manager to the Commissioner dated 23/11/2006," is shown on line 18 in the spreadsheet as FR minute and dated 4 December 2006.

There were four paper files allocated to your case file number, these were files of some substance I am unable to say what documents were contained in the files as they have now been destroyed.

Following receipt of your email, I have carried out a search on the EDRMS which reveals that there are no electronic or paper files still in existence for this case.

Although all documentation is filed to the appropriate case file, in order to allay your concern that some documents have been inadvertently retained, I have spoken to the casework manager who had conduct of your case and to the commission secretariat to ensure that they have no documents relating to your case in their possession. In both cases they confirmed that they do not have any documents.

I am therefore able to confirm that all documents relating to your case have been destroyed in accordance with our retention policy.

Even after this apparently thorough review, I had some remaining concerns as to whether the searches may have missed documents with the case file reference mistyped or misspellings of my name (such typos were present in some of the documents). This had been considered:

I did carry out some searches using variances of both your name and the case number. These were done both on my initial search and the further search carried out last week.

It would have been easier to allow me to witness the deletions and destructions as initially requested.

The Metropolitan Police Service should delete their litigation and investigation files on 2015-09-02, six years after their last correspondence: their apology.

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Tue, 24 Jun 2014

Further supplementary evidence to the Home Affairs Committee (Taser use forms)

I have two ongoing complaints with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) about how the South London and Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) are both responding to some of my Freedom of Information requests. There's little visibility as to when further disclosures, prompted by the ICO's caseworkers, are made by SLaM and the MPS. Soon after SLaM sent me an over-redacted 105-page report into incidents at the River House mental health secure unit, I received four Taser use forms from the Metropolitan Police Service. (Both complaints are ongoing as the SLaM report is clearly over-redacted and the MPS have not yet addressed the non-location of its incident management log.)

These new disclosures are directly related to the second section (paragraphs 15 to 23) of my Evidence to the Home Affairs Committee's inquiry into policing and mental health submitted last month and are relevant to this inquiry. I sent to the Home Affairs Committee a supplementary evidence about SLaM's disclosure of its 105-page report earlier this month, and copied below is a further supplementary evidence (also published on the Parliament's website as PMH0044) about the MPS eventual disclosure of the four Taser use forms:

  1. This second supplementary submission provides further information about the use of Tasers by and tactics of the the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) when they were deployed on the night of 2012-10-01 at the River House mental secure unit, part of the Bethlem Royal Hospital run by the South London and Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust.
  2. As mentioned in paragraphs 17 of my evidence1 I have an ongoing complaint with the Information Commissioner’s Office about the cover up of the MPS concerning incidents at the River House mental secure unit. As part of their response to this complaint, the MPS have disclosed four Taser use forms2. The further information contained in these forms should be directly relevant to this inquiry.
  3. The forms confirm that four Tasers were ‘Drawn’ and reveal that 12 ‘TASER officers [were] present’.
  4. The text of the four forms is very close but with some differences. So much wording is identical that it is obvious the four officers conferred before filling in these forms, which may well be the standard procedure. However, some differences are significant.
  5. It appears that part of the intelligence that informed police decisions was faulty. One form’s ‘Information/Intelligence’ box includes: ‘Reports were also received that someone had been stabbed to death within the unit and that a further person had also been stabbed.’ while the three others state: ‘Reports were also received that someone had been stabbed within the unit’. Nowhere in the fully unredacted summary report3 is there any mention of a stabbing and the extensively redacted full report4 only includes one mention on p. 25: ‘One report by xxxx refers to “support to stabbing incident”. This is probably based on one of several hoax calls made by xxxxxxx.’ The police based its decision on how to intervene in a mental health ward in part on intelligence which was a hoax (not even considered worthy of mention in the summary independent investigation report), with one officer believing there had been two stabbings resulting in one death and three other officers believing there had been one stabbing and no consequent death, when there had been no stabbing at all.
  6. While the tactical options considered included ‘Negotiators’, ‘Prison training tactics’, ‘Taser’ and ‘Entry to save life and limb’, the one adopted was ‘Officers used prison training tactics and cleared the unit with the use of taser. Each of the bedrooms/rooms were cleared and all patients were eventually contained in the lounge area. The staff were removed from the secure room they were in and the aggressive ring leaders [also described as ‘main trouble makers’ in other forms] were removed from the group of patients into a separate secure location.’ The forms do not mention any consideration to the potential additional trauma to the vulnerable patients treated on this mental health ward when faced with ‘prison training tactics’ imposed by TSG officers, twelve of them equipped with Tasers and four of them having their Tasers drawn.
  7. At a meeting of Lambeth's Health and Adult Services Scrutiny Sub-Committee5, representatives from SLaM stated ‘The police had been called for support but the incident had been managed well by staff at SLaM and the police did not get involved in the incident’. The investigation report already contradicted this statement, but now we learn that SLaM was attempting to cover up ‘prison training tactics’ used by the police.
  8. In light of these Taser forms, it would be useful for this inquiry to look into what intelligence the police use when deployed to mental health settings, how they check this intelligence with medical staff, the suitability of the tactics considered and used, and whether there should be support for patients following a police deployment.
  9. Further to the recommendation in paragraph 22 of my original evidence to publicly publish a minimum amount of information to ensure some transparency about police deployment to mental health units, police forces should publish monthly figures of the use of Tasers (and other weapons) that also include:
    • (a) how many weapons were brought to mental health settings,
    • (b) how many and which type of weapons were used (and as already suggested, which type of use) in mental health settings, and specifically on mental health wards,
    • (c) overall number, age, ethnicity and whether patient/staff/other of those police tactics are used against.

[1] PMH0021 David Mery - written evidence (PDF): http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/policing-and-mental-health/written/9174.pdf

[2] MPS disclosure of the four Taser use forms: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/river_house_2012_10_01_critical#incoming-530359
Direct links to the four forms: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/193137/response/530359/attach/3/Redacted%20Taser%20Use%20MPS%2002.10.12%20287.12.doc.tif.pdf, https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/193137/response/530359/attach/4/Redacted%20Taser%20Use%20MPS%2002.10.12%20291.12.doc.tif.pdf, https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/193137/response/530359/attach/5/Redacted%20Taser%20Use%20MPS%2002.10.12%20292.12.doc.tif.pdf and https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/193137/response/530359/attach/6/Redacted%20Taser%20Use%20MPS%2002.10.12%20294.12.doc.tif.pdf

[3] An independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding two separate but related incidents involving Norbury patients on Spring Ward on the night of 1st October 2012 (Final Report - Summary): https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/164330/response/496004/attach/3/RH%20Report%20Oct12%20unredacted.pdf

[4] An independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding two separate but related incidents involving Norbury patients on Spring Ward on the night of 1st October 2012 (Final Report): http://www.slam.nhs.uk/media/255726/slam_rh_incident_underlying_detail_redacted_140528.pdf

[5] Minutes of meeting of Lambeth's Health and Adult Services Scrutiny Sub-Committee (Item 5), 2012-10-23: http://moderngov.lambeth.gov.uk/mgAi.aspx?ID=20256

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Tue, 17 Jun 2014

Supplementary evidence to the Home Affairs Committee (incidents at the River House mental health secure unit)

Last month I submitted some Evidence to the Home Affairs Committee's inquiry into policing and mental health. On 2014-05-28, the South London and Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust sent a further response in relation to my complaint to the Information Commissioner's Office and I consequently sent the supplementary evidence, copied below, to the Home Affairs Committee (also published on the Parliament's website as PMH0043):

As mentioned in paragraphs 17 of my evidence[1] I have an ongoing complaint with the Information Commissioner’s Office about the cover up of the South London and Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust concerning incidents at the River House mental secure unit. There has been some progress in this regard which should be of interest to the Home Affairs Committee.

As a response to this ongoing complaint, SLaM has now published a heavily redacted version of its full 105-page report (pdf) into these incidents. [In case this redacted report is updated or removed, a copy, as originally published, is available here (pdf).]

This report is distressing as it is still heavily redacted with snippets of great concern appearing without the original context. I have asked the Information Commissioner’s Office to check the redactions are valid as even without having access to the full document, many redactions are clearly excessive and not justified by the claimed exemptions (these exemptions can be read in SLaM's letter (pdf). [This letter is part of this Freedom of Information request.])

For instance, on p. 19 one interviewed staff is of the opinion that these incidents could have been avoided and that none of the 48 police officers that attended River House that night should have been deployed: ‘[…] it was possible to foresee what would happen, once a decision was taken to [redacted]. In the opinion of [redacted], the situation could have been pre-empted and the police should not have been called.’

However, only a few pages later on p. 23 there are both mentions of the seriousness of how the incident developed and the confusion between staff and the Trust about it: ‘Comment: several staff referred to incident 1 as a hostage situation, whereas according to the Trust Policy (Major Incident Protocol), it is defined as a riot.'

A clear example of the further poor attempt at a cover-up can be seen on p. 31. Most of the paragraphs describing the details of 'Incident 2' are redacted, however we already know from the 12-page summary report (link in footnote 11 in my evidence), and the repeated paragraph in the executive summary (p. 3), that 'In the second incident which occurred at approximately 0250, one patient challenged staff with regard to decisions which had been taken about the management of the four patients involved in the first incident. He accused them of discrimination, believing that there had been a racist motive and that staff had assisted the police to pursue this line of action. He threatened to kill staff and one of the white perpetrators, who he declared had been treated differently to the black perpetrators. This resulted in nursing staff losing control of the ward for a second time when they retreated to the nursing station.’ These allegations of discrimination must not be redacted.

Given that this report is from the largest mental health provider in the country, where two people from the UK’s African Caribbean communities have lost their lives while in the care of this provider at the hands of the Metropolitan Police services, it is particularly important that every member of the committee should be able to read a fully unredacted copy of this report. Considering the serious public safety implications, as well as public confidence concerns in policing and mental health, exemplified by such incidents, it would be helpful for this inquiry to get a full insight into both policing practice on the ground and patient experience at this mental health provider.


[1] PMH0021 David Mery - written evidence (PDF) [also on this blog at Evidence to the Home Affairs Committee's inquiry into policing and mental health]

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Wed, 14 May 2014

Evidence to the Home Affairs Committee's inquiry into policing and mental health

The Home Affairs Committee, whose remit 'is to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Home Office and its associated public bodies' is running an inquiry into policing and mental health. The deadline for written evidence was a week ago and 34 submissions have been published online on the Parliament's website. The evidence I submitted (PMH0021) is also copied below:

  1. This submission consists of three unrelated sections:
    • The first part is about my experience as someone with Asperger’s syndrome of a police encounter at Southwark tube station on 2005-07-28 that resulted in an unlawful arrest.
    • The second one is about two critical incidents that occurred at the River House facility operated by the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust on 2012-10-01. I eventually exposed that 48 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) officers were deployed and four Tasers drawn.
    • The third one is about the use of Mental Health Act (MHA) 1983 s136 in London and is the result of a research I did last year.
  1. I submit this written evidence as an individual having lived in London for over twenty years.[1]

A) Autistic behaviour considered suspicious and subsequent unlawful arrest

  1. On 2005-07-28 at 19:21, when trying to take the tube at Southwark tube station, Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) officers found my behaviour suspicious, stopped and searched me under s44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and eventually arrested me for the offence of public nuisance.[2]
  2. In May 2013 I was diagnosed as being on the autistic spectrum - of the Asperger’s type, by a clinical neuropsychologist at Homerton Hospital.
  3. The reasons given by the police officers for finding my behaviour suspicious were that:
    • I went into the station without looking at the police officers at the entrance or by the gates, i.e., I was ‘avoiding them’ as I ‘appeared to be shielding [my]self from view’
    • two other men entered the station at about the same time as me
    • I was wearing a jacket ‘too warm for the season’
    • I was carrying a bulky rucksack
    • I kept my rucksack with me at all times
    • I looked at people coming on the platform
    • I played with my mobile phone and then took a paper from inside my jacket.
  1. As can be seen from this list it is clear that my failure to interpret social cues appropriately, including avoiding eye contact with the police, which is typical autistic behaviour, triggered the stop and search and the wrongful arrest.
  2. While on the platform there were reminders to ‘keep your bags with you at all times’ and of course I interpreted these literally keeping my rucksack on my back at all times.
  3. I am hypersensitive to sound and I was made to wait for a while at the entrance of the station, before being led to the police van, while some station’s alarms were ringing. As my hands were handcuffed I could not block my ears.
  4. At the station entrance an officer removed the handcuffs and started giving me back what they had taken from my pockets. However, confusingly another officer said that was not the proper procedure and I was re-handcuffed and was told a senior officer would come to apologise and I should wait in the police van. First time the door re-opened when I was in the back of the van was not to apologise as I had just been told but instead to tell me I was arrested.
  5. As I was innocent and did not know any better at the time, I made the mistake to refuse to call a solicitor. During the police interview, one question particularly bothered me. The interviewing officer after asking me questions about my laptop such as ‘has it got anything on there about public underground?’ and ‘has it got anything on there about plans for any terrorism act?’, asked ‘has it got anything on there that might be construed as causing a public nuisance?’[3]. The correct answer would have been ‘yes’ as I have a word processor, an email client, etc that could all be useful to a terrorist and most likely can be construed to be of use for anything including causing a public nuisance. However, I also realised that answering the positive would not be helpful to me and challenged the question when the investigating officer just wanted answers.
  6. After four years of fighting, including an IPCC supervised investigation, an appeal and threats of civil actions, the MPS Borough Commander for Southwark ‘apologise[d] on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service for the circumstances that arose on 28 July 2005 including your unlawful arrest, detention and search of your home’[4].
  7. An essential recommendation would be for all front-line police officers to receive some training about the autism spectrum. This training ideally would involve those on the autism spectrum. I understand that a few police officers have had sessions with the Asperger London Area Group (ALAG)[5]. This training should be made more generally available.
  8. At the very least, front-line officers should read the ACPO-endorsed Autism: a guide for criminal justice professionals publication of the National Autistic Society[6].
  9. With such training it is hoped that police officers realise that a behaviour different from that of a neurotypical is just different rather than suspicious; consider hyper- and hypo-sensitivities that the public they interact with may have; and use clearer interviewing questions.

B) The River House incidents and its cover-up by the NHS and the MPS

  1. Two inter-related incidents involving service users happened on the night of 2012-10-01 at the River House mental secure unit, part of the Bethlem Royal Hospital run by the South London and Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust. Police were called to both incidents. These incidents happened two years after Olaseni Lewis died after being restrained by up to 11 policemen at the Bethlem Royal Hospital and only two months to the day after the Sean Rigg inquest verdict, in which SLaM’s failings were criticised to have ‘more than minimally contributed to the Sean Rigg’s death’[7].
  2. The extent of police involvement was covered up by SLaM and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). SLaM delayed publication of its investigation report and initially published a heavily redacted version before I forced it, with the assistance of the Information Commissioner’s Office, to publish the redactions as well. The MPS also delayed their response to my Freedom of Information requests and still claim that the ‘Incident Management Log [their final report] cannot be located’[8], i.e., was lost.
  3. Data obtained from a campaign of Freedom of Information requests to SLaM, the MPS, the Independent Police Complaint Commission (IPCC), the Care Quality Commission (CQC) and Monitor, as well as from ongoing complaints to the Information Commissioner’s Office about breaches of the Freedom of Information Act in SLaM’s and the MPS’s responses, and from letters sent by the MPS to Baroness Jenny Jones has revealed the extent of this cover up[9]: 48 police officers were deployed including six officers from armed response units, two from dog units, 21 PC from the Territorial Support Group (TSG)[10] and the entire Bromley Borough night response team[11]. TSG officers entered the mental health ward and four drew their Tasers[12].
  4. It is unclear whether anyone was physically hurt in these incidents. SLaM stated on 2012-11-08 in its first response to my Freedom of Information requests that luckily this time ‘there were no injuries to patients or staff in this incident’[13]. It reiterated this position to its board of directors: ‘there were no reports of any injuries to staff or patients.’[14] However the investigation report states: ‘One patient sustained injury to his hand during the second incident. No physical injuries were sustained by staff.’[15] In any case, having TSG officers drawing their Tasers in a mental health ward can exacerbate or cause mental trauma to vulnerable individuals already suffering from mental health issues.
  5. To reassure Londoners that policing of vulnerable individuals with mental health issues is improving, the Metropolitan Police Service and the NHS Foundation Trusts will have to improve on their transparency as well as their performance.
  6. Commander Christine Jones, lead on mental health for both the Metropolitan Police Service and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) is reassuring when saying at the London Assembly’s Police and Crime Committee on 2013-11-21 ‘I have stopped police responding to mental health institutions for the purposes of restraint unless there are very, very good reasons why. […] We have an escalation process in place at the moment for the Metropolitan Police Service which basically means that if a mental health institution calls on police, it goes into my mental health team to assess the circumstances before we respond. It is as simple as that. We have that level of commitment that we are all on call virtually 24 hours a day to make sure that if we have to respond we have the right people doing it and for the right reason.’[16] However this message has not managed to get through the organisation to the MPS press office which still stated on 2014-01-28 ‘The MPS does not have a specific policy in relation to the deployment of firearms officers to mental health units.’[17] Again, we have confusion.[18]
  7. A policy about all deployment of police to mental health units, preferably based on the words of Commander Christine Jones, should be published.
  8. When a deployment of police officers to a mental health unit does happen, some information should be published soon after the incident such as:
    • (a) how many officers from which unit were deployed,
    • (b) how many officers from which units entered mental health wards,
    • (c) details of any restraints of patients by police officers,
    • (d) details of any use of weapons by police officers; in particular if Tasers are used, details of the type of use (fired, angled drive stun, drive stun, red dot, arcing, aimed and/or drawn[19]) should be included,
    • (e) details of injuries caused to patients, staff or any other person.
  1. Any investigation report into incidents that required police intervention should also be published in full in a timely manner.

C) The use of section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 in London

  1. Attempting to find out how Mental Health Act (MHA) 1983 s136 is used in London has proved very difficult as there was ‘no central recording system in place that recorded the number of individuals detained under s136 of the Mental Health Act (MHA) by MPS officers for the period [I requested of] January 2012 to December 2012.’ and ‘Form 434’s would need to be searched for and the relevant information retrieved from each of the 32 London boroughs.’[20] (which is not possible to ask in a Freedom of Information request).
  2. The difficulty of obtaining any data on s136 in London is surprising when one finds out that the situation in London is better than in the rest of the country as the MPS has been very good in avoiding to bring individuals detained under s136 to custody suites. Only 59 persons were detained in police custody in the calendar year 2012 whose ‘Arrest Offence [in NSPIS] was set to equal “Mental Health Act” or “S.136 Mental Health Act”’[21] (when the number of s136 detentions for that year was approximately 2,665[22]).
  3. It is however interesting to note that not all boroughs are equally represented: Southwark (12), Lambeth (10), Croydon (7), Newham (5), and Lewisham (4) and Westminster Central (4) top the list of boroughs that use custody suites occasionally to detain individuals under s136.[23] With the exception of Newham, the boroughs were the SLaM NHS Foundation Trust operates are the ones with the highest number of individuals detained under s136 that were brought to a police custody suite and not into the NHS, in 2012.
  4. The operation of Section 136 in London[24] suggests that the situation has improved in Newham: ‘If a Section 136 patient arrives at one of these place of safety on an occasion when it is already occupied by a previous patient then arrangements are made to transfer one of the patient’s to a ward. Whilst this is not practical in every case, the evidence clearly shows that performance in 5 out of 6 [including Newham] of these places of safety is considerably better than average.’ I have been in touch with SLaM but have not managed to get any information to explain why numbers were higher in SLaM’s boroughs and/or any remedial step taken.
  5. Some limited information is available from many sources[25]. Hopefully this frustrating situation has recently improved as Commander Christine Jones expressed at the London Assembly’s Police and Crime Committee on 2013-11-21 that ‘I absolutely reflect that unhappiness. When you have disparate systems, disparate information technology (IT) and technology that does not talk to itself, you are immediately into a difficult arena. Until I took over the lead for mental health back in September last year, we had no way of knowing by pressing a button how many people across London we had encountered with vulnerability leading to mental health issues. We had no way of looking up how many Section 136 interventions we had or Section 135. We changed that in January this year and in April that rolled out across the Metropolitan Police Service, so we now use the Merlin system to highlight vulnerable adults coming to notice. [...] Good metrics now under Section 136. We have good metrics now.’[26]
  6. It would be useful for more statistics to be published on a regular basis. As an example, for London the following data would be helpful:
    • (a) the number of individuals detained under s136 of the Mental Health Act (MHA) 1983 by MPS officers,
    • (b) the list of NHS s136 suites, per borough and the breakdown, per s136 suite, of the number of days the s136 has been opened that month,
    • (c) the breakdown by type of the initial place of safety those individuals in (a) where brought to (i.e., s136 suite, emergency department, custody suite, or other),
    • (d) the breakdown by type of vehicle (per s136 suite, A&E department and custody suites) those individuals in (a) were conveyed to a place of safety,
    • (e) the breakdown by gender (per s136 suite, A&E department and custody suites) of those individuals in (a),
    • (f) the breakdown by age range (per s136 suite, A&E department and custody suites) of those individuals in (a),
    • (g) the breakdown by ethnicity (per s136 suite, A&E department and custody suites) of those individuals in (a),
    • (h) the breakdown of whether those individuals in (a) were considered to be suffering from the effects of drink or drugs (per s136 suite, A&E department and custody suites).
    • (i) the breakdown of whether of those individuals in (a) were restrained (per s136 suite, A&E department and custody suites),
    • (j) the number of individuals detained under s136 of the MHA and admitted to hospital in each borough, following an MHA assessment.

[1] CV: http://gizmonaut.net/cv/

[2] The detailed description of my arrest and subsequent fight to get off the National DNA Database and other police databases, and receive an apology is at http://gizmonaut.net/bits/suspect.html

[3] Police interview tape; Walworth Police Station; 2005-07-29 03:12:50-03:56:30

[4] Letter from Chief Superintendent Wayne Chance, Metropolitan Police Service Borough Commander for Southwark dated 2009-09-02: http://gizmonaut.net/blog/uk/2009/09/mps_apologises.html

[5] Asperger London Area Group (ALAG): http://alag.org.uk [Updated to new name and URL of ALAG]

[6] Autism: a guide for criminal justice professionals: http://www.autism.org.uk/working-with/criminal-justice/autism-a-guide-for-criminal-justice-professionals.aspx

[7] Sean Rigg inquest verdict: http://www.gardencourtchambers.co.uk/imageUpload/File/Inquisition-for-Mr-Rigg.pdf

[8] https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/river_house_2012_10_01_critical#incoming-505753

[9] NHS Trust attempted cover-up over massive police deployment to mental health ward: http://gizmonaut.net/blog/uk/2014/03/SLaM_attempted_cover-up_over_massive_police_deployment.html

[10] https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/river_house_2012_10_01_incident#incoming-465743

[11] An independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding two separate but related incidents involving Norbury patients on Spring Ward on the night of 1st October 2012: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/164330/response/496004/attach/3/RH%20Report%20Oct12%20unredacted.pdf

[12] http://gizmonaut.net/foia/2014-03-20_Jenny-Jones-Armed_police_called_to_mental_health_wards_AC_Rowley_response.pdf

[13] https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/136039/response/329620/attach/2/FOI%20response%20DMery%20121108.pdf

[14] Minutes of the fifty ninth meeting of the board of directors of the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation trust held on 30th october 2012: http://www.slam.nhs.uk/media/177219/novboard_12.pdf

[15] An independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding two separate but related incidents involving Norbury patients on Spring Ward on the night of 1st October 2012: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/164330/response/496004/attach/3/RH%20Report%20Oct12%20unredacted.pdf

[16] Transcript of London Assembly’s Police and Crime Committee on 2013-11-21: https://www.london.gov.uk/moderngov/mgChooseMDocPack.aspx?ID=4993&SID=9700

[17] MPS press lines: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/river_house_2012_10_01_critical#incoming-505753

[18] More on this confusion in Deployments of armed police officers at London’s mental health units: http://gizmonaut.net/blog/uk/2014/04/mps_at_mhus.html

[19] Police use of taser statistics, England and Wales, 2012 to 2013: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-use-of-taser-statistics-england-and-wales-2012-to-2013/police-use-of-taser-statistics-england-and-wales-2012-to-2013

[20] https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_section_136#incoming-368981

[21] https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/161877/response/396631/attach/3/43126%20FOI%20Final%20v2.xls.pdf

[22] https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_section_136#incoming-390373

[23] https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/161877/response/405673/attach/4/43126%20FOI%20Final%20v3.xls

[24] The operation of Section 136 in London, An Action Plan to improve was published in March 2013 by the Mental Health Partnership Board for London. This document does not appear to have been made public; a copy was obtained from David Mellish, Chair of the Mental Health Partnership Board for London.

[25] MPS: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/joint_mental_health_protocols
MPS: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_section_136
MPS: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/dps_in_custody_hac-policing-mh_following_s136
Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136
Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_2
East London NHS Foundation Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_3
South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_4
West London Mental Health NHS Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_5
South West London and St George’s Mental Health NHS Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_6
North East London NHS Foundation Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_7
Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_8
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_9

[26] Transcript of London Assembly’s Police and Crime Committee on 2013-11-21: https://www.london.gov.uk/moderngov/mgChooseMDocPack.aspx?ID=4993&SID=9700

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Mon, 21 Apr 2014

Deployments of armed police officers at London's mental health units

Patients treated in mental health units are vulnerable individuals and deploying police officers to handle them is not the kind of care that patients and their families are expecting. It has on occasions resulted in deaths, often of young black men, such as that of Sean Rigg and Olaseni Lewis. So what is the Metropolitan Police Service's policy for such deployment of their officers?

In their press lines, dated 2014-01-28, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) describe their lack of policy about armed police deployments at mental health units:

Q2: Does the Met have a policy on the deployment of armed police to incidents that take place in mental health units?

= The MPS does not have a specific policy in relation to the deployment of firearms officers to mental health units.

Firearms officers are deployed to incidents where firearms or weapons are involved. Decisions to deploy firearms officers will include consideration around the type of premises and the persons concerned.

(Note that firearms officers include not only those in armed response vehicles but also Territorial Support Group (TSG) officers and the forty or so officers per borough trained in the use of Tasers.)

The investigation report into the incident at mental secure unit River House includes mentions of some patients 'making threats' but does not make any mention of either 'firearms' or 'weapons' having been in the possession of the patients. Forty-eight police officers were deployed, including armed response units, and four Tasers were drawn.

Commander Christine Jones, lead on mental health for both the Metropolitan Police Service and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), expressed a more cautious approach at London Assembly's Police and Crime Committee on 2013-11-21 (pdf) and insisted that all calls for MPS deployment to mental health settings will have to be approved by her team:

Christine Jones (Commander, Metropolitan Police Service): [...] There is also an appetite to take people down to Grays End to show them the Taser training so that we can have the critical third eye from the lens of the community around when it is used and why it is used.

Again, my sense is that on many occasions police have been in that place because there is nothing else and that is the issue we are working through now. Actually, if you need to restrain in a mental health environment, why would that fall to police? If you woke up in hospital after a triple heart bypass and became violent with staff, there is no question that the police would be called. Of course they would not. In a mental health environment, if the right commissioned services do not exist, there has been a reliance on police attending to support staff. I can absolutely understand that, but we need to move on from that and that is the work we are doing. [...]

Christine Jones (Commander, Metropolitan Police Service): [...] I do not think police should be going into mental health institutions to restrain and I have put a stop to it. What I have said is --

Jenny Jones (Deputy Chair): You have stopped the TSG being sent?

Christine Jones (Commander, Metropolitan Police Service): I have stopped police responding to mental health institutions for the purposes of restraint unless there are very, very good reasons why. Claire [Murdoch] and I are busy working through a protocol for London because there are certain areas of London that we get very few calls to and other areas of London that we get lots of calls to. For me, the only time that police should ever go into that health setting, frankly, because you are talking about somebody who is ill, is if there is real danger to life. That is a different issue.

Jenny Jones (Deputy Chair): It is bad for the police as well, of course.

Christine Jones (Commander, Metropolitan Police Service): Of course it is bad for the police, but imagine what it is like for the person. I cannot think of anything more terrifying. We have an escalation process in place at the moment for the Metropolitan Police Service which basically means that if a mental health institution calls on police, it goes into my mental health team to assess the circumstances before we respond. It is as simple as that. We have that level of commitment that we are all on call virtually 24 hours a day to make sure that if we have to respond we have the right people doing it and for the right reason.

Jenny Jones (Deputy Chair): Do you know if this has actually reduced the number of times the police are going to --

Christine Jones (Commander, Metropolitan Police Service): Hugely. Absolutely massively.

The press lines detail some new training for firearm officers and front line officers hopefully resulting in respectful encounters with vulnerable individuals and fewer uses of Tasers:

Q3. Do you recognise the concerns from campaigners about the use of armed police in mental health incidents?

= The MPS takes onboard concerns raised around the use of armed officers to mental health incidents and always places the safety of the public paramount.

Met firearms officers attend special training days where they work with mental health workers and patients to assist them in understanding and responding to people who suffer from mental health issues. We have introduced information sharing protocols to obtain fast time intelligence about any person who may be considered EMD (Emotionally or Mentally Distressed) or suffering behavioural disorders. Training around mental health issues is also included as part of officers on going training as well as forming part of the NPFTC (National Police Firearms Training Curriculum) instruction courses for firearms officers.

In September 2012, the Commissioner requested an independent commission to look at the MPS response to mental health. It was also asked to examine the interface between the MPS, mental health services and other partners.

Since the report by Lord Adebowale was published in May 2013, the MPS has fundamentally looked again at how we work as an organisation, and with partner agencies, to improve services, share information and better understand the needs of people with mental ill health with the aim of delivering a service that can be best adapted to fit individual needs.

The 28 Recommendations within the Independent Commission report on Mental Health and Policing (2013) are being progressed and embedded in the direction of travel for policing, both locally and nationally.

We continue to work locally across London and nationally with partners across the health spectrum and we have also contributed to the forthcoming Department of Health Crisis Care Concordat [(pdf)]. This is where a number of national organisations have committed to work together to support local systems to achieve systematic and continuous improvements for crisis care for people with Mental Health issues.

The MPS are also in the process of rolling out the Community Risk MARAC group (Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conference) and a pilot is currently underway in all NW London Boroughs. This is a local partnership forum, where high risk and developing cases can be discussed and problem solved.

The MPS are also in the process of training all front line officers in the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF). The VAF is a simple investigative approach to assessing vulnerability, in all interactions the police have with the public.

The MPS is committed to delivering a quality of service and care for all those who come into contact with the MPS - especially those who are at their most vulnerable through mental ill health or crisis.

The training of front line officers should have been completed by now and other police staff will be trained by the end of the year:

Christine Jones (Commander, Metropolitan Police Service): Our training plan starts in January for all frontline officers and goes through to March [2014]. For the frontline uniformed response, so emergency response officers, all of those who work at borough level, they will receive vulnerability assessment training, as will our core staff. By the end of the year, every single member of the Metropolitan Police Service will have received that training, so that is how we will embed it at every stage. Regardless of what department you work in or at what point you engage with a member of the public, everybody was applied the same approach, so that is point number one. [...]

Absolutely, and that is the point, I do not think we have invested enough in teaching our officers to understand vulnerability. What we have said is, “You need to be trained in this, you need to be trained in this, you need to understand this risk assessment, you need to know ...” No, actually, our officers need to know this, that is the primary issue for us, we need to understand the legal framework in which we operate and then the issue is how we understand the vulnerabilities and diverse needs of our communities and that is my issue. I do not think we have trained our officers effectively in recognising vulnerability. We have done lots and lots around race, we have done lots and lots around professionalising investigation, but actually the human piece around this is how we deal with people on a daily basis, how we recognise their different needs by understanding where they may be vulnerable, and to be perfectly honest the feedback that we have had from the communities in London around satisfaction has regularly told us, “The officer failed to recognise my vulnerability”. We have the evidence there; we are now using it to fundamentally change that frontline training and, as I say, every single officer in London will have had that training by the end of next year and every single encounter we have with a member of the public they must apply that framework.

If you have an interest in policing and mental health it is well worth reading the transcript of this Police and Crime Committee session (pdf) in its entirety. One learns that some improvements have already been implemented. Last year I made a series of Freedom of Information requests to the MPS and London's NHS Trusts to get some data on the use of section 136 of the Mental Health Act and was frustrated by the police keeping their data in paper form at borough level:

Christine Jones (Commander, Metropolitan Police Service): I absolutely reflect that unhappiness. When you have disparate systems, disparate information technology (IT) and technology that does not talk to itself, you are immediately into a difficult arena. Until I took over the lead for mental health back in September last year, we had no way of knowing by pressing a button how many people across London we had encountered with vulnerability leading to mental health issues. We had no way of looking up how many Section 136 interventions we had or Section 135.

We changed that in January this year and in April that rolled out across the Metropolitan Police Service, so we now use the Merlin system to highlight vulnerable adults coming to notice.

[...] Good metrics now under Section 136. We have good metrics now.

Some changes have happened while others are going through the organisation. At the Police and Crime Committee, Commander Christine Jones said she 'took over the lead for mental health back in September last year', i.e., September 2012, a month at most before the deployment of 48 police officers at River House. Police involvement at this incident was covered up by the South London and Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust and the Metropolitan Police Service. I have two complaints currently with the Information Commissioner's Office, one for each of these organisations about how they are still attempting to avoid publication of information related to this incident. To reassure Londoners that policing of vulnerable individuals with mental health issues is improving, the Metropolitan Police Service will have to improve on their transparency as well as their performance.

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Sat, 29 Mar 2014

More police officers use more Tasers more often

Home Office statistics show that the use of Tasers keeps increasing, by 27% in 2013 compared to 2012. Police officers in England and Wales equipped with Tasers used them 10,380 times in 2013. More police officers are responsible for this increase. The article Tasers: the 'non-lethal' weapon reckoned to have caused more than 500 deaths, published in November 2013 on The Justice Gap, explains that, '[i]nitially only Authorised Firearm Officers (AFO) were equipped with Tasers, however 'Currently there are 14,700 officer trained to use Tasers [but the] number of AFOs is 6,979.' The Justice Gap has also published a video of a Taser refresher course with the London Metropolitan Police in 'Shocking Britain': the controversial roll-out of the Taser.

The timeline for rollout in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) is described in a letter to the London Assembly's Chair of the Police and Crime Committee:

The initial trial of Taser concluded on the 31st March 2004.  In July 2007 the Home Secretary approved a year long trial of 10 forces to extend the use to "specially trained units" (STUs). The MPS was one of these forces. Its use was initially restricted to SCO20 (TSG) officers. In February 2012 Management Board supported the extension of Taser to other STUs including those on Boroughs.

In October 2012, when 48 police officers were deployed to River House, an NHS mental health unit (NHS Trust attempted cover-up over massive police deployment to mental health ward), this extension to borough officers hadn't been completed. And the police wanted Tasers to 'managed the situation' involving mental health patients. AC Mark Rowley wrote 'Armed response vehicles responded to this incident as they were the nearest available unit with a Taser capability. You will recall that at this time, only firearms officers and TSG were the only units equipped with Taser.' The MPS confirms that the roll-out of Tasers to trained Territorial Police officers has been completed:

All 32 London boroughs now have a group of officers on their borough who are trained in the use of Taser.

[...] Around forty officers from each borough have been trained in the use of Taser. The initial training is now complete. Taser trained officers are deployed in pairs in two cars on each borough, that's a maximum of 4 officers per 8 hour shift over a 24 hour period.

Even more officers may eventually get a Taser as '[i]n November 2011, Commissioner Hogan-Howe said that all officers should have easy availability of Taser.' (interview with LBC radio as reported in Governance of Taser and other less-lethal weaponry). And as a report published earlier this week by the Independent Police Complaint Commission shows, some of these officers make mistakes with terrible consequences such as firing a Taser on a 63-year old blind man with a white stick when looking for someone in his mid-twenties with a sword.

How Tasers are used is recorded:

Level of use Type of use % uses in 2013 (*) Definition
Highest use Fired 17% The taser is fired with a live cartridge installed. When the trigger is pulled, the probes are fired towards the subject with the intention of completing an electrical circuit and delivering an incapacitating effect.
  Angled Drive Stun
The officer fires the weapon with a live cartridge installed. One or both probes may attach to the subject The officer then holds the taser against the subject's body in a different area to the probe(s), in order to complete the electrical circuit and deliver an incapacitating effect.
  Drive stun 3% The taser is held against the subject's body and the trigger is pulled with no probes being fired. Contact with the subject completes the electrical circuit which causes pain but does not deliver an incapacitating effect.
Non-discharges Red dot 51% The weapon is not fired. Instead, the taser is deliberately aimed and then partially activated so that a laser red dot is placed onto the subject.
  Arcing 1% Sparking of the taser without aiming it or firing it.
  Aimed 5% Deliberate aiming of the taser at a targeted subject.
Lowest use Drawn 22% Drawing of taser in circumstances where any person could reasonably perceive the action to be a use of force.

(*) Percentage for England and Wales that 'excludes Humberside and West Midlands who are unable to provide a full breakdown of taser use'. (Source)

Even though information about Taser use is held, it does not follow that police forces are forthcoming about how Tasers were used at specific incidents. In my Freedom of Information requests to the MPS about the River House incident, no such data was provided. This is subject to an internal review.

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