When I sent in a freedom of information request, in October 2012, asking for the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust investigation report into an incident involving a massive police deployment that happened earlier that month at one of the Trust's mental health ward, I expected to receive the report within a few months. It took close to two and half years and involved sending a dozen of freedom of information requests to the Trust, the Metropolitan Police, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, Monitor and the Care Quality Commission as well as requesting many internal reviews and making several complaints to the Information Commissioner’s Office who issued two related decision notices.
Here’s a brief chronology of the reports I received from the Trust (the Metropolitan Police after many searches cannot find its own report):
The full report lists what the Trust and the Metropolitan Police have been covering up during all this time. My investigation has been written up in the Saturday 9 May editions of The Independent (pdf and below) and i (pdf). Note that, at the time of writing, the online version of The Independent's article is abruptly cut in the middle of the article (surprisingly where the text finishes on the first page of the article in the print edition, as if the online version was created from the printed paper).
By Paul Gallagher, The Independent, Saturday 9 May 2015
A mental health trust and the Metropolitan Police have been accused of trying to cover up alleged racism towards patients during an extraordinary night when 48 officers – some in riot gear – were deployed to deal with disturbances in a ward of vulnerable adults.
Campaigners have spent three years trying to uncover what happened at the River House facility at Bethlem Royal Hospital, part of the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust, on 1 October 2012.
Several days of disturbances escalated into a riot, the ringleaders of which were four patients, three black and one white. They had placed staff under siege which required police intervention before control could be regained.
The Met sent in 48 officers, including armed and dog units. More than 20 officers entered the ward including several Tactical Support Group (TSG) officers in “strict, compact riot formation” armed with Tasers, shields, visors and batons.
An independent report into the disturbances commissioned by the trust said: “According to staff statements, the police, after entering the unit, ignored the request of staff to treat Patient C (a white patient) the same way as they had treated the three black patients.
“Staff state that the police made no attempt to coordinate their actions with [hospital] staff as is standard practice during a siege, to gain information and to help them plan their strategy in order to minimise disruption to the unit.”
Police, assisted by hospital staff, escorted the three black patients (Patients A, B and D) to solitary confinement, handcuffing two of them. Officers also placed a clear plastic cover over Patient B’s head preventing him from moving his head and shoulders. “He was initially ignored by police until several promptings by staff,” the trust report said.
Patient C, the only white patient of the four, was not handcuffed and allowed to stay in the television lounge despite staff insisting to police he was also “a significant player in the disturbance” and that being left on the ward could lead to another disturbance – which it did.
Immediately after police left, around 3am, another patient, E, demanded an explanation as to why Patient C had remained on the ward. The report said: “Patient E believed that there was a racial motive which led to staff assisting the police to place three black patients in supervised confinement, while a white patient was treated more favourably.”
Despite explanations, Patient E became increasingly agitated and hostile and threatened to kill staff and patient C. “This led to a second siege when staff lost control of the ward for a second time. Police assistance was required again before staff could regain control of the clinical area,” said the report.
Eleven officers returned and “dealt with the situation promptly”. By 5am full control was restored.
A 111-page report was completed in May 2013 and a summary published that August. An “unreadable” version was only made public in May 2014 following Freedom of Information requests made by David Mery on behalf of the charity Black Mental Health UK. Almost all the allegations of racism and the patients’ ethnicity had been censored.
Mr Mery appealed and the trust was forced to publish the report again earlier this year detailing the accusations of racism as well as Scotland Yard’s refusal to engage with hospital staff. Around 30 pages remain completely redacted.
A paragraph initially redacted said: “It took eight weeks to secure material from the Metropolitan Police. Requests for further and better particulars have been unsuccessful, despite reminders on matters which were explored at interview with an inspector from Bromley borough police.”
Mental health campaigners say it was only luck that prevented staff or patients being injured that night.
The Met Police had previously been heavily criticised for their actions at the same hospital in September 2010. Then, Olaseni Lewis, a 23-year-old Kingston University postgraduate student, died after being forcibly restrained by up to 11 officers while seeking help as a voluntary patient. Five years on his family are still waiting to hear when an inquest into his death will be held.
Addressing the 2012 incident, Mr Mery told The Independent: “The cover up, with the trust releasing conflicting statements and deliberately attempting to avoid the release of its investigation report (and still refusing to name its authors), and the Metropolitan Police losing its own report, demonstrate that neither organisation is keen to take responsibility for what happen and ensure that it won’t happen again.
“Surprisingly, there doesn’t appear to have been a specific investigation into the racist behaviour described in the report. NHS trusts and police forces should have an obligation to publish reports into serious incidents publicly, promptly and in their entirety. However, the police have lost the incident management log for what they have classified as a critical incident.”
The police have said they were concerned that the staff on the ward that night were unaware of any contingency plan other than to call them on such an occasion. Operation Metallah, a new way of the Met to work with the mental health trust, was launched a few months later.
Mr Mery said: “The tactics that resulted in the deployment at a mental health unit of armed officers, dog units, and TSG officers with Tasers drawn are clearly wrong. Such tactics cause distress to the vulnerable individuals housed there. The apparently racist behaviour of TSG officers involved is unacceptable.
"It is lucky this time no one died or was seriously injured. Olaseni Lewis and Sean Rigg [whose death in police custody in Brixton, south London, in 2008 led to widespread campaigns on how officers treat suspects with mental health issues] were not so lucky.”
A trust spokeswoman said the report had been redacted on legal advice "for reasons of patient and public safety, and patient confidentiality… to maintain security arrangements used in a forensic mental health facility and to protect patient and public safety”.
She said: "The report published on the trust website provides a clear and independent account of what happened on 1 October 2012. The trust's intention was to publish the report in the interests of transparency while using the correct application of the FoI Act to ensure that the identity of patients and their security was not compromised.
"Following the investigation in 2013, the trust has taken action to address all recommendations made in the report to prevent a similar incident recurring.
A Met spokeswoman said: "The location is known to officers as housing high-risk mental health patients. There was a serious threat to staff safety, and some patients, whose medical history was not known to officers, were unsupervised and believed armed with furniture and access to a kitchen area containing knives.”
She said the response was based on "using the widest range of resources available during a highly charged incident by deploying resources appropriate to bring the situation under control, while ensuring the safety of staff and patients. The Metropolitan Police Service has received no complaint in relation to the incident. Should any complaint be received it would be thoroughly investigated."
She added that since the May 2013 publication of Lord Adebowale's report into how the Met responds to mental health incidents: "The MPS has fundamentally looked at how we work as an organisation, and with partner agencies, to improve services, share information and better understand the needs of people with mental ill health.”
The fudge report: Crucial details obscured
[NB xxxx represents details such as names mentioned in the copy but redacted in the ‘Final 10th May 2010 Report’]
‘Staff under siege’
Incident 1: escalated to a riot (as defined by BDP CAG – Major Incident Protocol and Procedures, February 2012), involved xxxxxxxxx who opportunistically placed staff under siege in the nursing station which required police intervention before nursing staff could regain control of the clinical environment. The antecedent to this incident stemmed from one patient, xxxxxxxxx. This incident resulted in damage to property but no physical injury to staff. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. The fourth patient, xxxxxxxxx, was initially left on the ward, despite concerns raised by staff that this could lead to further disturbance.
Incident 2: followed on almost immediately from the first incident, when xxxxxxxxx approached staff demanding an explanation as to why xxxxxxxxx had remained on the ward. Xxxxxxxxx believed that there was a racial motive xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. Notwithstanding explanation from staff, xxxxxxxxx became increasingly agitated and hostile and threatened to kill staff and xxxxxxxxx. This led to a second siege when staff lost control of the ward for a second time. Police assistance was required again before staff could regain control of the 12 Independent Report – Norbury incidents, night of 1st October 2012 clinical area. This incident also resulted in damage to property. Xxxxxxxxx sustained minor injury to his hand. There were no physical injuries to staff.
‘Threatening and abusive’
Xxxxxxxxx had, by this time, calmed down considerably and although remained verbally threatening and abusive, obeyed police instruction, sitting on the floor with his arms above his head allowing the police to handcuff him. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. He was initially ignored by the police until several promptings by staff. He was escorted by xxxxxxxxx on Norbury Ward.
Here are my previous posts about this incident:
Autistic British journalist/author and advocate Lydia Andal has just published an epic interview of Mark Lever, Chief Executive of the National Autistic Society. It is a revealing interview. Mark Lever admits ‘I think we’ve got to get much better at communicating with, engaging with autistic people. And I know that sounds crackers – it’s the National Autistic Society, but I’m just being honest.’ You can start with a guide to the six parts.
The first instalment is about the Ask Autism training programme, created by autistics. In it, Lydia Andal questions Mark Lever about contributors to Ask Autism not having been paid and not having been given access to these modules. To provide a reality check to Mark Lever’s answers, this section includes a case study of my experience of being video recorded for one of the training module:
What Happened Next?
During the Interview: When asked if he will commit to sending the autistic contributors to the Ask Autism programme an access code – Mark says he will.
After the Interview: Mark did not deliver on this commitment.
Instead the NAS subsequently issued the following statement: “Everyone who developed the modules has been offered free access to Ask Autism.” (bold emphasis added).
This statement highlights that in contrast to Mark’s commitment in the interview – access continues to be restricted to the small number of people who actually developed the training materials – a policy which was already in place at the time I met Mark.
As such the rest of the autistic contributors continue to be barred from accessing the online training programme they helped to create.
During the Interview: Mark states several times that he is committed to ‘significantly reducing’ the price of the Ask Autism programme so that those most in need of the training tool – autistic people and their families – are not priced out of accessing it.
After the Interview: The following enquiry was sent “Can Mark confirm the new pricing policy for Ask Autism for members? There was talk of it being free or at a heavily discounted rate during our discussion.”
Five weeks later the NAS provided the following statement:
“Prices for the Ask Autism service can be downloaded from our website here: http://www.autism.org.uk/our-services/training-and-consultancy/ask-autism/online-modules.aspx
Members are able to claim a 20% discount for individual modules. There are on-going discussions about how the modules could be further discounted for members and others where price is a significant barrier to accessing them.”
The 20% member discount was already in place at the time of the interview and remains unchanged. At time of writing (six weeks after the interview) – the pricing policy remains unchanged.
This article will be updated if and when the NAS change their pricing policy – until then it could be considered that Mark has not delivered on his commitment to reduce the pricing of Ask Autism.
During the Interview: Mark states he wasn’t aware that some contributors had not been paid.
After the Interview: The following enquiry was sent “Can Mark confirm how many of the 70 contributors to the Ask Autism training modules have been paid.”
The NAS subsequently confirm the following “28 of the 74 contributors to the Ask Autism training modules were paid. Others contributed via Survey Monkey and so were not paid.”
The above NAS statement seeming to confirm that only those who contributed to Ask Autism via Survey Monkey have not been paid does not seem to be accurate as Ask Autism contributor David Mery explains below.
Ask Autism Contributor Case Study
“In August last year  I was contracted as a ‘consultant’ to be filmed for an Ask Autism training module. As this module has still not yet been published, I will not mention its topic. It is an area where much training is required so I am very keen for this module to be completed and for it to be of a good standard. When I was initially contacted to be asked if I was interested in participating in this module, I was told that the Ask Autism budget was stretched and that the NAS could only pay expenses. I expressed my unhappiness about this, but this was not open for negotiation although it was suggested there may be some money for reviewing the module.
The impression I got was that the Ask Autism staff was not given a budget to pay contributors and did not have the power to get one. The contract I was sent offered only expenses. I did reluctantly accept it as I very much want training on this topic to be widely disseminated, but it was a difficult decision. An hour was scheduled on August 12th to do the filming. Two NAS staff and two videographers were present, probably paid.
After an initial editorial interest in the topic of the module, all the emails I received were about administrative issues. The most time spent was on negotiating usage permissions for the video for which I was asked to give away many rights that had little to do with Ask Autism and its promotion. As I was volunteering my time and expertise, I was not willing for the NAS to make more money outside of the sales of this Ask Autism module without any sharing. I wished the same amount of energy spent by NAS arguing this release form had been spent discussing the editorial content.
When in September I received a reminder to send in my travel expenses – which I had said I would waive as I had travelled to the filming by bus and on the way back by foot – I asked if this was an invitation to re-open the discussion about a fair payment for my time, and was told ‘In regards to payment for your time, unfortunately we are unable to do this as discussed before the interview and noted in your contract.’
I was not given access to any of the existing Ask Autism modules, which would have been useful to ensure consistency of style across the modules; I have been promised access to the module I contributed to when it is published.
In March I was eventually invited to a closed testing of the module and I discovered I was the only interviewee in this module. There were some serious editorial issues on which I provided feedback and I believe these are being worked on before the module is finalised, but communication has been limited. With some other autistics, I was promised in January, independently of my discussions with the Ask Autism team, that all the 70+ contributors to Ask Autism would be given access to all the modules; this has not yet happened and the only module I’ve seen so far was the one I was given five days to review.
I regularly volunteer for several other charitable projects and am very happy to do it for the good of the community. However when income is generated as part of the activity it should be shared fairly. For example, one of the charities I volunteer for also occasionally has paid events; for these the charity pays ‘volunteers’ a very reasonable one-off fee. As the Ask Autism training modules are a commercial offering of the NAS, even for its members, I would have expected some payment.
The NAS has in its vision a world where an autistic ‘lives with dignity and as independently as possible’, along with a mission to ‘involve, inform and empower people living with autism’. For the NAS not to pay fairly all its autistic contributors to reflect their expertise and the work they have done, to help them make a living and have an independent life is hypocritical as it goes against the NAS mission and vision.”
The sixth and last instalment touches upon the NAS position on the proposed autism marker on the Police National Computer:
Mark Lever: ’I know there’s talk about markers on some databases so that they can provide better support to people. […] I imagine [the information is] going to be self-disclosed, it would have to be self-disclosed I would think. I know there is talk in some systems about having autism flags so that they can better support people with autism but that would have to come from self-disclosure I would think.’
I wrote a detailed analysis about this proposed autism marker in the post Police marking of autistics.
It is well worth reading the full interview and what happened after, when Lydia Andal was checking information with the National Autistic Society’ PR team. In one of the changes to a quote by Mark Lever requested by the PR team (in part 5), they asked to remove
‘[W]e’ve never been a bio-med type charity […] people on the spectrum deserve to have all the support they can get to achieve their potential. That’s where we come from and that is no different to anybody else actually that they should have the right to get that support to achieve their potential.’
The South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (SLaM) has attempted to cover up what happened during two related incidents on a mental health ward. On the night of 2012–10–01, at its River House facility, 48 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) officers were deployed, including officers from armed and dog units, and four Territorial Support Group (TSG) officers drew their Tasers on the mental health ward. The police cannot find its own investigation report. SLaM has eventually published a version of its investigation report with many fewer redactions remaining, in response to my multiple freedom of information requests and an eventual decision notice of the Information Commissioner’s Office.
You can now find out much of what they didn’t want you to know.
The mostly underacted 105-page report, released on 2015–02–25 is available here (in case this redacted report is updated or removed, a copy, as originally published, is available here). For comparison, the extensively redacted version, released on 2014–05–28, is available here (and a safe copy of it, here)
p. 29 in the 2014 and 2015 versions of the report.
What follows are excerpts from the SLaM investigation report which were blacked out in the earlier more extensively redacted release.
‘Three patients (patients A, B, and D; all black) out of the four patients involved were placed in SC [Supervised Confinement]. The fourth patient, (patient C; a white patient), was initially left on the ward, despite concerns raised by staff that this could lead to further disturbance.’ p. 11 (first incident)
‘Incident 2: followed on almost immediately from the first incident, when patient E (a black patient) approached staff demanding an explanation as to why patient C had remained on the Ward. Patient E believed that there was a racial motive which led to staff assisting the police to place three black patients in supervised confinement, whilst a white patient was treated more favourably.’ p. 11 (Emphasis added)
’The UC confirmed that patients A, B, C, and D were involved and that prominent amongst these patients was patient C [a white patient].’ p. 24
’Patient B [a black patient], had by this time, calmed down considerably and although remained verbally threatening and abusive, obeyed police instruction, sitting on the floor with his arms above his head allowing the police to handcuff him. The police placed a clear plastic cover over his head to prevent him from moving his shoulders and elbows. He was initially ignored by the police until several promptings by staff. He was escorted by the first on-call CAG [Clinical Academic Group] manager and the police to SC on Norbury Ward.
Patient C [a white patient] was left sitting in the day area, as if he had played no part in the riot, despite all earlier insistence from staff that he had been a significant player in the disturbance. He was not handcuffed, as patients B and D had been and he was not taken off the ward. He was allowed to continue to remain in the TV lounge.
Patient A was considered by staff to be a behind-the-scenes orchestrator and manipulator.
According to staff statements, the police, after entering the unit, ignored the request of staff to treat patient C (a white patient) the same way as they had treated the other three black patients.’ p. 29 (Emphasis added)
‘Just before the police finally retired staff complained again about patient C [a white patient] remaining on Spring Ward. Therefore, a decision was taken to nurse patient C in the ICA on Spring Ward and to offer him prn medication. Two staff were were deployed on 2:1 observations with this patient.’ p. 30
‘These patients asked staff why one of the main activists [sic] (patient C) in the earlier incident, was left on the unit, while three other patients (all black) had been handcuffed and taken off the unit, accusing them of being racist for transferring three black patients into SC and leaving the white patient on the ward. Patient E (a black patient) approached staff around the nursing station demanding an explanation as to why patient C remained on the ward. Notwithstanding explanation from staff, patient E believed there to be a racist motive in the way black patients had been treated, accusing staff of assisting the police.’ p. 31 (Emphasis added)
’At 2347 the incident was considered by xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx to be “otherwise so dangerous” that Trojan (armed police officers), Dog Units and London Ambulance Service (LAS) were requested.’ p.23
’At 0052 there were in excess of 20 police officers on site; some in standard police uniform and others in tactical wear, carrying Tasers, shields and batons.’ p. 24 (Emphasis added)
’On arrival of Trojan [armed police officers] (unspecified in the police log), tactical advice was given, as per standard practice, with regard to use of fire arms. However, Trojan was stood down, as was the Bromley Borough Response team, as TSG [Territorial Support Group] would take the lead in entering Spring Ward.’ p. 27
’TSG entered Spring Ward from the fire road entrance via the airlock leading to the ICA and to the main ward in “strict compact riot formation (regimented crowd control)” armed with shields, visors, batons and Taser guns. Taser guns were not used.
Comment: According to some statements, patients who were already asleep and who were in no way connected to the disturbance were forced to leave their bedrooms by police officers, even though staff kept signalling to the officers that the real culprits were in the corridor and in the TV lounge.’ p. 28 (Emphasis added)
’Comment: Most patients played no part in the riot. Nevertheless they were forced to leave their rooms (with the exception of patient F who was SC) as part of the tactical intervention made by the TSG. Some patients subsequently reported their sense of distress to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx but there is nothing recorded in the notes to this effect, even though there were potential safeguarding issues at stake. Attempts to secure further and better particulars about the methods used by the TSG have been unsuccessful.’ pp. 28–29 (Emphasis added)
‘It took eight weeks to secure material from the Metropolitan Police. Requests for further and better particulars have been unsuccessful, despite several reminders on matters which were explored at interview with an Inspector from Bromley Borough Police.’ p. 15
‘Although, according to some evidence, an agreement had been reached with Bromley Police Station that there would be police presence at the point of patient F’s transfer. When this was requested on 29/09/12, it was not forthcoming.’ p. 15
’At 2317 a third call was made to request ‘riot police support’ - CAD 9864. This was recorded on the police log as three patients had started rioting in the first instance and that all thirteen (patients) had now joined in; that suspects had metal poles and were trying to break the windows where the staff had retreated for security and that if the patients broke the windows, the staff would all be killed because patients had committed murder before.
Comment: This account is inaccurate, either because of what the police were told or because it was misconstrued in the translation. Most of the patients were sleeping or at least in their own bedrooms. There were no metal poles involved, although three patients were continually throwing a large metal bin with force at the window of the nursing station.’ p. 22 (Emphasis added.)
‘When the police declared incident 1 to be a Critical Incident’ p. 80
’A decision was taken to prepare oral prn midazolam 10mg as well as to draw up 7.5mg of midazolam for intramuscular injection. This was because the team determined there be to be a likelihood of patient D refusing oral medication. This was based on previous knowledge of him.
Comment: Preparing intramuscular medication at the same time as oral medication falls outside the ideal standard of practice. Whilst the Trust policy does not give guidance on this matter, NMC guidance (Standard 14: Standards for medicines management (NMC 2007)) is clear. However, under the circumstances and on balance, the Independent Team acknowledge that the specific situation required a degree of flexibility and staff initiative. The Independent Team accept that in some circumstances both oral and injectable medicines can be prepared simultaneously but that the injectable form of the medicine should then be stored in a readily accessible place and not handled in front of the patient at the same time that the oral medication is handled.’ p. 17 (Emphasis added)
’patient B smashed the oral medication out of the hand of the UC, spilling all the medication and water on the floor, along with the intramuscular medication, which according to some statements was concealed out of sight when it had been taken as a contingency measure, should patient D refuse oral medication.
Patient B accused the staff of bullying patients.’ p. 18 (Emphasis added)
‘The HCA [Healthcare Assistant] told the Independent team that as the ‘triggers’ associated with incident 1 were known to staff, that arguably, it was possible to foresee what would happen, once a decision was taken to offer patient D prn medication and how patient B would react to this. Patient B is known to object to the use of medication and tends to act as an intermediary between a patient and a staff member, often to try to ‘whip’ the situation up. In the opinion of the HCA, the situation could have been pre-empted and the police should not have been called.’ p.19 (Emphasis added)
‘The UC [Unit Coordinator] advised some staff to withdraw and to assemble in the nursing station for safety, as the situation was getting out of hand.’ p. 18
‘staff retreated to the nursing station’ p.19
‘Patient F remained unsupervised in SC [Supervised Confinement] once staff in the ICA [Intensive Care Area] and the nursing station had been evacuated from the ward. The first on-call CAG manager (a Registered Nurse) saw patient F on two brief occasions, with a police escort, to establish that he was breathing and not in too much distress.’ p. 28 (Emphasis added)
‘According to a statement from an Inspector from the Metropolitan Police, numerous requests were made to ascertain the names of those involved and risk assessment details, but there were no staff on duty able to provide such information, with no contingency plan, other than calling the police for dealing with such a disturbance. There was discrepancy between this statement and the evidence given by the UC.’ p. 21 (Emphasis added)
‘The UC and three other staff retreated to the nursing station to summon help.’ p. 31
’Comment: Given the severity of the situation the presence of an RC [Responsible Clinician] would have been appropriate. There was no senior medical presence for either incident 1 or 2.’ p. 33
’Eight patients, including patient I, deemed very vulnerable, were left without access to any staff or care.’ p. 34 (Emphasis added)
‘Operation Metallah, a joint BRH/RH - Bromley Metropolitan Police protocol, with an operational implementation date of 20/04/13 – document received.’ p. 84
‘Operation Metallah, undertaken with the Bromley Metropolitan Police, in recognition that a new way of working was required to ensure optimal coordination and management of resources and sharing of information when police assistance is required, whilst not directly commissioned as a result of events on the night of 1st October 2012, has been influenced by it.’ p. 85
‘Operation Metallah - Joint Trust/Bromley Metropolitan Police protocol for responding to requests for police assistance at BRH, April 2013’ p. 104
‘Operation Metallah - Joint Trust/Bromley Metropolitan Police protocol for responding to requests for police assistance at BRH, April 2013’ p. 104
‘SC - Supervised confinement (seclusion)’ p. 105
‘Trojan - Metropolitan Police Firearms Unit’ p. 105
‘TSG - Tactical Support Group (Metropolitan Police)’ p. 105
It would have been useful to get the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) version of their intervention at River House that night, especially as from SLaM’s investigation report it would appear some TSG officers behaved in a racist way and caused undue distress to several vulnerable patients. An internal MPS email explains that ‘I have been informed that on [sic] Incident Management Log was created however despite searches on [Bromley] borough and with the senior investigating officer I have not been able to locate this document. Furthermore one document refers to a meeting in which this matter was to be discussed , again no further information could be found in respect of this meeting which may or may not have occurred.’ Following a complaint about the loss of this important document, the investigation log at an incident declared to be critical, the Information Commissioner’s Office wrote that ‘I have been advised by the MPS that searches for the log, which would be in hard copy rather than electronic, have failed to locate anything. Senior Officers connected to the event have been contacted but to no avail. The MPS have stated to me: “Unfortunately, in this instance the log in question cannot be located and is therefore, on the balance of probability not held”.’
So far, it has taken eleven freedom of information requests (to SLaM, the MPS, the Independent Police Complaint Commission, the Care Quality Commission and to Monitor), too many complaints to the Information Commissioner’s Office and a decision notice to uncover what has just been exposed that the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and the police didn’t want us to know.
Some of these revelations are shocking.
There are still some redactions, which are likely unwarranted and, if so, in breach of the the decision notice of the Information Commissioner’s Office. The only valid exemption, agreed by the Information Commissioner’s Office, is for third party personal data which explains that most names are still redacted. It is more difficult to understand how the use of this exemption can be justified to miss pp. 39–67 from the table of content (on p. 2), and that from the middle of p. 40 to the middle of p. 65 the content is still entirely blacked out. From the headings just before and after these redactions, the redacted text must concern some of the findings of the investigation.
[Update 2015-04-24] The Information Commissioner’s Office has now compared the redactions made by SLaM with the steps prescribed in the decision notice and concludes:
‘From my analysis of the redacted and unredacted versions of the report, I am satisfied that SLAM has generally acted in accordance with the Commissioner’s instructions and therefore complied with the decision notice. This finding also applies to SLAM’s decision to withhold pages 40 – 65 in their entirety.’
Here are my previous posts about this incident:
First published on 2015-04-06; last updated on 2015-06-24 to add details about compliance of remaining redactions.
German broadcaster Deutsche Welle was filming earlier this month a segment in Trafalgar Square for its series Focus on Europe - Spotlight on People.
The topic was how pervasive video surveillance is in the UK and the opposition to it by organisations such as No CCTV:
No other European country keeps as close a watch on its citizens as the UK. For years, the government has been broadening its powers of surveillance in the name of security. In other nations, its laws would long since have been considered breaches of privacy. Now opposition has also been growing in Britain.
I was interviewed for it and briefly appear 3’10" in the short programme.
A parliamentary written answer about creating an autism marker on the Police National Computer (PNC) was recently answered:
Lord Touhig (Labour)
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what progress has been made in considering whether police marker systems used to identify those with mental health and learning difficulties can be extended to those with autism as proposed in the report Think Autism.
Lord Bates (Conservative)
Work is continuing to establish whether a separate marker, specifically for autism, can readily be added to the Police National Computer in addition to the existing mental health marker, and to assess potential impacts on police force IT systems.
A follow-up written answer clarified the implementation plan:
Lord Touhig (Labour)
To ask Her Majesty’s Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Bates on 5 February (HL4542), whether there is a deadline for completing work to establish whether a separate marker, specifically for autism, can be added to the Police National Computer […], whether the current police information technology systems are capable of accommodating an additional marker, specifically for autism, to be added to the Police National Computer.
Lord Bates (Conservative)
For the purposes of speed of implementation it is proposed to use an existing marker to encompass cases of autism rather than developing a specific marker, which would require further significant work and assessment. These proposals are expected to be considered by the Police National Computer Board within the next month.
The National Autistic Society’s (NAS) Policy & Parliamentary team provided a note titled Further information on Government proposals to establish a marker for autism on the Police National Computer. I am copying its content below and interspersing with some comments:
What is proposed?
A Police National Computer (PNC) record is created for anyone who is charged with an offence or receives a fixed penalty notice, community-based service, or caution. This may be for first time or continued offending.
This is incorrect. ‘The PNC holds details of people who are, or were, of interest to UK law enforcement agencies’. A PNC record is created at arrest and is retained until the individual becomes 100 year-old (if there are several dates of birth on record, the first one is used). See Notes on the Police National Computer for more details on the PNC.
Current Government proposals are to include a marker on these records that alerts criminal justice workers to a person’s autism. The Government’s proposal is to record autism within the “AT” marker, rather than to take longer creating a new marker: The AT marker signifies ‘Ailment’ and will remain on the record for the life of the specific record (e.g. being acquitted or the record being expunged). There is room for 60 text characters (max) to accompany the marker, e.g. “has autism, needs support”.
The NAS persists in its use of the offensive person first terminology (‘has autism’). Autism is an integral part of who we are and how we experience the world. Identity-first language should be preferred (’is autistic). Someone does not have Englishness or jewishness or left handedness, or autism, etc. One is English or jewish or left handed or autistic. This page has a good explanation of this semantical issue.
The NAS recognises that the use of the phrase “Ailment” is unfortunate. However, this will mean that information about someone’s autism can be recorded more quickly. It is important that criminal justice professionals receive training so that they can interpret this marker, know about the nature of autism and make suitable adjustments. To this end, the NAS is working with the Cross-Government group on autism and the criminal justice sector to develop training resources for professionals.
The NAS also believes that, while the recording of autism under the AT marker will provide a quick solution in the short term, the relevant authorities should continue to look to create a separate, more appropriate, marker that could record autism (and potentially other non-medical or non-mental-health conditions).
Even though the NAS finds the current proposal ‘unfortunate’ and short term, its policy advocates for the creation of a ‘marker that could record autism’ (and potentially other neurodivergences).
This is very concerning, as it is advocating for what will effectively be a database of autistics for policing purposes. That the records have to already exist to add such a marker is not as much a safety as it may look; one only has to remember the claims that Police ‘have made arrests just to get people on to the DNA database’. Such a database would criminalise and stigmatise autistics. Being autistic is not criminogenic; if anything it may increase the risk of being victim of crime.
Also there are many autistics who have not yet realised they are autistics. Would this marker apply solely to autistics having followed the medical pathway and been medically diagnosed? If the criminal justice system (CJS) became over reliant on such a marker, it would create the additional risk that the many autistics not having the marker would not be dealt with adequately.
Another unaddressed issue is what criteria would be used to decide to set such a marker for an individual? Does this imply that autistics would be forced to disclose their autism? Whether and when to disclose is an an individual right. This right to choose cannot be so lightly ignored.
What could be useful to record in a database accessible to emergency call handlers is communication needs, e.g., whether some one uses BSL as first language, is unable to make voice calls, may need an independent advocate, etc. That would still be useful only for those on this database so is a very limited solution.
What does this mean for a person with autism?
For most people with autism, this will have no effect at all as it only adds a marker to existing PNC record (i.e. there must have been a caution, charge or sanction).
If it will have no effect for most autistics, then what is the point of advocating for such a marker? What is the point of creating an ineffective, criminalising and stigmatising marker, albeit on a pre-existing PNC record? There are better solutions to improve the actions of those in the criminal justice system towards all autistics.
This PNC project is designed to make it easier for the police to know if a person has been diagnosed with autism so that they know they may need to make changes to their usual practices and make sure they are explaining what is happening so that it is understood. We believe that, on the whole, this could be useful for police and may help a number of interactions between people with autism and the police from escalating.
The NAS has heard of situations where, for example a confrontation between police and a person with autism has escalated because of the shouting of confusing/mixed instructions. While the marker will be limited to people who already have a PNC record, one possible virtue of the marker is that police would be alerted to a person’s autism and know to approach an arrest differently. This cannot replace appropriate training of criminal justice professionals, but would be intended to help those with training identify appropriate responses much more quickly
Good training is indeed essential. Some researchers, police officers and the Home Affairs Committee also agree. Police need to understand that atypical behaviour is just a different behaviour and not a sign of criminality. Some of the reasons given by the police for finding my behaviour suspicious and wrongfully arresting me were that I had avoided eye contact with them (a failure to interpret social cues appropriately) and was wearing a jacket allegedly too warm for the season, both of which are common autistic behaviours.
Training for the police and others in the criminal justice system on common autistic behaviours and sensory issues would be particularly helpful.
How can this information be used?
Given the sensitive nature of the information, it is vital that it is not used improperly – especially to stigmatise people with autism or to fuel misconceptions about them. We have asked criminal justice representatives how the proposal means the information within the marker will be used. This section summarises their response.
This is nice wishful thinking, but there are examples of the PNC, including information of a sensitive nature such as DNA profiles and photographs, used improperly. For an innocent to become an honorary criminal by being on a police database is stigmatising. If there’s an autism marker, it would be surprising for it to never be used improperly.
In data protection terms this information is classed as sensitive personal data so permission of the individual concerned should always be sought by any non-police agency seeking inclusion of relevant marker on PNC.
Police does not seek consent for inclusion of information on the PNC. If the information is to remain under the control of autistics, then a much simpler mechanism is to carry a card briefly explaining that one is autistics and possibly including some basic interaction advice. If one cannot talk to explain they are autistic, they may show their card, and if handcuffed, the police will find the card when searching the individual. The police must treat all who have special needs appropriately whether these are expressed verbally or with a card. And an autism alert card can be used in other settings as well.
As regards to data protection, databases have incorrect information, information can leak (or become lost on a train) and databases can be used for surveillance. Not entering additional information, especially in a police database, avoids all these issues. (After the police decided to take no further action in my case, they forgot to update the PNC accordingly for many months, in breach of the Data Protection Act. This is not a theoretical issue.)
The marker would be present for protective purposes. Suggested examples of (policing) decisions which it would usefully influence:
- Police contact on the street with someone presenting in a way that is perceived by those police as unusual - a PNC “body check” (police speak for a record check based on name and date of birth) would result in the PNC operator disclosing existence/nature of any warning markers to the officer and this could influence the outcome of the contact, possibly avoiding arrest.
- Support measures put in place for previous offenders who are victims or witnesses at a later date.
- Where a criminal offence has apparently taken place, awareness that the suspect has autism would bring a number of other factors into play, i.e. necessity to call police healthcare provider to triage/assess fitness for further process and interview, ask for Appropriate Adult (AA) service, information as to rights and entitlements provided in presence of AA, provision of solicitor, arrangements for interview format to be adapted so appropriate for autism.
- Police/CPS decision on criminal justice outcome would be appropriate to nature of offence and needs of the individual and may include diversion to aftercare service.
- For courts and prisons it is expected that this would result in similar protective arrangements - including extra vigilance in a prison context to ensure that the prisoner is appropriately supported as vulnerable and not abused.
The NAS’ position
The NAS believes that the central issue for improving experiences of the criminal justice sector for people with autism is ensuring that all professionals have a good knowledge of autism and the changes that they need to make to practices and environments. We are currently working with the College of Policing to improve training for new police recruits and pushing for more training for other professionals.
Improving training is a positive step. Awareness is essential, but not sufficient. Acceptance of neurodivergences is what is needed.
In order to ensure that the right changes can be made, it is vital that the police, or other criminal justice sector professionals, know that someone has autism as soon as possible. There are a number of ways that this can be achieved: e.g. autism alert cards, encouraging people to declare their autism without fear of prejudice, improving training so professionals can identify the signs. A marker on the PNC is one other way that this could happen.
We believe that there are important safeguards that must be included, to ensure that sensitive data is used appropriately. Professionals must be sufficiently knowledgeable about autism to know that having autism is not an indicator of criminality or guilt. The marker should only be used in ways that will allow a person with autism the same protection of the law and access to justice as any person.
It is discriminatory and wrong for the police to keep markers which have nothing to do with criminality on categories of individuals for most of their lives. Police keeping tab on innocent inviduals is typical of a police state, not of a liberal democracy. Having an autism marker on the PNC will criminalise autistics. As was expressed in the European Court of Human Rights judgment in S. and Marper v. the UK: ‘Weighty reasons would have to be put forward by the Government before the Court could regard as justified such a difference in treatment of the applicants’ private data compared to that of other unconvicted people.’
By focusing on a marker identifying autistics, this discriminatory approach, rather than addressing the root causes of how traumatic encounters with the criminal justice system too often are for autistics, further legitimises the current societal attitude of blaming autistics for their poor treatment.
A much better solution to the problem this tries to address is two-fold: training of those in the criminal justice system and autism card schemes. Voluntarily carrying a card can help an autistic encountering the police to clarify that some of their behaviour may be atypical. A card is fully under the control of the individual. It is a helpful communication tool, not an ID card or get out of jail free card. And such cards can be used in other situation where communication may be difficult.
The police must serve all of society with respect and humanity. Autistics deserve equal treatment and the forced disclosure of our neurology to ensure ‘equality’ cannot be a requirement. The police need to be aware and more accepting of all neurodivergences, including of autism. An increased acceptance that many experience the world differently, would be of benefit to more than just autistics.
Hopefully the NAS will fully consider the many problems and risks of such a marker, review its policy and use its influence to help stop this proposal going any further.
This post was written in collaboration with Kabie Brook, chairperson of the Autism Rights Group Highland (ARGH). ARGH has designed an autism alert card available to all autistic people, children or adults, across the UK and carried by several hundreds autistics.
Some other recent parliamentary debates and written answers about autism:
The Discovery programme on BBC World service broadcast an episode on the throwaway society on 2015-02-16:
Hundreds of millions of computers, mobile phones and televisions are thrown away every year around the world. In this week’s Discovery Gaia Vince will be looking at the reasons behind this rapidly growing mountain of electronic waste and asking, who is responsible? The manufacturers or the consumers? When our gadgets break, maybe we should just be repairing them. And Gaia attends a party where people are fixing stuff for themselves.
The half hour programme can be listened to on the BBC Radio Player.
Some of the interviews were recorded at a Hackney Restart Party. My interview starts at 19:21.
Bootnote: Other blog posts about The Restart Project:
For the past two years I have been attempting to uncover what happened during two critical incidents that occurred at the River House facility operated by the South London and Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust on 2012-10-01. I eventually exposed that 48 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) officers were deployed and that four TSG officers drew their Tasers on the mental health ward.
Using the Freedom of Information Act, I got SLaM to initially publish a redacted summary report and then to unredact it, fully. This revealed it was hiding a full report. Using that information, I got it to publish an extensively redacted version of the full report. After an internal review in which SLaM found it was justified to do all these redactions on health and safety, and third party personal data, last week, the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) disagreed and decided against SLaM:
South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust
21 January 2015, Health (NHS)
The complainant has requested a copy of an investigation report that was commissioned to investigate an incident that occurred on a ward at the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (the Trust) in late 2012. The Trust initially relied on the future publication exemption (section 22) in FOIA to withhold a version of the report. Upon its publication, parts of the report were withheld under the health and safety (section 38) and third party personal data (section 40(2)) exemptions in FOIA, although these were later released to the complainant. However, during the course of the Commissioner’s investigation it became apparent that the Trust had only considered a summary of the report rather than a version containing the complete findings. A further partial disclosure of the complete report was made with the remaining information withheld under sections 38(1)(b) and 40(2) of FOIA. The Commissioner has found that section 40(2) but not section 38(1)(b) of FOIA is engaged. He therefore requires the disclosure of the information to which section 38(1)(b) has been applied. The public authority must take these steps within 35 calendar days of the date of this decision notice. Failure to comply may result in the Commissioner making written certification of this fact to the High Court pursuant to section 54 of the Act and may be dealt with as a contempt of court. [Emphasis added]
FOI 38: Upheld FOI 40: Partly upheld
Here are my previous posts about this incident:
SLaM has to publish an unredacted version of its full report that complies with the ICO's decision by 2015-03-25.
The Protection of Freedom Act 2012 introduced more restrictive rules about the retention of DNA profiles of individuals on the National DNA Database (NDNAD) including the deletion of the DNA profiles of most individuals who are not charged (No Further Action) or acquitted. This was a change welcomed by activists who had been campaigning that keeping tabs on innocents should not happen in a liberal democracy and that it does not make policing more efficient (adding hay to the hay stack makes finding the needles harder). What would have increased the crime detection rate would have been to fund for more DNA profiles from crime scenes to be added.
As of 31 March 2014, the National DNA Database held 5,716,085 DNA profiles from individuals down from 6,737,973 a year earlier, and 456,856 DNA profiles from crime scenes up from 428,634 a year earlier. In 2013-14, 1,384,905 DNA profiles from individuals were deleted from the database. Of these, 1,352,356 of these were deleted under the provisions of PoFA; 31,690 profiles taken by Scottish forces were deleted under Scottish law. A further 6,837 crime scene profiles were deleted because the crimes had been solved.
I wrote nearly three years ago:
It is a success for all the privacy activists and victims who campaigned to restore the presumption of innocence and the rehabilitation of offenders having been convicted of a minor crime. GeneWatch UK –as an indefatigable organisation at the forefront of the campaign to change the law to make the National DNA Database much smaller and more carefully controlled, and to safeguard privacy and rights without compromising the use of DNA in fighting crime– deserves much credit in this success.
Last month the government eventually agreed with what we had said all along. Lord Bates, Lords Minister and Minister for Criminal Information, Home Office in his ministerial foreword to the National DNA Database: annual report, 2013 to 2014 recognised that:
The reduction in profiles held from innocent people has not led to any reduction in the number of matches the database produces. In the quarter from 1 April to 30 June 2014, the database produced 37 matches to murder, 127 to rapes and 6,111 to other crime scenes. In the same quarter of 2013, when the old system for retaining DNA was in effect, it produced 37 matches to murder, 103 to rapes and 6,141 to other crime scenes.
Chris Sims, Chair, National DNA Database Strategy Board Chief Constable, West Midlands added:
The NDNAD match rate on loading a crime scene profile reached 61.9% in 2013–14. This was the highest annual rate yet and shows the success of the NDNAD in detecting crime and protecting the public.
The NDNAD Strategy Board showed some surprise at this outcome at its September 2014 meeting, but could not find any error in the draft annual report!
4.6 MC presented a draft of the National DNA Database Strategy Board’s Annual Report for 2013–14 (Paper 4.1) to the Board. He thanked Carl Jennings for his hard work on the report. He said that this was the first report since the implementation of PoFA. The proportion of profiles from innocent people had fallen from 50% to 3%. He reported that the number of profiles on the database had fallen from 7.2 million to five million but that the match rate had had in fact risen slightly from 59% to 62%. He had checked this with KF and they could not find any errors with the figures. JA said that the increase in match rate was not expected; in fact, a decrease had been anticipated. She asked if the number of crime scene profiles had reduced. MC said that the report would be published as soon as the Board were content. CS added that it was good that we were near publication.
4.7 CS asked if we had got the chronology on the deletion of samples correct and MC confirmed that we had. Batches of deletions took place in fairly short timescales (for example over a weekend). CS said that we needed a proper review of PoFA implementation and MC added that any analysis of implementation must be independent and not carried out by the police or the Home Office. CH added that such a review would need ministers’ co-operation as well as funding and an appropriate experimental design. AP said that the scientific design committee could input into any such review.
Blanket and indiscriminate surveillance is not the solution. It is neither necessary nor appropriate.
Retention periods for DNA profiles and fingerprints (as presented in the annual report).
|Occurrence||Fingerprint and DNA Profile Retention|
|Minor offence – arrested or charged||None – but speculatively searched|
|Qualifying offence* – arrested not charged||None, but in exceptional cases on application to the Biometrics Commissioner, three years retention may be authorised, plus two year extension by court|
|Qualifying offence* – arrested and charged||Three years plus possible two year extension by court|
|Minor offence – Penalty Notice for Disorder||Two years|
2. Convictions (include cautions, reprimands and final warnings):
|Occurrence||Fingerprint and DNA Profile Retention|
|Under 18 – Convicted of a minor offence||First conviction: five years (plus length of any custodial sentence), or indefinite if the custodial sentence is five years or more.|
|Under 18 – Second conviction||Indefinite|
|Under 18 – Convicted of a qualifying offence*||Indefinite|
|Adult – Convicted of an offence||Indefinite|
*Qualifying offences are serious violent or sexual, terrorism and burglary offences.
Where an individual has more than one arrest on their record, the longest retention period will be applied.
Should police officers behave differently with autistic suspects? Two recent commentaries support the changes I suggested in my written evidence to the Home Affairs Committee.
Researchers found that conventional police interview techniques are not effective for people with autism:
Police find interviewing and interacting with witnesses and suspects with autism a real challenge, a study has revealed - highlighting that the ways officers have been taught to interview are at odds with what is needed in these situations. Existing interview techniques tend to focus on open questions, only later narrowing down to closed questions, but research shows that people with autism may need focused questions from the outset.
The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)-funded research studied what does, and does not, work when police interview people with autism. The researchers - Dr Katie Maras, University of Bath, and Dr Laura Crane, City University London - are calling for better training of police and criminal justice professionals as, at present in the UK, these groups currently have no standard compulsory training about autism. […]
My experience of the police interviewing process, as described in my evidence, matches this research:
10. As I was innocent and did not know any better at the time, I made the mistake to refuse to call a solicitor. During the police interview, one question particularly bothered me. The interviewing officer after asking me questions about my laptop such as 'has it got anything on there about public underground?' and 'has it got anything on there about plans for any terrorism act?', asked 'has it got anything on there that might be construed as causing a public nuisance?'. The correct answer would have been 'yes' as I have a word processor, an email client, etc that could all be useful to a terrorist and most likely can be construed to be of use for anything including causing a public nuisance. However, I also realised that answering the positive would not be helpful to me and challenged the question when the investigating officer just wanted answers.
An obvious way forward to make police encounters less damaging to autistics would be to improve training. Inspector Michael Brown, who is on secondment to the College of Policing as Mental Health Coordinator, recommends on his Mental Health Cop blog to have autism awareness training for police officers:
[…] I've argued before that I see the point of specific autism awareness training for police officers because we know that where officers deal with incidents involving someone with autism there could be considerations that wouldn't necessarily apply to other situations, if they can be accommodated. I'm not sure if that could be said of all of the above conditions, however. Would it matter to the policing of an emergency mental health incident whether someone who appeared to be in distress was psychotic because of schizophrenia or because of bipolar or because of Addison's disease? Probably not. […]
These two commentaries support the recommendations I made to the Home Affairs Committee:
12. An essential recommendation would be for all front-line police officers to receive some training about the autism spectrum. This training ideally would involve those on the autism spectrum. I understand that a few police officers have had sessions with the Asperger London Area Group (ALAG). This training should be made more generally available.
13. At the very least, front-line officers should read the ACPO-endorsed Autism: a guide for criminal justice professionals publication of the National Autistic Society.
14. With such training it is hoped that police officers realise that a behaviour different from that of a neurotypical is just different rather than suspicious; consider hyper- and hypo-sensitivities that the public they interact with may have; and use clearer interviewing questions.
Restarter Profile: Meet David
Tell us a little about yourself.
I am known as either David or Panda. I moved to London from Paris twenty-one years ago. I have studied computer science and criminology, and worked as a software developer, a technologist and a journalist. I am autistic and have been described as ‘calm, almost too calm’.
When did you start repairing electronics and electricals?
Before the web had been invented. A lot of my early repairs were telecoms related: RS232 cables, modems and phones, and computers as well.
Why do you attend Restart Parties?
To empower others to regain control of their devices. For more than thirty years I’ve been demystifying new technologies and software development, initially, and how to reclaim our civil liberties, later. The collaborative repairing going on at Restart Parties are occasions to demystify repair and to empower participants to fix their electronic and electrical devices. It is for this transformative process, when people realise that many repairs are accessible to them, that I am involved with the Restart Project.
What is your favourite kind of repair?
The variety is interesting, but what is most gratifying is when someone arrives hoping for a free fix and leaves having fixed their device mostly on their own. It is the process of discovery, when they realise that they are already knowledgeable: that if they have changed a fuse they likely understand the need for electric continuity; that if they have ever touched a lit lightbulb they likely realise that electric devices get hot. Fixing their device is a small step from that knowledge: when a device stops working, first steps are to check that everything is still connected, that electricity flows, and that there’s no dust or crumbs blocking any fan so the heat is not trapped inside. The next realisation is that some simple tips go a long way: how not to end up with a pile of screws, use a pill box or an egg carton to store them so it’s easy to find which screws are used at which step when time comes to reassemble things. The skills needed for such repairs are a lot of common sense, some limited experience (learnt in the process), good research skills and access to a few tools.
What do you do when you are not Restarting?
Learn, research, occasionally write. Check on the welfare of the detained persons by making unannounced visits to the custody suite of police stations. Write (too many) Freedom of Information requests. Walk.
What frustrates you (in life)?
Injustice. Noise. Surveillance. Crowds. Deaths in custody. Cars. Waste.
What gets you out of bed in the morning?
Restart Parties, Qi Gong, police custody visits, mornings of mindfulness, conferences. Though mornings are difficult and best avoided.
What’s the first thing – one material thing – that you could not live without? (besides oxygen, food, water, and shelter and medical care)
In this weather, a hat.
Share something cool with us [preferably a link]
Bootnote: Read an earlier post about my experience of becoming a restarter.
After my unlawful arrest in July 2005, I complained to the Independent Police Complaint Commission (IPCC) and then appealed the outcome of the supervised investigation. After deciding not to uphold my appeal, the Independent Police Complaint Commission (IPCC) closed my case file seven years ago. On 2014-06-19, the seventh anniversary of its final correspondence about my appeal, the IPCC was due to delete the electronic content of my case file and destroy its paper content.
When reminding the IPCC of this deadline, I requested to witness the occasion. This was refused:
Unfortunately, it is not possible for you to witness either the destruction of the hard copy file or deletion of the electronic file but we will send you confirmation of their destruction once this has been done.
At a time when the IPCC is trying to regain the trust of the public it is disappointing that such requests cannot be accommodated. However on 2014-06-20, IPCC's Records & Archives Manager confirmed it had all been done:
I am pleased to confirm that the documents held in the electronic file of your case were deleted yesterday morning. I confirm that four paper files were also destroyed at the same time.
I attach a spreadsheet detailing the electronic documents that were deleted. I am unable to list the contents of the paper files as we do not maintain an index of each paper document destroyed, only the fact that the file has been destroyed. Included in the spreadsheet is reference to the destruction of the 4 paper files.
The attached spreadsheet listed the creation date, record number, title and container title (the case reference number) of 32 electronic documents that had just been deleted and the box numbers of the four paper files that had been destroyed.
I found it difficult to verify whether the spreadsheet listed all the documents I knew the IPCC held. Some of the dates did not match that of the documents I had obtained with a subject access request and most of the documents I had did not have titles. I was concerned that the IPCC might still be retaining some documents and requested a review of the deletion process. The IPCC's Records & Archives Manager explained on 2014-06-27:
In 2006 the use of a Electronic Document Records Management System (EDRMS) was in its infancy at the IPCC. At this time the majority of information was filed in paper files. Your case was allocated a case number 2006/007520 and documents for your case, whether in electronic or hard copy format, were filed against this number. The whereabouts of paper files were also recorded onto the EDRMS.
Electronic documents were either scanned or saved directly to the case file and dated with the date that they were added to the system, not the date of the document. As an example of this, the document cited in your email "Final Report Minute - Supervised Investigation' from the Casework Manager to the Commissioner dated 23/11/2006," is shown on line 18 in the spreadsheet as FR minute and dated 4 December 2006.
There were four paper files allocated to your case file number, these were files of some substance I am unable to say what documents were contained in the files as they have now been destroyed.
Following receipt of your email, I have carried out a search on the EDRMS which reveals that there are no electronic or paper files still in existence for this case.
Although all documentation is filed to the appropriate case file, in order to allay your concern that some documents have been inadvertently retained, I have spoken to the casework manager who had conduct of your case and to the commission secretariat to ensure that they have no documents relating to your case in their possession. In both cases they confirmed that they do not have any documents.
I am therefore able to confirm that all documents relating to your case have been destroyed in accordance with our retention policy.
Even after this apparently thorough review, I had some remaining concerns as to whether the searches may have missed documents with the case file reference mistyped or misspellings of my name (such typos were present in some of the documents). This had been considered:
I did carry out some searches using variances of both your name and the case number. These were done both on my initial search and the further search carried out last week.
It would have been easier to allow me to witness the deletions and destructions as initially requested.
I have two ongoing complaints with the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) about how the South London and Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) are both responding to some of my Freedom of Information requests. There's little visibility as to when further disclosures, prompted by the ICO's caseworkers, are made by SLaM and the MPS. Soon after SLaM sent me an over-redacted 105-page report into incidents at the River House mental health secure unit, I received four Taser use forms from the Metropolitan Police Service. (Both complaints are ongoing as the SLaM report is clearly over-redacted and the MPS have not yet addressed the non-location of its incident management log.)
These new disclosures are directly related to the second section (paragraphs 15 to 23) of my Evidence to the Home Affairs Committee's inquiry into policing and mental health submitted last month and are relevant to this inquiry. I sent to the Home Affairs Committee a supplementary evidence about SLaM's disclosure of its 105-page report earlier this month, and copied below is a further supplementary evidence (also published on the Parliament's website as PMH0044) about the MPS eventual disclosure of the four Taser use forms:
 PMH0021 David Mery - written evidence (PDF): http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/policing-and-mental-health/written/9174.pdf
MPS disclosure of the four Taser use forms: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/river_house_2012_10_01_critical#incoming-530359
Direct links to the four forms: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/193137/response/530359/attach/3/Redacted%20Taser%20Use%20MPS%2002.10.12%20287.12.doc.tif.pdf, https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/193137/response/530359/attach/4/Redacted%20Taser%20Use%20MPS%2002.10.12%20291.12.doc.tif.pdf, https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/193137/response/530359/attach/5/Redacted%20Taser%20Use%20MPS%2002.10.12%20292.12.doc.tif.pdf and https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/193137/response/530359/attach/6/Redacted%20Taser%20Use%20MPS%2002.10.12%20294.12.doc.tif.pdf
 An independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding two separate but related incidents involving Norbury patients on Spring Ward on the night of 1st October 2012 (Final Report - Summary): https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/164330/response/496004/attach/3/RH%20Report%20Oct12%20unredacted.pdf
 An independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding two separate but related incidents involving Norbury patients on Spring Ward on the night of 1st October 2012 (Final Report): http://www.slam.nhs.uk/media/255726/slam_rh_incident_underlying_detail_redacted_140528.pdf
 Minutes of meeting of Lambeth's Health and Adult Services Scrutiny Sub-Committee (Item 5), 2012-10-23: http://moderngov.lambeth.gov.uk/mgAi.aspx?ID=20256
Last month I submitted some Evidence to the Home Affairs Committee's inquiry into policing and mental health. On 2014-05-28, the South London and Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust sent a further response in relation to my complaint to the Information Commissioner's Office and I consequently sent the supplementary evidence, copied below, to the Home Affairs Committee (also published on the Parliament's website as PMH0043):
As mentioned in paragraphs 17 of my evidence I have an ongoing complaint with the Information Commissioner’s Office about the cover up of the South London and Maudsley (SLaM) NHS Foundation Trust concerning incidents at the River House mental secure unit. There has been some progress in this regard which should be of interest to the Home Affairs Committee.
As a response to this ongoing complaint, SLaM has now published a heavily redacted version of its full 105-page report (pdf) into these incidents. [In case this redacted report is updated or removed, a copy, as originally published, is available here (pdf).]
This report is distressing as it is still heavily redacted with snippets of great concern appearing without the original context. I have asked the Information Commissioner’s Office to check the redactions are valid as even without having access to the full document, many redactions are clearly excessive and not justified by the claimed exemptions (these exemptions can be read in SLaM's letter (pdf). [This letter is part of this Freedom of Information request.])
For instance, on p. 19 one interviewed staff is of the opinion that these incidents could have been avoided and that none of the 48 police officers that attended River House that night should have been deployed: ‘[…] it was possible to foresee what would happen, once a decision was taken to [redacted]. In the opinion of [redacted], the situation could have been pre-empted and the police should not have been called.’
However, only a few pages later on p. 23 there are both mentions of the seriousness of how the incident developed and the confusion between staff and the Trust about it: ‘Comment: several staff referred to incident 1 as a hostage situation, whereas according to the Trust Policy (Major Incident Protocol), it is defined as a riot.'
A clear example of the further poor attempt at a cover-up can be seen on p. 31. Most of the paragraphs describing the details of 'Incident 2' are redacted, however we already know from the 12-page summary report (link in footnote 11 in my evidence), and the repeated paragraph in the executive summary (p. 3), that 'In the second incident which occurred at approximately 0250, one patient challenged staff with regard to decisions which had been taken about the management of the four patients involved in the first incident. He accused them of discrimination, believing that there had been a racist motive and that staff had assisted the police to pursue this line of action. He threatened to kill staff and one of the white perpetrators, who he declared had been treated differently to the black perpetrators. This resulted in nursing staff losing control of the ward for a second time when they retreated to the nursing station.’ These allegations of discrimination must not be redacted.
Given that this report is from the largest mental health provider in the country, where two people from the UK’s African Caribbean communities have lost their lives while in the care of this provider at the hands of the Metropolitan Police services, it is particularly important that every member of the committee should be able to read a fully unredacted copy of this report. Considering the serious public safety implications, as well as public confidence concerns in policing and mental health, exemplified by such incidents, it would be helpful for this inquiry to get a full insight into both policing practice on the ground and patient experience at this mental health provider.
 PMH0021 David Mery - written evidence (PDF) [also on this blog at Evidence to the Home Affairs Committee's inquiry into policing and mental health]
The Home Affairs Committee, whose remit 'is to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Home Office and its associated public bodies' is running an inquiry into policing and mental health. The deadline for written evidence was a week ago and 34 submissions have been published online on the Parliament's website. The evidence I submitted (PMH0021) is also copied below:
A) Autistic behaviour considered suspicious and subsequent unlawful arrest
B) The River House incidents and its cover-up by the NHS and the MPS
C) The use of section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 in London
 Police interview tape; Walworth Police Station; 2005-07-29 03:12:50-03:56:30
 Letter from Chief Superintendent Wayne Chance, Metropolitan Police Service Borough Commander for Southwark dated 2009-09-02: http://gizmonaut.net/blog/uk/2009/09/mps_apologises.html
 Autism: a guide for criminal justice professionals: http://www.autism.org.uk/working-with/criminal-justice/autism-a-guide-for-criminal-justice-professionals.aspx
 Sean Rigg inquest verdict: http://www.gardencourtchambers.co.uk/imageUpload/File/Inquisition-for-Mr-Rigg.pdf
 NHS Trust attempted cover-up over massive police deployment to mental health ward: http://gizmonaut.net/blog/uk/2014/03/SLaM_attempted_cover-up_over_massive_police_deployment.html
 An independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding two separate but related incidents involving Norbury patients on Spring Ward on the night of 1st October 2012: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/164330/response/496004/attach/3/RH%20Report%20Oct12%20unredacted.pdf
 Minutes of the fifty ninth meeting of the board of directors of the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation trust held on 30th october 2012: http://www.slam.nhs.uk/media/177219/novboard_12.pdf
 An independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding two separate but related incidents involving Norbury patients on Spring Ward on the night of 1st October 2012: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/164330/response/496004/attach/3/RH%20Report%20Oct12%20unredacted.pdf
 Transcript of London Assembly’s Police and Crime Committee on 2013-11-21: https://www.london.gov.uk/moderngov/mgChooseMDocPack.aspx?ID=4993&SID=9700
 More on this confusion in Deployments of armed police officers at London’s mental health units: http://gizmonaut.net/blog/uk/2014/04/mps_at_mhus.html
 Police use of taser statistics, England and Wales, 2012 to 2013: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-use-of-taser-statistics-england-and-wales-2012-to-2013/police-use-of-taser-statistics-england-and-wales-2012-to-2013
 The operation of Section 136 in London, An Action Plan to improve was published in March 2013 by the Mental Health Partnership Board for London. This document does not appear to have been made public; a copy was obtained from David Mellish, Chair of the Mental Health Partnership Board for London.
Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136
Camden and Islington NHS Foundation Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_2
East London NHS Foundation Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_3
South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_4
West London Mental Health NHS Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_5
South West London and St George’s Mental Health NHS Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_6
North East London NHS Foundation Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_7
Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_8
Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/mha_s136_9
 Transcript of London Assembly’s Police and Crime Committee on 2013-11-21: https://www.london.gov.uk/moderngov/mgChooseMDocPack.aspx?ID=4993&SID=9700