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Last year, after the final decision of the Independent Police Complaint Commission not to uphold my appeal I consulted a solicitor for advice as to whether I should pursue a civil claim. Last month my solicitor sent a letter of claim to the Metropolitan Police Directorate of Legal Services.
Gareth Peirce, ‘a lawyer who has since the 1970s represented individuals accused of involvement in terrorism from both the Irish and the Muslim communities’ explores in the London Review of Books whether the position of Muslims in Britain is what it was like for the Irish. It is a longish article, very well written, in a calm voice, which raises serious issues that too many may not be fully aware of: ‘Over the years of the conflict, every lawless action on the part of the British state provoked a similar reaction: internment, ‘shoot to kill’, the use of torture (hooding, extreme stress positions, mock executions), brutally obtained false confessions and fabricated evidence. This was registered by the community most affected, but the British public, in whose name these actions were taken, remained ignorant: that the state was seen to be combating terrorism sufficed.’ Please, do read her article in full.
[...] The answer lies in Blair’s warning: ‘The rules of the game have changed.’ Previously accepted boundaries of freedom of expression and thought have been redefined and are now in effect being prosecuted retrospectively, with the result that our criminal justice system is becoming further distorted as many truly innocent defendants plead guilty, against their lawyers’ advice, terrified by the prospect, as they see it, of inevitable conviction and ever lengthening prison sentences. Thousands of others, all of whom have searched the internet, watch with horror the process of criminalisation and punishment.
In this country we did not grow up with a written constitution and human rights legislation entered our law only recently. In times of tension we struggle to find answers to basic questions. Are there rules and can they be changed? Are there legal concepts that protect a community under blanket suspicion, or should that community’s adverse reaction to suspicion be seen as oversensitivity in the face of perceived political necessity? Should we accept the concept of the greatest good for the greatest number? The answer is again the same: we are bound by international treaty and, belatedly, by domestic human rights legislation, to hold that there are inalienable rights that attach to the individual rather than society. Article 8 of the European Convention protects not only respect for family and private life, but also the individual against humiliating treatment; Article 10 protects freedom of expression, Article 9 freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and Article 14 guarantees that in the enjoyment of these rights any discrimination is itself prohibited. Occasionally, fierce campaigning successfully sounds an alarm: the proposed extension from 28 to 42 days of the time allowed for questioning those suspected of involvement in terrorism is being energetically fought. But there are less obvious erosions of parallel rights.
If this is indeed how it was for the Irish, we should urgently try to understand how significant change came about for them. Much current reminiscence ignores vital factors, such as the inescapable responsibility of the Irish Republic and, above all, the political weight of the Irish diaspora and the far-sightedness of those who began and maintained contact, long before Blair was elected and claimed the ultimate prize. Throughout the thirty years of conflict, forty million Americans of Irish descent formed an electoral statistic that no US administration could afford to ignore. It is said that on the night before he decided to grant a visa to Gerry Adams, Bill Clinton watched a film about the catastrophic injustice inflicted on one Irish family by the British state. Here, Lord Scarman and Lord Devlin, retired law lords, joined Cardinal Hume, the head of the Catholic Church in England, in educating themselves in the finest detail of three sets of wrongful convictions involving 14 defendants. At one critical moment Cardinal Hume confronted the home secretary, Douglas Hurd, challenging the adequacy of his briefing.
No similar allies for the Muslim community are evident today, capable of pushing and pulling the British government publicly or privately into seeing sense. Spiritually, the Muslim Ummah is seen as being infinite, but the powerful regimes of the Muslim world almost without exception not only themselves perpetrate oppression, but choose to work hand in hand with the US and the UK in their ‘war on terror’. It is for us, as a nation, to take stock of ourselves. We are very far along a destructive path, and if our government continues on that path, we will ultimately have destroyed much of the moral and legal fabric of the society that we claim to be protecting. The choice and the responsibility are entirely ours.
(Discovered via Dick Destiny.)
More on Gareth Peirce in English legal system contaminated.
On 2008-04-23, Gareth Peirce will join Independent columnist Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, poet and writer Benjamin Zephaniah, chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission Nick Hardwick, and Guantanamo survivor Moazzam Begg in a panel discussion on Racism and the state of Britain chaired by chaired by Asad Rehman - Newham Monitoring Project.
The Governance
of Britain – Analysis of Consultations summarises the responses it received to the Managing
Protest
around Parliament consultation as follows:
11. The Government received 512 responses during the 12 week consultation period. Representations were received from 25 campaign groups, from six MPs and two Peers, from a number of other interested stakeholders including the Metropolitan Police Service, the Greater London Authority,Westminster City Council and the Law Society of Scotland. However, most responses – over 90 percent – were received from members of the public.
12. The vast majority of responses – over 95 percent – either explicitly or implicitly called for the straight repeal of sections 132 to 138 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCAP), rejecting arguments that a distinct framework for managing protest around Parliament could be justified on security grounds, or on grounds that the business of Parliament needed special protection, or by a need to safeguard wider public enjoyment of the space.
13. There was a clear and strongly articulated view that sections 132 to 138 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act, and in particular the requirement to notify the police in advance, have restricted and stifled spontaneous protest in the area around Parliament.There was also a clear view expressed by members of the public that the area around Parliament is special in that it is the focus of political protest and that nowhere is the right to protest and voice one’s views more important than at the seat of Parliament itself.
On an unrelated news The Governance of Britain – Draft Constitutional Reform Bill
starts with the repeal of the sections 132
to 138 of SOCPA (this act is more commonly abbreviated to SOCPA than SOCAP):
PART 1
DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF PARLIAMENT
1 Repeal of sections 132 to 138 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005
(1) Omit sections 132 to 138 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (c.15) (which regulates demonstrations in the vicinity of Parliament)
(2) In the Table in section 175(3) of that Act (transitional provision relating to offences) omit the entries relating to section 136.
(3) In paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 2 to the Noise and Statutory Nuisance Act 1993 (c.40) (which is about consents for the operation of loudspeakers) omit "or of section 137(1) of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005".
(4) Omit paragraph 64 of Schedule 6 to the Serious Crime Act 2007 (c.27)
This intention is welcomed, but at this stage this is just a draft bill which may be changed and will take time to come into force. If this happens then we'll return to the status quo before these sections came into force – minus all the arrests of peaceful protesters in the designated zone and the time wasted by protesters and the Police alike in dealing with the required authorisations.
What do Marper, S., Kevin Reynolds and myself have in common? We're all innocents who have had our DNA taken following an arrest. I have been the lucky one as it only took me two years to get my DNA profile removed and samples destroyed. Marper & S. are fighting it all the way to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and Kevin Reynolds has had to go through a traumatic arrest, which could have been avoided had the Police immediately checked his previously retained DNA profile.
After having gone all the way to the Grand Chamber of the ECHR, the Marper
and S v. UK is viewed as a test case about whether the UK is
breaching human rights by retaining DNA samples and profiles of unconvicted innocent people. The
hearing of this case by is available to watch online and the ruling
will be given later this year:
As mentioned two weeks ago, you can:
Helen Wallace from GeneWatch, name checked during the hearing, makes a very strong argument that there is a diminishing return from adding more individuals' DNA profiles to the National DNA Database (NDNAD). Here's an extract from the GeneWatch page on its contribution to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics consultation:
Collecting more DNA from crime scenes has made a big difference to the number of crimes solved, but keeping DNA from more and more people who have been arrested – many of whom are innocent – has not. Since April 2003, about 1.5 million extra people have been added to the Database, but the chances of detecting a crime using DNA has remained constant, at about 0.36%.
The recent conviction of Mark Dixie for the horrific murder of Sally Anne Bowman has been used in the ECHR hearing and by the Police to justify and demand retention of DNA of even more individuals:
The policeman who led the hunt for Sally Anne Bowman's killer today called for a national DNA register. Detective Superintendent Stuart Cundy said having everyone's DNA on file would speed up arrests and cut down on further offending.
What Detective Superintendent Cundy didn't mention is how, in this very same case, the data retained on the National DNA Database was ignored to arrest an innocent for murder, indecent assault and robbery. Let's go into more details of the case of Kevin Reynolds to understand how retaining DNA samples and profiles of innocents does not automatically help to eliminate them as suspect in investigation.
Postman Kevin Reynolds had had his DNA and fingerprints taken on 2002-06-14 when he was charged, but later acquitted, with being drunk and disorderly. The profile was loaded on the NDNAD on 2002-07-04. Even though he was acquitted, his fingerprints and DNA profile remained on file.
Fast forward to 2005-12-12, when following complaints by a jilted girlfriend, Kevin is taken into custody at the Edmonton Police station at 02:10. He is led to the fingerprinting room to have his fingerprints taken and DNA sampled. The Livescan fingerprinting system confirms Kevin's identity and give his CRO number. So even if there are several Kevin Reynolds with the exact same date of birth living at the same place, Livescan has confirmed that this is the Kevin Reynolds for which the Police has retained a DNA profile (and samples). Here are the Livescan sheet for Kevin and an extract from the Livescan manual:
Search Result (SRE)
An SRE is returned to the Livescan unit. This will be received after the ACK and once the search has been completed (and verified if requested). This will contain the result of the search. If a search is verified, i.e. has been viewed by a fingerprint expert, there will be one CRO. If the search is non-verified, there may be up to four respondents displayed, with system confidence ratings (High, Medium, or Low). If the result is a no trace, No Respondents will be displayed.
Nothing was explained to Kevin. When they took him to the fingerprinting room, he asked why they were doing this as they already had his fingerprints and DNA. He received no reply. Even though Livescan confirmed the identification, DNA samples were again taken from him. This has recently been confirmed by the Forensic Science Service (FSS):
The sample which you supplied to the Metropolitan Police Service on 12 December 2005, in connection with a murder inquiry, was analysed by the FSS in order to generate your DNA profile. Your DNA profile was compared against the DNA profile obtained from the crime scene. Additionally your DNA profile record relating to this sample was submitted to The National DNA Database and is now retained, in compliance with legislation, on The National DNA Database.
Kevin is placed in cell. At 04:50 the wicket of the cell opens and the officers ask Kevin to come to the cell door. He is told he is ‘arrested on suspicion of the murder of Sally Ann [sic] Bowman [...] and cautioned’. His reply: ‘Who? Who is Sally Ann Bowman?’
A news article from the Metropolitan Police Service explains: ‘At an early stage DNA was recovered from the murder scene, which police believed identified the murderer.’ The Police had profiled the DNA from the crime scene, they had a man in their custody for whom they already had a DNA profile loaded in the system, the identification of this man was even confirmed by Livescan, and they still arrested him for the murder of Sally Anne Bowman? Kevin's DNA profile on the NDNAD would have been sufficient to show there was no match and clear him from suspicion.
It doesn't stop there. At 14:15, Kevin is further arrested for indecent assault and for the robbery in Sanderstead Road (this attack is linked to the murder of Sally Anne Bowman). He reiterates: ‘I am completely innocent’. At 21:18, Kevin is taken to a double identity parade using video capture; he learns two hours later from his solicitor that both id parades were negative and in one of them another person was picked out. At 12:09 the next day, Kevin is formally interviewed, and close to half an hour in the interview, the interviewing officer's phone beeps to tell him that Kevin's DNA didn't match the crime scene's DNA, and he's eventually released as no further action (NFA'd).
He then goes home and find his father's house, where he was living, smashed to pieces and to learn his car is in some pound in south London. The specialist search team were still in his house but leaving. His father commented to the Morning Star:
"They pulled my house apart - breaking furniture and damaging the walls - and went through all my files. Yet, I was not asked a single question about my son," he says.
Kevin told the Eye:
“My heart goes out to the Bowman family, but it makes me very angry that time, money and energy were wasted pursuing me when it was known all along that I could not be the killer. I dread to think what would have happened had one of the witnesses identified me in the line-up. My case shows that the database does not protect innocent people from wrongful arrest and detention.”
Kevin's DNA eventually cleared him after more than 34 hours and a harrowing experience. Having his DNA retained should have cleared Kevin immediately, but it did not. They did not use the retained DNA samples and profile. DNA appears to be used only when convenient for the Police, with little respect for innocent individuals.
The cost of criminalising a whole population in the hope of being better at catching criminals is a price to high to pay when the case for a better detection rate with an increasing larger database has not even been made. Calls, such as the Times reports, are dangerous propaganda as the innocents do have to fear:
The detective who led the Bowman investigation said: “It is my opinion that a national DNA register could have identified Sally Anne’s murderer within 24 hours.” The innocent would have nothing to fear, while the guilty would be caught. It could even deter criminals.
Gary Pugh, director of forensic sciences at Scotland Yard and the new DNA spokesman for the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), has just been joining Detective Superintendent Cundy in calling for an ever bigger NDNAD. Worryingly he's setting his personal sights on children as young as five when currently under 10-year-old are out of the reach of the NDNAD:
'If we have a primary means of identifying people before they offend, then in the long-term the benefits of targeting younger people are extremely large,' said Pugh. 'You could argue the younger the better. Criminologists say some people will grow out of crime; others won't. We have to find who are possibly going to be the biggest threat to society.'
Thanks to Stephen Cragg for the title of this post and to Kevin Reynolds for his assistance regarding his story.
Yet another Counter-Terrorism Bill is currently before Parliament. It will impose new and worse forms of punishment without trial. Since the first permanent Terrorism Act of 2000, people have suffered much injustice under anti-terrorism measures, particularly Muslims and migrant communities. Out of over 1,200 people arrested under anti-terrorism laws, less than 5% have been convicted of ‘terrorism’ offences, few of these involving any plans for violent activities. Less than 20% were even charged with such offences. A key effect and political aim has been a climate of fear – fear that political activity, or simply talking to the wrong people, will bring arrest or house raids.
Why does the government propose yet another Counter-Terrorism law? What effects will it have? What can people do to oppose it?
This Friday 2008-03-14, 6.30pm-9.00pm at the London Muslim Centre, 46 Whitechapel Road, London E1 1JQ, speakers will look at unjust effects of the current anti-terrorism measures and how this injustice would be extended by the new proposals. They will explain and analyse the proposals in the new Bill. There will be plenty of time for questions and discussion – about what powers to oppose, how to present the issues to your own community, and what action to request from your MP.
Event organised by the Campaign against criminalising communities (CAMPACC) with the Centre for the study of terrorism (CFSOT), and co-sponsored by the London Muslim Centre, Islamic Forum of Europe, Cage Prisoners and the Newham Monitoring Project.
The government’s new proposals are based on the Terrorism Act 2000, which defined terrorism so broadly as to include simply the threat of violence to property in an attempt to influence a government, anywhere in the world. This broad definition, with offences like belonging to or helping a banned organisation, criminalises many normal political activities in the UK and any resistance to oppressive regimes abroad.
For more information on the bill and a model letter to send your MP visit the CAMPACC Briefing Document Counter Terrorism Bill 2008. Please ask your MP to oppose these proposals!
Information in this post is from the announcement for this event.
For the past two years or so I've been wearing a badge designed by
Vivienne Westwood for the civil liberty organisation Liberty. On it is
written in friendly letters ‘I
am not a terrorist, please don't arrest me’. Liberty describes
the writing as ‘a child-like scrawl plea’. It obviously works as I have
not been arrested, or even stopped and searched, since I started
wearing this badge.
The badge helps people realise that we must all adopt a rational attitude to the terrorist threats. We must promote measures that really do enhance our security and not security theatre measures that just inconvenience many innocents and do not make us any safer.
I have travelled abroad many times while wearing it. While waiting in security queues at airports I had the occasional positive response from fellow passengers. At Stansted Airport, early February, I had the first and so far only negative reaction to it. While I was waiting at the gate, by the counter, for an Easyjet flight to Copenhagen, a Swissport staff requested that I remove the badge which was pinned to my coat.
When I queried the staff why he was making such a request, he explained his motivation was that it might upset some passengers. I pointed out that the design of this badge is friendly and the message is non-threatening. I found his request upsetting and that his motivation was purely hypothetical as he hadn't heard from any concerned passenger. As he insisted, I complied with his request. This exchange was short and polite. At the bottom of the steps leading to the tarmac, he further discussed this incident with a colleague travelling with me adding that you have to be careful because some people are getting nervous about these things.
On board of the plane, my colleague opened The Times, and the headline on top of p.3, visible from several rows, was ‘Ryanair ordered to pay damages to steel band ‘terrorists’ thrown off jet’. Oh, the irony.
As no passenger has ever complained about this badge and I don't believe requesting me to remove it increases our security, back in London I contacted the General Manager for Swissport at Stansted to query the regulations covering Swissport staff's authority in requesting passenger to remove badges and other items of clothing. He investigated the incident and was very diligent in responding:
As all communications from passengers and customers are important to us, we do investigate all complaints or comments fully, and by the nature of our business this can take longer than perhaps I might prefer.
I have now had the opportunity to investigate the circumstances surrounding a member of Swissport staff asking you to remove your badge before boarding a flight at Stansted Airport.
Our business as a major provider of airport ground handling services around the world, works hard with our customer airlines and operators at airports where we work, to ensure aviation continues to be a safe and secure method of transport. The aviation industry is rightly well regulated and all businesses co-operate with the Department for Transport and the police services and security staff at the airports to meet these regulations. Additionally, we try and ensure that passengers are spared additional anxiety that they may feel as a result of enhanced security processes at the airports.
The badge which I understand you were wearing bears the message "I am not a terrorist. Please don't arrest me." Whilst it is unlikely that anybody could take exception to such a friendly and, presumably well-intentioned sentiment, our concerns were that the word "terrorist" was clearly the most prominent and could be read from a distance, while the context in which it was used could not.
Our request for the badge to be removed while you were preparing to board the flight and during the flight itself, followed consultation with the airline on which you were travelling, in particular the Captain and senior cabin crew member. We did not intend to cause you offence or to demonstrate support or rejection of the objectives of Liberty, the cause which I gather the badge supports. It was merely to spare other passengers any potential anxiety through the prominence of the word "terrorist" in what many would consider a security sensitive area. As part of legislative requirements, all airport staff are now required to undergo a greater degree of security awareness training and one of the supporting strains of this is to recognize and to act upon the “out of the ordinary”.
I hope that this provides some explanation of the reason for the action of our member of staff and I trust that this explains why you were asked to remove the badge on this occasion.
It is reassuring that airport staff benefit from additional security awareness training. This is exactly the type of measure that increases our safety.
Unfortunately some of the explanations still left me confused. Neither my colleague nor I noticed the Swissport staff having radio communications with the Easyjet Captain. We may have missed that as even though we were right by the counter we weren't paying particular attention to this. However, during the request to remove my badge, there was no mention of any consultation with the Captain. Sparing potential anxiety is of course something I fully subscribe to, but how come the word ‘terrorists’ when more prominent on a newspaper has not the same potential to create anxiety in a security sensitive area? Security measures, if efficient, should be applied consistently. Why singling my badge out?
I sent a further email requesting clarifications. Here's the concluding email:
Thank you for your further correspondence, and my apologies for a tardy reply. I have been dealing with a large redundancy issue which as I hope you can appreciate is very time consuming.
Our dispatchers are responsible for ensuring the boarding process is safe and timely and, as such, liaise with a number of personnel during the time the aircraft is on the ground. It is likely you would not have been aware of all of these discussions, some of which will have been made by radio or telephone from our Operations office, and there was no need for the dispatcher to explain them to you at the time.
Whilst I can understand your frustration, I am satisfied that in the light of the circumstances on the day as they were explained to me, the dispatcher made the right decision in asking you to remove the badge in question. The dispatcher was the senior member of our staff on duty at the time and, as such, I support his decision and am grateful to you for complying with it.
I have not received the Swissport's regulations covering Swissport staff's authority in requesting passenger to remove badges and other items of clothing
In March last year, the Met launched a counter-terrorism ad campaign. I wrote about it exactly a year this week: Not enough innocents arrested, let's do an ad campaign. These were some of the posters from last year's campaign:
A year later, a new campaign is launched at the tail end of February, and friends sent me links (thank you) to Thomas Hawk's blog post and Flicker thread titled London's Metropolitan Police Launches Anti Photography Propaganda Campaign, as well as doctored images by email. What's changed? Not much. The Police are still asking untrained people to ‘look out for the unusual’. Most foreigners have different customs, hence have ‘some activity or behaviour [...] not quite right and out of place in their normal day to day lives.’ Either you conform or you should be reported.
Here are some of this year's posters:
This year, the poster are simpler and more focused, and phones and cameras get the limelight. As more and more phones are camera-phones, soon one poster will suffice. When I was arrested I somehow had only one phone on me, but when they searched my flat the Police could admire my phone collection: several bowls and drawers full of phones. People working in the mobile phone industry routinely carry several and collect many phones. Photographers do the same with cameras and are harassed.
Going after the techies (and keeping their DNA) will not make us any safer.
Tomorrow, on 2008-02-27, the Europen Court of Human Rights will be holding a Grand Chamber hearing in the case of S. and Michael Marper v. the United Kingdom.
Wednesday 27 February 2008: 9 a.m.
Grand Chamber
S. and Michael Marper v. the United Kingdom (nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04)
The applicants S. and Michael Marper, were born in 1989 and 1963. They are both British nationals who live in Sheffield, United Kingdom.
The case concerns the decision to continue storing fingerprints and DNA samples taken from the applicants after unsuccessful criminal proceedings against them were closed.
On 19 January 2001 S. was arrested and charged with attempted robbery. His fingerprints and DNA samples were taken. He was acquitted on 14 June 2001. Mr Marper was arrested on 13 March 2001, charged with harassing his partner. His fingerprints and DNA samples were also taken. The charges were dropped following reconciliation with his partner and the case against him was discontinued, also on 14 June 2001.
Both applicants unsuccessfully requested that their fingerprints and DNA samples be destroyed.
The applicants both complain about the retention of their fingerprints and DNA samples and the fact that they are being used in ongoing criminal investigations. They are also concerned about the possible future uses of those samples and, in general, that their retention casts suspicion on people who have been acquitted or discharged of crimes. They further contend that, as people without convictions who are no longer suspected criminals, they should be treated in the same way as the rest of the unconvicted population of the United Kingdom. They rely on Articles 8 (right to respect for private life) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention.
The Chamber to which the case was assigned decided to relinquish jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber on 10 July 2007.
Some countries require Police record information as part of their immigration, visas, work permits and residency acceptance processes. This is the case for the USA: ‘Under United States visa law, people who have been arrested at anytime are required to declare the arrest when applying for a visa.’ This applies to all those that have been arrested even if never convicted.
The way to get details of your – blank or otherwise – police record is to make a subject access request using the Police National Computer (PNC) Form 3019B. This is a right given by the Data Protection Act 1998. The act stipulates that a reply must be received within 40 days as long as the necessary fee has been paid. The fee is decided by the relevant data controller up to a maximum of £10 and the Police do charge the maximum.
With very little fanfare, a trial has recently started in which four countries will no longer accepting PNC record extracts for their visa procedures. Instead you will need a police certificate:
The ACPO Criminal Records Office is piloting an initiative to provide Police Certificates for Visa purposes. The four countries involved in the pilot are Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States of America.
There's no press release from the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) I could find. Searching the Hansard (or They work for you) does not bring any result so this doesn't appear to have been debated in Parliament at all. Nothing either on the websites of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Department for Transport, the Home Office or the Ministry of Justice (sponsor of the Information Commissioner's Office). The new form on the ACPO site, a Word file, does not include any issuance date, but the document properties reveal that it was created by the Hampshire Constabulary on 2008-01-15. The US Embassy is requiring new visa applicants to furnish a new style police certificate from the ACPO and those that have already applied for a PNC data subject access have only until 2008-08-15 to appear for interview. For a trial, it looks rather definitive. The websites of the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand embassies do not appear to have been updated yet to reflect the changes (with the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website even including out of date URLs to the Metropolitan Police Service website).
Here's a summary of the differences:
| PNC data subject access | ACPO police certificate | |
| Provides | ‘[I]nformation that may be held about you on the Police National Computer’ | Unclear The form states: ‘ACRO will carry out extensive authentication exercises including searching various databases.’ |
| Validity | 12 months | 6 months |
| Cost | £10 paid to the local police force | £35 for standard service (£70 for a premium service) paid to ‘HPA’ (apparently the Hampshire Police Authority) |
| Processing time | Within 40 days (Data Protection Act requirement) | Aimed to be within 10 working days (2 working days for the premium service) |
| Requirements | Proof of identity (returned), fee and form 3019B (less than a page) | Proof of identity (retained), photograph, fee and Police Certificate Application Form (two pages) Declaration and photograph to be countersigned by a guarantor |
| Who handles the requests | National Indentification Service (NIS) All data subject access requests are under the authority of the Information Commissioner's Office |
ACPO Criminal Records Office (ACRO) |
These new police certificates appear to work outside the constraints of any law and any debate, they are entirely governed by the ACPO and the agreements it made with several embassies. The list of database queried is not known and what will be communicated is not yet known either (someone who has gone through the process may detail what the result reveals). The fee has more than tripled. The only positive is that it is speedier, but even that is not guaranteed: ‘ACRO will aim to produce all police certificates (standard service) within 10 working days.’
And the ACPO is most likely free to change any aspect of this scheme as it chooses.
Why introducing a paralegal process when there's already one in place that seems to do the job? If the PNC data subject access process was not adquate for visa requirements of some countries then this should be explained, debated by Parliament and put under the authority of the Information Commissioner's Office.
The Home Office consultation on Managing Protest around Parliament closes on 2008-01-17. Have you sent your response in yet?
Peaceful demonstrations happened on Saturday. Here's what Rikki wrote at Indymedia about the London event:
in an afternoon of filming, at no time did i see a single act of violence towards the police from the peaceful protestors, and yet police used completely disproportionate and aggressive tactics to disperse and control peaceful sit-downs and blockades. i saw a 61 year old woman being dragged without any heed for 'health and safety' and dumped on the pavement. another elderly man was thrown over his bicycle (despite having recently had an accident leaving him in considerable pain)
there were several other arrests this afternoon, mainly for obstruction and public order offences. one person was arrested for 'organising an unauthorised protest'
See also Parliament Protest. And, don't delay sending in your response any further.
(In unrelated news, the planned demonstration by the Police Federation of England and Wales to go through Westminster on 2008-01-23 looks like it may be banned by the Metropolitan Police.)
Several readers of How to delete your DNA profile (El Reg) have queried what happens to the backups of the National DNA (and IDENT1) database. Here's Wayne Sheddan:
Do you know how the fingerprint and DNA records are removed from the backup tapes? These still contain the records from when they are first entered until they are removed? It's one thing to delete the records from the online database, it's another thing altogether to eliminate them completely from all data repositories...
Knowing most organizations it's likely the records are even online in the test systems - since these are often just a restore from production at some point in time, and are often 'refreshed' using production backup tapes...
Deleted - but not gone...
If only for cost reason it is unlikely for any backup tape to be expunged of ‘deleted’ data. Depending on the backup rotation scheme and the number of tapes used, the backed up data may have a finite lifetime and tapes degrade as they age and are eventually destroyed. Hence, it is likely that data such as fingerprints, DNA profiles and Police National Computer (PNC) records when ‘electronically deleted’ remain on backup tapes for possibly several more years. Deleted - but not (entirely) gone...
Another reader even suggested the possibility for the Police to keep a database of deleted DNA profiles. This is the standard operating procedure! ‘The Retention Guidelines are based on a format of restricting access to PNC data, rather than the deletion of that data.’ The step-down model effectively makes the data appear deleted to all but the Police and for Enhanced Checks. However, it is most unlikely the Police would maintain such a database of ‘electronically deleted’ records for ‘exceptional cases’ (as defined in these same Police guidelines) as it would be in complete contradiction to the statements they issue to each individual for whom they delete the DNA profile. Of course, if this procedure was to be changed in the future, all the records marked as stepped-down could be stepped back up.
Wayne Sheddan adds:
I just hope the legislation is such that records that have been deleted are subsequently inadmissible in court. I can just imagine the scenario where a restore is required, but the subsequent transaction roll-forward that contains the 'delete' commands fails - leaving the records in place again.... the legal status of the records must thus be the primary protection for the
citizenry[residents].
Current legislation authorises the Police in England and Wales to keep the DNA profiles they collect – of innocents and convicted alike – forever. So if such records were used in court, even after the Police promised they had been deleted, they likely would be admissible as long as they were collected and retained legally. You could of course complain and/or go to trial about the fact that the Police lied to you but I'd expect that to be a separate matter entirely. (Reminder: I am not a lawyer and this is just my interpretation.)
This is yet another reason that makes the ‘exceptional case process map’, the SCD12 Senior Information Manager promised me will be published early this year so important. When describing all the steps taken when deleting electronic records (and destroying samples), the document will, hopefully, make it clear as well what happens to the backups of deleted data. Publishing this process will also mean that innocents getting their DNA profile deleted will be treated fairly as the process will be documented and the same for everyone in that situation.
P.S. Earlier this week, Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys, the geneticist who first found a way to identify people through their DNA two decades ago, told the BBC that ‘recent developments such as the retention of innocent people's DNA raises significant ethical and social issues.’
Last year I wondered: ‘Hopefully there are processes to ensure that no database record or bio-information sample is missed in the destruction and deletion procedure.’ Then I learnt that no such processes yet exist.
El Reg published earlier today my article ‘How to delete your DNA profile’ that reveals that a process map is coming:
[...] So how would I know that my DNA profile really had been deleted? One way to verify this would be to plant some of my DNA at a crime scene and wait for a knock at the door. Obviously this is an experiment I will not undertake. I'd much prefer to have (verifiable) specific assurances rather than assumptions, but instead I'll have to trust the Police and the labs they use.
To avoid others having to go through this same situation, I shared these concerns with the SCD12 Senior Information Manager. The outcome: "An exceptional case process map will be available on the MPS Publication Scheme early 2008."
Having a documented process in place instead of the current ad-hoc mechanisms will go some way to increase confidence in the efficacy of what must be a complex procedure. Unsurprisingly, the Information Commissioner's Office has also been keen for a long time for the Police to implement such a step-out (deletion) procedure.
Publishing a process - which describes in detail the actions to be taken by the Police departments and their contractors - will help ensure other innocents get fair and open treatment in getting off the NDNAD. This, in turn, will help make exceptional cases the norm.
2007:
2006:
To friends and readers,
The BBC story about Samina Malik explains:
The jury found her not guilty of possessing articles for terrorist purposes. [ Section 57 of the Terrorism Act 2000]
But they did convict of the lesser terror charge of collecting articles "likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism". [ Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000]
This gives Malik the dubious honour of being the first woman ever convicted for offences related to Islamist terrorism in the UK.
Samina Malik is the 23-year old English woman who wrote bad poetry under the pseudonym of the ‘Lyrical Terrorist’ among others. This case is ‘profoundly disturbing’; this is the expression used by Gareth Peirce about the same Section 58 under which Malik was convicted.
This unease is shared by Rachel North who has been researching muslim radicalisation for the past two and half years:
There are many things about this case which disturb me (besides the appalling comparison of Owen's devastating poetry with Samina's ghastly scrawls). I think there are a great many Saminas in this country. In suburban bedrooms all over the UK, young men and women of all ages and religions and colours and shapes and sizes are writing bad poetry, listening to horrible lyrics, wearing black clothes, keeping diaries about how they hate the world and nobody understands, slamming the door and not coming down to eat their tea on time.
Things were ever thus.[...]
Samina did not own any bombs, or guns, or quantities of fertiliser or peroxide, or detonators. She owned literature, and she wrote obnoxious lyrics and she seems to me to be as star-struck as the young girls and boys who wish they were ''with the band'', and who write letters and poetry expressing their admiration for the gangster rap thug, the death-metal anti-hero, the groupie-slapping rock star. If you can't drink, or smoke, or get a tattoo, or stay out late at gigs and hang about in trashy bars, then how do you express your rebellion? Samina wore a hijab, when her mother didn't. Samina wrote truly awful poetry. Samina, the shop girl, bored in WH Smiths beeping endless stuff through the tills to the endless airport crowds, then back home in her suburban bedroom, hoped to meet radical boys who thought she was ''cool''. Samina is the first woman to be convicted under the Terrorism Act.
Gareth Peirce pointed out that ‘we now see a new and disturbing phenomenon whereby more than one innocent defendant [is] unable to comprehend the accusation levelled’. It is not only defendants who find it difficult to comprehend that such possession is inconsistent with the right to freedom of thought. Here are Kathz' thoughts:
As children, my brother and I practised stealing handkerchiefs from one another's pockets. We were inspired by Fagin's gang in Oliver Twist. We became rather skilful - but never practised our skills on anyone else. We wrote stories - some in first person - imagining all kinds of extreme scenarios. My brother, aged 6, wrote a letter to a friend which suggested dynamiting the school he attended. (The head was quite worried by this but our mum was, rightly, amused. She knew the difference between play and act.) In my head I explored violent scenarios and I turned some of them into poems. I knew they weren't real. They will never be real.
In my poems, I still explore different characters and different points of view. In my novel (the one I will probably never finish) I explore a range of themes, including violence and murder. It's not real.
It's not real.
I haven't read full accounts of Samina Malik's trial. But so far as I can see, she has done no more than I would in exploring a character or point of view - or in following ideas on the web with curiosity. She has read books. She has visited websites. She has written poems. And she adopted a range of tags, including "Lyrical Terrorist."
I don't think real terrorists advertise their intentions in this way.
But Samina Malik has been told she faces a jail sentence. The charge was collecting articles "likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism." I have articles like that. I have an Oyster card and a London tube map. I have an encycopedia which probably has more useful advice than the dangerous literature she is said to have collected.
One item of dangerous litterature found in the possession of Malik was the Mujahideen Poisons Handbook. Dick Destiny was asked by the defense to contribute a short analysis concerning this book:
It contains many errors and some rather large fabrications which, while not obvious to laymen, are glaringly apparent to professionals trained in chemistry and biology.
DD has combed over it many times in the past year, tracing its origins and showing that it is fundamentally just an abridged and Bowdlerized copy of a pamphlet that had been published in the US in 1988, Maxwell Hutchkinson's The Poisoner's Handbook (Loompanics).
[...]
Malik was convicted for possessing records deemed to be of potential use to terrorists, including the document pictured above. It has been published many places on the web and the above snapshot was published in a Sunday edition of the Washington Post newspaper in 2005.
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