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Gareth Peirce, ‘a lawyer who has since the 1970s represented individuals accused of involvement in terrorism from both the Irish and the Muslim communities’ explores in the London Review of Books whether the position of Muslims in Britain is what it was like for the Irish. It is a longish article, very well written, in a calm voice, which raises serious issues that too many may not be fully aware of: ‘Over the years of the conflict, every lawless action on the part of the British state provoked a similar reaction: internment, ‘shoot to kill’, the use of torture (hooding, extreme stress positions, mock executions), brutally obtained false confessions and fabricated evidence. This was registered by the community most affected, but the British public, in whose name these actions were taken, remained ignorant: that the state was seen to be combating terrorism sufficed.’ Please, do read her article in full.
[...] The answer lies in Blair’s warning: ‘The rules of the game have changed.’ Previously accepted boundaries of freedom of expression and thought have been redefined and are now in effect being prosecuted retrospectively, with the result that our criminal justice system is becoming further distorted as many truly innocent defendants plead guilty, against their lawyers’ advice, terrified by the prospect, as they see it, of inevitable conviction and ever lengthening prison sentences. Thousands of others, all of whom have searched the internet, watch with horror the process of criminalisation and punishment.
In this country we did not grow up with a written constitution and human rights legislation entered our law only recently. In times of tension we struggle to find answers to basic questions. Are there rules and can they be changed? Are there legal concepts that protect a community under blanket suspicion, or should that community’s adverse reaction to suspicion be seen as oversensitivity in the face of perceived political necessity? Should we accept the concept of the greatest good for the greatest number? The answer is again the same: we are bound by international treaty and, belatedly, by domestic human rights legislation, to hold that there are inalienable rights that attach to the individual rather than society. Article 8 of the European Convention protects not only respect for family and private life, but also the individual against humiliating treatment; Article 10 protects freedom of expression, Article 9 freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and Article 14 guarantees that in the enjoyment of these rights any discrimination is itself prohibited. Occasionally, fierce campaigning successfully sounds an alarm: the proposed extension from 28 to 42 days of the time allowed for questioning those suspected of involvement in terrorism is being energetically fought. But there are less obvious erosions of parallel rights.
If this is indeed how it was for the Irish, we should urgently try to understand how significant change came about for them. Much current reminiscence ignores vital factors, such as the inescapable responsibility of the Irish Republic and, above all, the political weight of the Irish diaspora and the far-sightedness of those who began and maintained contact, long before Blair was elected and claimed the ultimate prize. Throughout the thirty years of conflict, forty million Americans of Irish descent formed an electoral statistic that no US administration could afford to ignore. It is said that on the night before he decided to grant a visa to Gerry Adams, Bill Clinton watched a film about the catastrophic injustice inflicted on one Irish family by the British state. Here, Lord Scarman and Lord Devlin, retired law lords, joined Cardinal Hume, the head of the Catholic Church in England, in educating themselves in the finest detail of three sets of wrongful convictions involving 14 defendants. At one critical moment Cardinal Hume confronted the home secretary, Douglas Hurd, challenging the adequacy of his briefing.
No similar allies for the Muslim community are evident today, capable of pushing and pulling the British government publicly or privately into seeing sense. Spiritually, the Muslim Ummah is seen as being infinite, but the powerful regimes of the Muslim world almost without exception not only themselves perpetrate oppression, but choose to work hand in hand with the US and the UK in their ‘war on terror’. It is for us, as a nation, to take stock of ourselves. We are very far along a destructive path, and if our government continues on that path, we will ultimately have destroyed much of the moral and legal fabric of the society that we claim to be protecting. The choice and the responsibility are entirely ours.
(Discovered via Dick Destiny.)
More on Gareth Peirce in English legal system contaminated.
On 2008-04-23, Gareth Peirce will join Independent columnist Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, poet and writer Benjamin Zephaniah, chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission Nick Hardwick, and Guantanamo survivor Moazzam Begg in a panel discussion on Racism and the state of Britain chaired by chaired by Asad Rehman - Newham Monitoring Project.
The Governance
of Britain – Analysis of Consultations summarises the responses it received to the Managing
Protest
around Parliament consultation as follows:
11. The Government received 512 responses during the 12 week consultation period. Representations were received from 25 campaign groups, from six MPs and two Peers, from a number of other interested stakeholders including the Metropolitan Police Service, the Greater London Authority,Westminster City Council and the Law Society of Scotland. However, most responses – over 90 percent – were received from members of the public.
12. The vast majority of responses – over 95 percent – either explicitly or implicitly called for the straight repeal of sections 132 to 138 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCAP), rejecting arguments that a distinct framework for managing protest around Parliament could be justified on security grounds, or on grounds that the business of Parliament needed special protection, or by a need to safeguard wider public enjoyment of the space.
13. There was a clear and strongly articulated view that sections 132 to 138 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act, and in particular the requirement to notify the police in advance, have restricted and stifled spontaneous protest in the area around Parliament.There was also a clear view expressed by members of the public that the area around Parliament is special in that it is the focus of political protest and that nowhere is the right to protest and voice one’s views more important than at the seat of Parliament itself.
On an unrelated news The Governance of Britain – Draft Constitutional Reform Bill
starts with the repeal of the sections 132
to 138 of SOCPA (this act is more commonly abbreviated to SOCPA than SOCAP):
PART 1
DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF PARLIAMENT
1 Repeal of sections 132 to 138 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005
(1) Omit sections 132 to 138 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (c.15) (which regulates demonstrations in the vicinity of Parliament)
(2) In the Table in section 175(3) of that Act (transitional provision relating to offences) omit the entries relating to section 136.
(3) In paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 2 to the Noise and Statutory Nuisance Act 1993 (c.40) (which is about consents for the operation of loudspeakers) omit "or of section 137(1) of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005".
(4) Omit paragraph 64 of Schedule 6 to the Serious Crime Act 2007 (c.27)
This intention is welcomed, but at this stage this is just a draft bill which may be changed and will take time to come into force. If this happens then we'll return to the status quo before these sections came into force – minus all the arrests of peaceful protesters in the designated zone and the time wasted by protesters and the Police alike in dealing with the required authorisations.
What do Marper, S., Kevin Reynolds and myself have in common? We're all innocents who have had our DNA taken following an arrest. I have been the lucky one as it only took me two years to get my DNA profile removed and samples destroyed. Marper & S. are fighting it all the way to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and Kevin Reynolds has had to go through a traumatic arrest, which could have been avoided had the Police immediately checked his previously retained DNA profile.
After having gone all the way to the Grand Chamber of the ECHR, the Marper
and S v. UK is viewed as a test case about whether the UK is
breaching human rights by retaining DNA samples and profiles of unconvicted innocent people. The
hearing of this case by is available to watch online and the ruling
will be given later this year:
As mentioned two weeks ago, you can:
Helen Wallace from GeneWatch, name checked during the hearing, makes a very strong argument that there is a diminishing return from adding more individuals' DNA profiles to the National DNA Database (NDNAD). Here's an extract from the GeneWatch page on its contribution to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics consultation:
Collecting more DNA from crime scenes has made a big difference to the number of crimes solved, but keeping DNA from more and more people who have been arrested – many of whom are innocent – has not. Since April 2003, about 1.5 million extra people have been added to the Database, but the chances of detecting a crime using DNA has remained constant, at about 0.36%.
The recent conviction of Mark Dixie for the horrific murder of Sally Anne Bowman has been used in the ECHR hearing and by the Police to justify and demand retention of DNA of even more individuals:
The policeman who led the hunt for Sally Anne Bowman's killer today called for a national DNA register. Detective Superintendent Stuart Cundy said having everyone's DNA on file would speed up arrests and cut down on further offending.
What Detective Superintendent Cundy didn't mention is how, in this very same case, the data retained on the National DNA Database was ignored to arrest an innocent for murder, indecent assault and robbery. Let's go into more details of the case of Kevin Reynolds to understand how retaining DNA samples and profiles of innocents does not automatically help to eliminate them as suspect in investigation.
Postman Kevin Reynolds had had his DNA and fingerprints taken on 2002-06-14 when he was charged, but later acquitted, with being drunk and disorderly. The profile was loaded on the NDNAD on 2002-07-04. Even though he was acquitted, his fingerprints and DNA profile remained on file.
Fast forward to 2005-12-12, when following complaints by a jilted girlfriend, Kevin is taken into custody at the Edmonton Police station at 02:10. He is led to the fingerprinting room to have his fingerprints taken and DNA sampled. The Livescan fingerprinting system confirms Kevin's identity and give his CRO number. So even if there are several Kevin Reynolds with the exact same date of birth living at the same place, Livescan has confirmed that this is the Kevin Reynolds for which the Police has retained a DNA profile (and samples). Here are the Livescan sheet for Kevin and an extract from the Livescan manual:
Search Result (SRE)
An SRE is returned to the Livescan unit. This will be received after the ACK and once the search has been completed (and verified if requested). This will contain the result of the search. If a search is verified, i.e. has been viewed by a fingerprint expert, there will be one CRO. If the search is non-verified, there may be up to four respondents displayed, with system confidence ratings (High, Medium, or Low). If the result is a no trace, No Respondents will be displayed.
Nothing was explained to Kevin. When they took him to the fingerprinting room, he asked why they were doing this as they already had his fingerprints and DNA. He received no reply. Even though Livescan confirmed the identification, DNA samples were again taken from him. This has recently been confirmed by the Forensic Science Service (FSS):
The sample which you supplied to the Metropolitan Police Service on 12 December 2005, in connection with a murder inquiry, was analysed by the FSS in order to generate your DNA profile. Your DNA profile was compared against the DNA profile obtained from the crime scene. Additionally your DNA profile record relating to this sample was submitted to The National DNA Database and is now retained, in compliance with legislation, on The National DNA Database.
Kevin is placed in cell. At 04:50 the wicket of the cell opens and the officers ask Kevin to come to the cell door. He is told he is ‘arrested on suspicion of the murder of Sally Ann [sic] Bowman [...] and cautioned’. His reply: ‘Who? Who is Sally Ann Bowman?’
A news article from the Metropolitan Police Service explains: ‘At an early stage DNA was recovered from the murder scene, which police believed identified the murderer.’ The Police had profiled the DNA from the crime scene, they had a man in their custody for whom they already had a DNA profile loaded in the system, the identification of this man was even confirmed by Livescan, and they still arrested him for the murder of Sally Anne Bowman? Kevin's DNA profile on the NDNAD would have been sufficient to show there was no match and clear him from suspicion.
It doesn't stop there. At 14:15, Kevin is further arrested for indecent assault and for the robbery in Sanderstead Road (this attack is linked to the murder of Sally Anne Bowman). He reiterates: ‘I am completely innocent’. At 21:18, Kevin is taken to a double identity parade using video capture; he learns two hours later from his solicitor that both id parades were negative and in one of them another person was picked out. At 12:09 the next day, Kevin is formally interviewed, and close to half an hour in the interview, the interviewing officer's phone beeps to tell him that Kevin's DNA didn't match the crime scene's DNA, and he's eventually released as no further action (NFA'd).
He then goes home and find his father's house, where he was living, smashed to pieces and to learn his car is in some pound in south London. The specialist search team were still in his house but leaving. His father commented to the Morning Star:
"They pulled my house apart - breaking furniture and damaging the walls - and went through all my files. Yet, I was not asked a single question about my son," he says.
Kevin told the Eye:
“My heart goes out to the Bowman family, but it makes me very angry that time, money and energy were wasted pursuing me when it was known all along that I could not be the killer. I dread to think what would have happened had one of the witnesses identified me in the line-up. My case shows that the database does not protect innocent people from wrongful arrest and detention.”
Kevin's DNA eventually cleared him after more than 34 hours and a harrowing experience. Having his DNA retained should have cleared Kevin immediately, but it did not. They did not use the retained DNA samples and profile. DNA appears to be used only when convenient for the Police, with little respect for innocent individuals.
The cost of criminalising a whole population in the hope of being better at catching criminals is a price to high to pay when the case for a better detection rate with an increasing larger database has not even been made. Calls, such as the Times reports, are dangerous propaganda as the innocents do have to fear:
The detective who led the Bowman investigation said: “It is my opinion that a national DNA register could have identified Sally Anne’s murderer within 24 hours.” The innocent would have nothing to fear, while the guilty would be caught. It could even deter criminals.
Gary Pugh, director of forensic sciences at Scotland Yard and the new DNA spokesman for the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), has just been joining Detective Superintendent Cundy in calling for an ever bigger NDNAD. Worryingly he's setting his personal sights on children as young as five when currently under 10-year-old are out of the reach of the NDNAD:
'If we have a primary means of identifying people before they offend, then in the long-term the benefits of targeting younger people are extremely large,' said Pugh. 'You could argue the younger the better. Criminologists say some people will grow out of crime; others won't. We have to find who are possibly going to be the biggest threat to society.'
Thanks to Stephen Cragg for the title of this post and to Kevin Reynolds for his assistance regarding his story.
Yet another Counter-Terrorism Bill is currently before Parliament. It will impose new and worse forms of punishment without trial. Since the first permanent Terrorism Act of 2000, people have suffered much injustice under anti-terrorism measures, particularly Muslims and migrant communities. Out of over 1,200 people arrested under anti-terrorism laws, less than 5% have been convicted of ‘terrorism’ offences, few of these involving any plans for violent activities. Less than 20% were even charged with such offences. A key effect and political aim has been a climate of fear – fear that political activity, or simply talking to the wrong people, will bring arrest or house raids.
Why does the government propose yet another Counter-Terrorism law? What effects will it have? What can people do to oppose it?
This Friday 2008-03-14, 6.30pm-9.00pm at the London Muslim Centre, 46 Whitechapel Road, London E1 1JQ, speakers will look at unjust effects of the current anti-terrorism measures and how this injustice would be extended by the new proposals. They will explain and analyse the proposals in the new Bill. There will be plenty of time for questions and discussion – about what powers to oppose, how to present the issues to your own community, and what action to request from your MP.
Event organised by the Campaign against criminalising communities (CAMPACC) with the Centre for the study of terrorism (CFSOT), and co-sponsored by the London Muslim Centre, Islamic Forum of Europe, Cage Prisoners and the Newham Monitoring Project.
The government’s new proposals are based on the Terrorism Act 2000, which defined terrorism so broadly as to include simply the threat of violence to property in an attempt to influence a government, anywhere in the world. This broad definition, with offences like belonging to or helping a banned organisation, criminalises many normal political activities in the UK and any resistance to oppressive regimes abroad.
For more information on the bill and a model letter to send your MP visit the CAMPACC Briefing Document Counter Terrorism Bill 2008. Please ask your MP to oppose these proposals!
Information in this post is from the announcement for this event.
In March last year, the Met launched a counter-terrorism ad campaign. I wrote about it exactly a year this week: Not enough innocents arrested, let's do an ad campaign. These were some of the posters from last year's campaign:
A year later, a new campaign is launched at the tail end of February, and friends sent me links (thank you) to Thomas Hawk's blog post and Flicker thread titled London's Metropolitan Police Launches Anti Photography Propaganda Campaign, as well as doctored images by email. What's changed? Not much. The Police are still asking untrained people to ‘look out for the unusual’. Most foreigners have different customs, hence have ‘some activity or behaviour [...] not quite right and out of place in their normal day to day lives.’ Either you conform or you should be reported.
Here are some of this year's posters:
This year, the poster are simpler and more focused, and phones and cameras get the limelight. As more and more phones are camera-phones, soon one poster will suffice. When I was arrested I somehow had only one phone on me, but when they searched my flat the Police could admire my phone collection: several bowls and drawers full of phones. People working in the mobile phone industry routinely carry several and collect many phones. Photographers do the same with cameras and are harassed.
Going after the techies (and keeping their DNA) will not make us any safer.
Tomorrow, on 2008-02-27, the Europen Court of Human Rights will be holding a Grand Chamber hearing in the case of S. and Michael Marper v. the United Kingdom.
Wednesday 27 February 2008: 9 a.m.
Grand Chamber
S. and Michael Marper v. the United Kingdom (nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04)
The applicants S. and Michael Marper, were born in 1989 and 1963. They are both British nationals who live in Sheffield, United Kingdom.
The case concerns the decision to continue storing fingerprints and DNA samples taken from the applicants after unsuccessful criminal proceedings against them were closed.
On 19 January 2001 S. was arrested and charged with attempted robbery. His fingerprints and DNA samples were taken. He was acquitted on 14 June 2001. Mr Marper was arrested on 13 March 2001, charged with harassing his partner. His fingerprints and DNA samples were also taken. The charges were dropped following reconciliation with his partner and the case against him was discontinued, also on 14 June 2001.
Both applicants unsuccessfully requested that their fingerprints and DNA samples be destroyed.
The applicants both complain about the retention of their fingerprints and DNA samples and the fact that they are being used in ongoing criminal investigations. They are also concerned about the possible future uses of those samples and, in general, that their retention casts suspicion on people who have been acquitted or discharged of crimes. They further contend that, as people without convictions who are no longer suspected criminals, they should be treated in the same way as the rest of the unconvicted population of the United Kingdom. They rely on Articles 8 (right to respect for private life) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention.
The Chamber to which the case was assigned decided to relinquish jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber on 10 July 2007.
The Home Office consultation on Managing Protest around Parliament closes on 2008-01-17. Have you sent your response in yet?
Peaceful demonstrations happened on Saturday. Here's what Rikki wrote at Indymedia about the London event:
in an afternoon of filming, at no time did i see a single act of violence towards the police from the peaceful protestors, and yet police used completely disproportionate and aggressive tactics to disperse and control peaceful sit-downs and blockades. i saw a 61 year old woman being dragged without any heed for 'health and safety' and dumped on the pavement. another elderly man was thrown over his bicycle (despite having recently had an accident leaving him in considerable pain)
there were several other arrests this afternoon, mainly for obstruction and public order offences. one person was arrested for 'organising an unauthorised protest'
See also Parliament Protest. And, don't delay sending in your response any further.
(In unrelated news, the planned demonstration by the Police Federation of England and Wales to go through Westminster on 2008-01-23 looks like it may be banned by the Metropolitan Police.)
Several readers of How to delete your DNA profile (El Reg) have queried what happens to the backups of the National DNA (and IDENT1) database. Here's Wayne Sheddan:
Do you know how the fingerprint and DNA records are removed from the backup tapes? These still contain the records from when they are first entered until they are removed? It's one thing to delete the records from the online database, it's another thing altogether to eliminate them completely from all data repositories...
Knowing most organizations it's likely the records are even online in the test systems - since these are often just a restore from production at some point in time, and are often 'refreshed' using production backup tapes...
Deleted - but not gone...
If only for cost reason it is unlikely for any backup tape to be expunged of ‘deleted’ data. Depending on the backup rotation scheme and the number of tapes used, the backed up data may have a finite lifetime and tapes degrade as they age and are eventually destroyed. Hence, it is likely that data such as fingerprints, DNA profiles and Police National Computer (PNC) records when ‘electronically deleted’ remain on backup tapes for possibly several more years. Deleted - but not (entirely) gone...
Another reader even suggested the possibility for the Police to keep a database of deleted DNA profiles. This is the standard operating procedure! ‘The Retention Guidelines are based on a format of restricting access to PNC data, rather than the deletion of that data.’ The step-down model effectively makes the data appear deleted to all but the Police and for Enhanced Checks. However, it is most unlikely the Police would maintain such a database of ‘electronically deleted’ records for ‘exceptional cases’ (as defined in these same Police guidelines) as it would be in complete contradiction to the statements they issue to each individual for whom they delete the DNA profile. Of course, if this procedure was to be changed in the future, all the records marked as stepped-down could be stepped back up.
Wayne Sheddan adds:
I just hope the legislation is such that records that have been deleted are subsequently inadmissible in court. I can just imagine the scenario where a restore is required, but the subsequent transaction roll-forward that contains the 'delete' commands fails - leaving the records in place again.... the legal status of the records must thus be the primary protection for the
citizenry[residents].
Current legislation authorises the Police in England and Wales to keep the DNA profiles they collect – of innocents and convicted alike – forever. So if such records were used in court, even after the Police promised they had been deleted, they likely would be admissible as long as they were collected and retained legally. You could of course complain and/or go to trial about the fact that the Police lied to you but I'd expect that to be a separate matter entirely. (Reminder: I am not a lawyer and this is just my interpretation.)
This is yet another reason that makes the ‘exceptional case process map’, the SCD12 Senior Information Manager promised me will be published early this year so important. When describing all the steps taken when deleting electronic records (and destroying samples), the document will, hopefully, make it clear as well what happens to the backups of deleted data. Publishing this process will also mean that innocents getting their DNA profile deleted will be treated fairly as the process will be documented and the same for everyone in that situation.
P.S. Earlier this week, Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys, the geneticist who first found a way to identify people through their DNA two decades ago, told the BBC that ‘recent developments such as the retention of innocent people's DNA raises significant ethical and social issues.’
Last year I wondered: ‘Hopefully there are processes to ensure that no database record or bio-information sample is missed in the destruction and deletion procedure.’ Then I learnt that no such processes yet exist.
El Reg published earlier today my article ‘How to delete your DNA profile’ that reveals that a process map is coming:
[...] So how would I know that my DNA profile really had been deleted? One way to verify this would be to plant some of my DNA at a crime scene and wait for a knock at the door. Obviously this is an experiment I will not undertake. I'd much prefer to have (verifiable) specific assurances rather than assumptions, but instead I'll have to trust the Police and the labs they use.
To avoid others having to go through this same situation, I shared these concerns with the SCD12 Senior Information Manager. The outcome: "An exceptional case process map will be available on the MPS Publication Scheme early 2008."
Having a documented process in place instead of the current ad-hoc mechanisms will go some way to increase confidence in the efficacy of what must be a complex procedure. Unsurprisingly, the Information Commissioner's Office has also been keen for a long time for the Police to implement such a step-out (deletion) procedure.
Publishing a process - which describes in detail the actions to be taken by the Police departments and their contractors - will help ensure other innocents get fair and open treatment in getting off the NDNAD. This, in turn, will help make exceptional cases the norm.
The BBC story about Samina Malik explains:
The jury found her not guilty of possessing articles for terrorist purposes. [ Section 57 of the Terrorism Act 2000]
But they did convict of the lesser terror charge of collecting articles "likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism". [ Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000]
This gives Malik the dubious honour of being the first woman ever convicted for offences related to Islamist terrorism in the UK.
Samina Malik is the 23-year old English woman who wrote bad poetry under the pseudonym of the ‘Lyrical Terrorist’ among others. This case is ‘profoundly disturbing’; this is the expression used by Gareth Peirce about the same Section 58 under which Malik was convicted.
This unease is shared by Rachel North who has been researching muslim radicalisation for the past two and half years:
There are many things about this case which disturb me (besides the appalling comparison of Owen's devastating poetry with Samina's ghastly scrawls). I think there are a great many Saminas in this country. In suburban bedrooms all over the UK, young men and women of all ages and religions and colours and shapes and sizes are writing bad poetry, listening to horrible lyrics, wearing black clothes, keeping diaries about how they hate the world and nobody understands, slamming the door and not coming down to eat their tea on time.
Things were ever thus.[...]
Samina did not own any bombs, or guns, or quantities of fertiliser or peroxide, or detonators. She owned literature, and she wrote obnoxious lyrics and she seems to me to be as star-struck as the young girls and boys who wish they were ''with the band'', and who write letters and poetry expressing their admiration for the gangster rap thug, the death-metal anti-hero, the groupie-slapping rock star. If you can't drink, or smoke, or get a tattoo, or stay out late at gigs and hang about in trashy bars, then how do you express your rebellion? Samina wore a hijab, when her mother didn't. Samina wrote truly awful poetry. Samina, the shop girl, bored in WH Smiths beeping endless stuff through the tills to the endless airport crowds, then back home in her suburban bedroom, hoped to meet radical boys who thought she was ''cool''. Samina is the first woman to be convicted under the Terrorism Act.
Gareth Peirce pointed out that ‘we now see a new and disturbing phenomenon whereby more than one innocent defendant [is] unable to comprehend the accusation levelled’. It is not only defendants who find it difficult to comprehend that such possession is inconsistent with the right to freedom of thought. Here are Kathz' thoughts:
As children, my brother and I practised stealing handkerchiefs from one another's pockets. We were inspired by Fagin's gang in Oliver Twist. We became rather skilful - but never practised our skills on anyone else. We wrote stories - some in first person - imagining all kinds of extreme scenarios. My brother, aged 6, wrote a letter to a friend which suggested dynamiting the school he attended. (The head was quite worried by this but our mum was, rightly, amused. She knew the difference between play and act.) In my head I explored violent scenarios and I turned some of them into poems. I knew they weren't real. They will never be real.
In my poems, I still explore different characters and different points of view. In my novel (the one I will probably never finish) I explore a range of themes, including violence and murder. It's not real.
It's not real.
I haven't read full accounts of Samina Malik's trial. But so far as I can see, she has done no more than I would in exploring a character or point of view - or in following ideas on the web with curiosity. She has read books. She has visited websites. She has written poems. And she adopted a range of tags, including "Lyrical Terrorist."
I don't think real terrorists advertise their intentions in this way.
But Samina Malik has been told she faces a jail sentence. The charge was collecting articles "likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism." I have articles like that. I have an Oyster card and a London tube map. I have an encycopedia which probably has more useful advice than the dangerous literature she is said to have collected.
One item of dangerous litterature found in the possession of Malik was the Mujahideen Poisons Handbook. Dick Destiny was asked by the defense to contribute a short analysis concerning this book:
It contains many errors and some rather large fabrications which, while not obvious to laymen, are glaringly apparent to professionals trained in chemistry and biology.
DD has combed over it many times in the past year, tracing its origins and showing that it is fundamentally just an abridged and Bowdlerized copy of a pamphlet that had been published in the US in 1988, Maxwell Hutchkinson's The Poisoner's Handbook (Loompanics).
[...]
Malik was convicted for possessing records deemed to be of potential use to terrorists, including the document pictured above. It has been published many places on the web and the above snapshot was published in a Sunday edition of the Washington Post newspaper in 2005.
Human rights lawyer Gareth Peirce wrote a comment piece in the Guardian about her client Cerie Bullivant and the injustices faced by those charged with control order breaches. The context is is the verdict in the case of Cerie Bullivant where a clear-sighted jury concluded ‘that his every breach, including absconding, was reasonable in the face of the crushing effects of a secret accusation by the state’:
[...] Worryingly, within the "ordinary" criminal process, many defendants now face charges of such vagueness and uncertainty that, even after a trial, in many cases after conviction, they still have no understanding of why what they have done has been ruled criminal.
Defendant after defendant has discovered that a long-forgotten internet search has left an indelible record sufficient for a conviction under the profoundly disturbing section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which allows prosecution for simple possession of an item likely to be useful to terrorists, and carries a sentence of up to 10 years' imprisonment. While the record of use remains permanently, no equivalent reconstruction is available or even required of the mindset of the user at the time. The common elements in each conviction have now become familiar: the defendant had not the slightest idea that such possession was inconsistent with the right to freedom of thought; was not remotely involved in any terrorist activity; and was Muslim.
To be blunt, as most of such prosecutions to have gone through the courts have succeeded, there is now the bleak prospect of imprisonment for thousands of young people, all Muslim, who have similarly accessed the internet prompted by an interest - shared with millions of their contemporaries around the world, Muslim and non-Muslim - in the workings of political or radical Islam. Additionally, possession of the Channel 4 film Road to Guantánamo, or 21st-century Crusaders, a compilation of documentaries from the BBC and elsewhere, is currently being held to demonstrate "radicalisation", a condemnation as conveniently imprecise as the label "subversive" used in the postwar McCarthyite witch-hunts in America.
In the face of a succession of questionable convictions, we now see a new and disturbing phenomenon whereby more than one innocent defendant, unable to comprehend the accusation levelled, yet terrified at the prospect of inevitable conviction, insists on pleading guilty in an attempt to avoid sentences that become ever more severe.
Such increasing contamination of the legal process, capitulating to an insatiable executive appetite for secret hearings when the spectre of national security is invoked, brings about a distortion of what should be the central purpose of the criminal process: achieving justice through predictable certainty and clarity. This week's returnees from Guantánamo faced secret hearings no more unjust than ours. [...]
I recommend you read the article in full. The sentence in bold is my emphasis. I first heard Gareth Peirce in 2006 at an event organised by the Institute of Race Relations (Gareth's keynote is available in MP3). After reading some of her articles and stories about her, I was expecting a strong person with a powerful voice. She is short and speaks with a small voice. However, in the few occasions I was lucky to see her, when she speaks the room goes quiet. Her actions and intensity mean she commands respect.
Other recent news:
On 2007-01-16, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) declared a challenge in ‘S’ and MARPER -v- THE UNITED KINGDOM, which may determine whether fingerprints and DNA samples taken from people who have been acquitted of crimes can be kept by the police, to be admissible and invited the parties to submit additional observations.
Below is the conclusion from the Response to questions posed by the Court upon the issue of its decision on admissibility and further submissions (31 pages). It states that the Court declares a violation of Article 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) and Article 14 (Prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention. It is dated 2007-03-15 and has just been republished by Statewatch.
A decision is expected in February 2008.
Conclusion
100. Both the retention and use of the fingerprints, DNA profiles and DNA samples of innocent persons, which PACE now allows, is a significant interference with the rights of such individuals under Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The information gathered and retained is far more intimate and intrusive than was recognised by the domestic courts; the creation of a record on the PNC, and resulting access to that record by a wide range of public authorities for a wide range of purposes, was not understood in the domestic courts; and the domestic courts failed to appreciate the distinction between DNA samples and DNA profiles.
101. Retention of such information is a fresh invasion of Art. 8 ECHR interests and must be subjected to fresh Art. 8(2) analysis. The Canadian approach to s. 8 of the Charter (the protective mantle only applies while the original justification for the taking of the material is still active) and the German Constitutional Court approach, applying proportionality analysis to each separate privacy invasion, are to be preferred over the approach of the domestic courts in S and Marper.
102. The interference in this case is not justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention because it is disproportionate to the legitimate aims being pursued. R (92) 1 and its explanatory memorandum (as analysed above) support this submission.
103. In addition, even if the Court accepts the government's claim that there are legitimate reasons for retention, the state must also justify rejecting the available 'less restrictive means' of achieving that objective, in particular the more privacy-friendly systems proposed by the Information Commissioner's Office (see exhibit).
104. In assessing whether the UK's approach is within its 'margin of appreciation' regard should be had to the fact that the UK's approach to both DNA databases and fingerprint databases is far more intrusive than that of any other Council of Europe or common law country worldwide. The UK is severely out of kilter with the approach in other democratic systems. Within Europe, the NDNAD of England and Wales is 800% larger than its closest rival in size, Germany's national database.
105. Not only does no other country in the world have a database on the scale of NDNAD or NAFIS, neither does any other country in the world treat its innocent citizens who have previously been incorrectly suspected of involvement in an offence en masse in the same manner as its convicted criminals. Further, the NDNAD and NAFIS have fewer safeguards than other large systems, and the NDNAD does not have an independent custodian monitoring its use and access to the sensitive information it contains.
106. At the very least, the keeping of DNA samples is unjustified. As they are not currently used for forensic purposes no legitimate purpose is pursued by their retention. Other countries with forensic DNA identification systems either destroy the sample immediately once the profile has been generated (New Zealand, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands) or permit the destruction of the sample at an earlier stage than the destruction of the profile or fingerprint (Australia). No other system worldwide retains DNA samples indefinitely. These systems recognise that the information contained in a DNA sample differs markedly from that contained in a DNA profile or fingerprint.
107. The blanket, permanent retention and open-ended use of personal information through the NDNAD, NAFIS and PNC under the PACE regime is unacceptable, and places the applicants at a permanent disadvantage when compared to those who have never been arrested (not on the relevant databases) and the police themselves (on an alternative database for a limited period of time, and with strong safeguards). It equalises the applicants with convicted criminals and, despite official assurances to the contrary, continues to mark them with the taint of criminality.
108. For the reasons set out above, it is submitted that this application should be allowed and the Court should declare a violation of Article 8 and Article 14 of the Convention.
See also the witness statement of Dr Caoilfhionn Anna Gallagher (97 pages), Council of Europe expert on Articles 8 (Right to respect for private and family life), 10 (Freedom of expression) and 11 (Freedom of assembly and association) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and co-author of Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998.
If you haven't already done so, write to your MP to ask him/her
to oppose attempts by this government to increase further the
pre-charge detention from its current 28 days period.
CAMPACC has published a model letter to help you ask your MP to give an undertaking not to vote for the renewal or extension of any ‘anti-terror’ powers (such as the extension of the detention without charge from 28 days to 56 days or possibly even 90 days, post-charge questioning of ‘terror suspects’, the creation of a new criminal offence of seeking ‘information which could be useful for terrorism’, travel restrictions for ‘suspects’, and the collective punishment of families of convicted terrorists). This effort is part of a national campaign bringing together many diverse organisations to oppose current anti-terror laws as well as their extension:
The government is planning yet more ‘anti-terrorism’ measures, which will go to Parliament in a new bill in October. This ‘anti-terror’ bill reinforces a trend beginning with the Terrorism Act 2000, whose broad definition of terrorism criminalised normal political activities, potentially on the basis of suspected ‘association’. This law was followed by three more in 2001, 2005, 2006; these multiplied extra police powers (e.g. arbitrary stop-and-search), punishment without trial and treatment of ‘suspects’ as guilty, thus bypassing due process. Together these laws have normalised detention without trial under various guises, such as control orders and immigration rules, whereby the accused never see the evidence against them.
Below is the email I sent to my MP on 2007-09-13 and her reply (in italics) sent on 2007-10-26:
When we met at Portcullis House early December 2005, we discussed the compromises you find are necessary as part of our political system. One specific example we discussed was your support of the compromise to extend pre-charge detention of suspects from 14 up to 28 days hence successfully defeating the 90 days amendment.
You may remember that I found this difficult to understand as these are not abstract compromises, they deeply affect the lives of individuals who have not been charged, and hence by definition are innocent. Gareth Peirce and Louise Christian both wrote at the time about how even 14 days or less in Paddington Green affect the mental health of detainees.
Gordon Brown has stated that he intends to propose a further extension to the current 28 days pre-charge detention period, and the police, via the ACPO, has even suggested they are keen for indefinite detention.
28 days is already the longest period of pre-charge detention of any western country. The case has not been made to even justify keeping this period as long as 28 days nor for extending it further. Extending this period will further erode our civil liberties and increase the likelihood of innocent persons to be detained without charge for over a month.
I urge you to publicly reject calls for extension of the pre-charge detention and vote against any such proposal that may be included in forthcoming Bills.
As we discussed at the time, I feel the 28 day limit to the detention period prior to charging to be a necessary compromise. I was very vocal about this issue at the time, sponsoring an amendment to limit the period of detention to 28 days rather than 90 days. I can, furthermore, assure you that I feel no need to extend the period at this point in time.
I also call to your attention a different issue: the de Menezes family is currently represented in the UK by four of Jean's cousins and one of his friend. The procedures around Jean's killing are delayed. The inquest will not start until after the health and safety procedure, for instance. Justice4Jean has indicated that the Home Office may not renew the visas of these five individuals. Ensuring they are welcome in the UK for at least the full duration of all the procedures surrounding Jean's killing is a very small gesture that must be done towards this grieving family.
I would be grateful for you to make representation to the Home Office so that Jean's four cousins and one friend's visas are extended and they can represent his family in all these legal proceedings.
I was concerned to hear about the issue surrounding the visas of those representing Charles de Menezes in the UK but will write to the Home office to enquire about this situation. I will be back in touch when I receive a reply.
Stockwell One – the report of the investigation into the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes by the Indpendent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) – has eventually been published.
The report was introduced by a statement from NicK Hardwick, IPCC chair.
[...] There are two very stark images from the now infamous CCTV coverage of Stockwell Station.
The first is of Jean Charles de Menezes entering the station, wearing light summer clothing, picking up a paper and going to get his train.
The second, just over a minute later, shows police officers running down into the depths of the station, into what I am sure they believed was deadly peril, the first passengers, alarmed by the arrival of police officers, were hurrying to escape in the other direction.
Neither Mr de Menezes nor the police officers are diminished by us remembering the tragedy of one and the heroism of others on that day.
Let me be clear what the trial was not about. It was not about the split second decisions that the firearms officers had to make when they confronted Jean Charles de Menezes in that tube train - nor indeed just about the death of Jean Charles de Menezes himself, terrible though that was.
The questions the trial did address and indeed the ones the public were asking in the aftermath of the incident were these:
'If they thought he might have a bomb, why was he allowed twice to get on a bus and then on the tube?' 'If they thought he didn't have a bomb, why did they shoot him?'
Nor must there be any attempt to blame Jean Charles de Menezes himself for his fate.
He did nothing out of the ordinary.
He looked over his shoulder as he walked to catch his bus; he got back on his bus when he found Brixton tube station was closed; he texted his friend; he hurried down the final few steps of the escalator when he saw a train was already on the platform; and, like other passengers, he got to his feet when police officers burst onto the train. These actions may have been misinterpreted by police officers hunting a suicide bomber but they were entirely innocent.
The priority for the police service now, and those responsible for the police, is to do everything possible to ensure the mistakes made on 22 July 2005 are not repeated. [...]
The report Stockwell One – Investigation into the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell underground station on 22 July 2005 is in three parts:
- The main investigation report that was completed and submitted within six months by 19 January 2006.
- The operational recommendations arising from the incident that were completed and submitted by 14 March 2006.
- A short addendum to the main report that sets out the results of further enquiries requested by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) which was submitted in June 2006.
Some related posts:
The Ministry of Justice has just published the Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 2006 for the financial year 2005-2006. In addition to giving ‘statistical information on the representation of [Black and Minority Ethnic] BME groups as suspects, offenders and victims within the CJS’, this report always includes detailed data on stop and searches conducted that year.
This report is no longer published by the Home Office on a page dedicated to the Criminal Justice Act 1991 Section 95, it can now be found on the CJS website and seems to be linked only from the What's New page. It is still being published very late.
Excerpt from Main Findings - Terrorism Act 2000: Tables 4.6-4.8 (p.26):
The number of stop and searches of pedestrians under section 44(2) [for which no reasonable grounds for suspicion is needed] nearly doubled between 2004/5 and 2005/6 with 19,064 stop and searches recorded in 2005/6. This increase was accounted for by the increase in use of the power in London. Use of the power in areas outside of London decreased by 19% between 2004/5 and 2005/6. In 2005/6, 61% of people stopped under section 44(2) were White compared to 74% in 2004/5 and 72% in 2003/4. The proportions for Black and Asian people fell to 11% and 21% respectively in 2005/6. In 2005/6, 59 arrests in connection with terrorism resulted from section 44(2) searches compared to 24 in the previous year and 5 in 2003/4. Arrests under non-terrorist legislation rose from 153 in 2004/5 to 212 in 2005/6.
Excerpt from Table 4.8: ‘Stop and searches’ of pedestrians under s 44(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 and resultant arrests by ethnicity, selected areas, 2005/6 (p. 36):
Searches Arrests in connection with terrorism Arrests for other reasons City of London 3,149 n/a 23 Metropolitan Police 11,407 49 148 Other areas 4,508 10 41 England & Wales 19,064 59 212
Comparing this data, for the Metropolitan Police, to that of previous years (more analysis in A pawn in their propaganda machine), you'll notice that the number of searches under Section 44(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 more than doubled in 2005/6 compared to the previous year, but the number of arrests in connection with terrorism at 49 remains less that half a percent. And of these 49, only a few will be charged and even less convicted. (The coloured table cells show how my arrest must have been counted in these stats.)
| 2003/4 | 2004/5 | 2005/6 | |
| S44(2) searches (Metropolitan Police) | 5,245 | 4,206 | 11,407 |
| Arrests in connection with terrorism | 2 (0.04%) | 15 (0.36%) | 49 (0.43%) |
| Arrests for other reasons | 57 (1.09%) | 51 (1.21%) | 148 (1.30%) |
This data confirms the abuse of Section 44 stop and search. As recently as last May, the Metropolitan Police Service reiterated how keen they are to keep (over)using these powers.
- Police did not stop and question everyone leaving Mr de Menezes’s apartment block, despite orders to do so;
- Armed officers did not arrive at the apartment block in time to halt the Brazilian, despite the surveillance operation beginning four hours previously;
- Without the armed officers, there was no plan for how to deal with a suspect suicide bomber leaving the building. This uncertainty helped create the confusion about Mr de Menezes’ status that ultimately led his death;
- There was no plan for absence of certainty about identity;
- When one of the surveillance officers tried to clarify what they should do if forced to “contain” the suspect, “all he got was a shrug of the shoulders”,
- Senior officers believing that Mr de Menezes had been identified as a terrorist despite the fact that no surveillance officer had stated that to be the case;
- Police failed in their duty of care by letting a suspected suicide bomber board a packed bus (twice) and then a busy Tube train;
- The New Scotland Yard operations room was too noisy and chaotic for officers to accurately assess the information coming from surveillance officers outside Mr de Menezes’ block, to the extent that people couldn’t make themselves heard;
- Non-essential staff contributed to the noise and chaos by not leaving the room despite repeated requests to do so;
- Surveillance officers who identified Mr de Menezes to armed officers on the Tube train were unaware of orders that he should be “stopped”, ie killed, before he could board the train;
- Commander Cressida Dick, Gold Commander at Scotland Yard, issued a series of contradictory orders to the surveillance team following Mr de Menezes;
- Somehow the firearms team made a leap from being in pursuit of one terrorist suspect to a whole cell, which resulted in one officer pointing a gun at ‘Ivor’, a surveillance officer, and another firearms officer chasing the tube driver into the tube tunnel.
In a statement released by Downing Street today, Mr Brown said the protestors have been exercising "great bravery" by protesting peacefully.
"I had hoped that the Burmese regime would heed the calls for restraint from the international community.
"But once again they have responded with oppression and force. This must cease."
The democratic movement in Burma were praised for their "courage, moderation and dignity".
Thousands of anti-war protestors are expected to march down Whitehall on Monday, 8 October, in defiance of a police ban. The police decision is an unprecedented attack on civil liberties.I wish I could join this demonstration.
LIBERTY have stated that this decision "interferes with the vital democratic rights of free expression and free assembly."
The Stop the War Coalition have sent a final appeal to the police to reverse their decision and have requested guarantees regarding the safety and security of all those who attend the demonstration. Among the marchers will be: Tony Benn, Walter Wolfgang, Brian Eno, Mark Thomas, Jenny Jones, Lindsey German, Ben Griffin and John McDonnell MP. (Statements of support included below)
TO:
Inspector Stuart Cornish
New Scotland Yard
05 October 2007
Dear Stuart,
Following the decision of the Metropolitan Police to agree to the banning of our long planned demonstration on October 8th we write to make our position as clear as possible and to ask for guarantees regarding the safety and security of those attending the event on the 8th October.
1] We met with you on four separate occasions to discuss the planning of the demonstration on the 8th October. In the first three meetings there was never any question of not being allowed to demonstrate. Only in the very last meeting did you say that you could no longer facilitate the demonstration.
2] The grounds on which you have made this decision is spurious. The sessional order, as you have admitted, is subject to different interpretation at different times but it should never be used to suppress the right to legitimate and peaceful protest.
The civil liberties organisation Liberty has written to Assistant Commissioner Chris Allison that, “this proposed restriction on peaceful protest is a disproportionate interference with the vital democratic rights of free expression and free assembly”.
3] Since 2001 we have arranged with the cooperation of your department 20 demonstrations. These have included the largest demonstration in British political history on February 15th 2003 and also the demonstration to protest at the visit of US president George Bush on November 20th 2003. On the latter nearly 400,000 people marched through Whitehall by the House of Commons on a weekday while parliament was sitting. There was no attempt to prevent this march using the sessional order. All our demonstrations have been peaceful.
4] On the 8th of October we intend to march to parliament. There will be a large number of elderly people and families with children attending our event. We strongly request that the Metropolitan Police do not endanger the safety of those attending, either by the use of riot police or through the use of mounted police. Our stewards will be working to facilitate a peaceful protest and we ask for that same cooperation from your officers.
5] We have no intention of disrupting parliament or preventing MPs from attending parliament. In fact the opposite is the case - our protest seeks to make parliament act in the interests of the vast majority of the people of this country who want British troops withdrawn from Iraq.
6] It is a matter of great concern to us that our previous good relations in regard to the planning of legitimate public protest have broken down. You will have received advice that your decision to ban our protest is of dubious legality and we ask you one more time to review your decision in respect of our march.
Andrew Burgin
Lindsey German
Chris Nineham
Stop the War Coalition
**********************************************
TONY BENN, in his letter to the Home Secretary
The authority for this march derives from our ancient right to free speech and assembly enshrined in our history. It is only fair to tell you that the march will go ahead, in any case, and I will be among those marching.
WALTER WOLFGANG, Labour Party NEC
A protest demanding all the troops out now is of national significance. To try and stop that protest is a major interference with free speech. The march should go ahead whether it is formally permitted or not.
LINDSEY GERMAN, Convenor Stop the War Coalition
The government want to bury the issue of their disastrous war. They will not succeed. We will be marching in our thousands on Monday.
BOB WAREING MP
In a democracy we expect peaceful protest to be permitted. We are not yet in the kind of tyranny that the Burmese people have to suffer, I hope the authorities will reconsider.
BEN GRIFFIN (ex SAS trooper)
Gordon Brown cannot praise protesters in Burma and then ban a protest in London. I will be protesting on Monday, regardless of whether Police permission is granted.
MICHAEL KUSTOW, theatre director
If people aren't allowed to have their say on all our streets, what kind of Parliament are we meant to be defending?
BRIAN ENO, musician and producer
If they are planning an Iranian attack they will have a public even more upset and disgruntled than before. This is what this tightening up is about…Civil liberties never seem very important until you need them. At times like this we need to be re-enforcing them.
DAVID HOWARTH MP
This is an outrageous attempt by the Government to block the democratic right to protest. This is a legitimate and important protest against an illegal war which Britain should never have been involved in. The Government should be listening to the people's protests not attempting to block them.
MARK THOMAS, comedian
This is rather a ham-fisted attempt to prevent us from demonstrating. What they (the government and police) do is up to them. We will just ignore them and we have the moral and logical high-ground. I will be marching on Monday 8 October.
JOHN MCDONNELL MP
The attempt to ban this demonstration is an unacceptable assault on our civil liberties and I will be joining the march to exercise my right to protest at the continuing presence of British troops in Iraq.
IAIN BANKS, author
It's becoming remarkably hard to escape the feeling we're ruled by people who are basically paranoid authoritarian incompetents.
BENJAMIN ZEPHANIAH, poet
It is depressing that our democratic rights are being whittled away bit by bit. We will look back and wonder how this happened. They wouldn't get away with this in one go. First an arrest for reading names, then a ban on marches. What will be next?
DAVID EDGAR, playwright
The stop the war demonstration on 15 February 2003 was arguably the most politically influential march in Britain since the 1970s, so it's no surprise that politicians are immobilising anti-war demonstrations now. At a time when the political debate at Westminster occupies ever narrower ground, it's vital that voices from outside are heard.
GORDON BROWN, 2007 Labour Party conference
Change to strengthen our liberties to uphold the freedom of speech, freedom of information and the freedom to protest.
She was then dragged along the ground to the lift. In considerable pain she appealed to the police to take the handcuffs off. They declined. When her husband Chris Gwyntopher came up the stairs to find out what had happened to her she appealed to him to get the police to remove the handcuffs. He tried to persuade the officers to do so, pointing out that she would not harm anybody and would not seek to run away. They refused and pulled him away from her.On 2007-09-26, Bob Hamlen, 47, and Michael Burbidge, 31 were stopped and searched as they sat on a bench outside the Westcliff Tavern in West Cliff Road, Bournemouth. The pub patio overlooks the security checkpoint at the entrance to the Highcliff Marriott Hotel where Labour politicians are staying during this week's party conference. Bob was interviewed by the Bournemouth Echo (via UK Liberty):
She was charged with trespassing on DLR station and refusing to leave. She had her freedom pass on her and was ready to leave, in the direction of the Excel She was offered bail on the condition she did not go on the Docklands Light Railway until her court appearance. She refused to accept this condition. She was transferred to Forest Gate Police Station and held overnight to appear before Stratford Magistrates on Friday 14/9/07.
At about nearly midday Friday, the Magistrate heard her plea of not guilty. She was bailed to appear for trial on Monday November 5th at 9.30 am with a pre-trial review the afternoon of Thursday 4th October at the Magistrates Court, 389-397 High Street, Stratford E15. Supporters welcome The bail conditions were that she not go on DLR land or the Excel Centre until midday Saturday 15th September. She was not required to accept or sign to keep the conditions which would have prevented her communicating with the arms traders.
"I was carrying my disabled bus pass but it didn't make any difference. I needed to go to the toilet and an officer went with me in case I escaped. After radioing through the information, they asked us to accompany them, in separate police cars, to the police station.Act now. Refuse to be terrorised.
"It was very embarrassing because some of our friends were sitting nearby. Michael suffers from stress and was getting very agitated.
"They said the reason I was being taken to the police station was because I had been seen passing a white envelope.
"But all I did was take my post out of my jacket pocket and open an electricity bill.
"On Michael's stop and search form they said they wanted to speak to him, under the Terrorism Act, because he had been looking at a police officer.
For several years discussions and measures aiming for enhancing security and fighting terrorism claimed that it was a necessity to balance individual rights and security, implicating that the freedom of individuals opposes the needs of combating terrorism and law enforcement.The Economist this week published Learning to live with Big Brother, the second article in a series on surveillance and privacy (my emphasis):
A report submitted by Europol provides figures on terrorism in the EU. According to the “TE-SAT 2007, EU Terrorism and Trend Report 2007” a total of 498 attacks were carried out in 2006 in the EU, of which the vast majority were not intended to kill.
“There were no successful Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU in 2006. However, a coordinated but ultimately failed attack aimed at mass casualties took place in Germany. The vast majority of terrorist attacks were perpetrated by separatist terrorist groups targeting France and Spain. In France, 283 attacks took place in Corsica in 2006. In Spain, despite the truce declared by ETA in March 2006, separatist groups perpetrated 136 attacks, mainly in the Basque region. Only the attack at the Madrid airport on 30 December 2006 resulted in casualties.”
According to the report the remaining attacks were left- or right-wing-motivated or driven by other/not given motivation.
The number of arrested suspects differs from these figures. A total of 706 individuals suspected of terrorism offences were arrested, of which 257 arrested individuals were suspected of Islamist, 226 of separatist, 52 of left wing and 15 of right wing terror. With regard to the approximately 260 arrests related to Islamist terror “[l]ess than ten percent of the arrested individuals were suspected of preparation, planning or execution of terrorist attacks. [...] The vast majority of the arrested individuals were suspected of being members of a terrorist organisation. Other frequent criminal activities were financing of terrorism and facilitation.”
The figures of the Europol report make clear that terrorism in the EU is mainly driven by separatists in France and Spain and focussing on Corsica and the Basque region. Of the relatively large number of arrests related to Islamic terror only less than 26 individuals were suspected of preparation, planning or execution of terrorist attacks. On the other hand we had and still have to face a series of measures, limiting the freedom of individuals and infringing with human rights, arguing this to be necessary to fight terrorism.
Britain used to pride itself on respecting privacy more than most other democracies do. But there is not much objection among Britons as “talking” surveillance cameras, fitted with loudspeakers, are installed, enabling human monitors to shout rebukes at anyone spotted dropping litter, relieving themselves against a wall or engaging in other “anti-social” behaviour [...]
With an estimated 5m CCTV cameras in public places, nearly one for every ten inhabitants, England and Wales are among the most closely scrutinised countries in the world [...] Few seem to mind, despite research suggesting that CCTV does little to deter overall crime. [...]
Britain has long permitted the “warrantless” eavesdropping of its citizens (only the home secretary's authorisation is required), and few people appear to mind [...]
Ross Anderson, a professor at Cambridge University in Britain, has compared the present situation to a “boiled frog”—which fails to jump out of the saucepan as the water gradually heats. If liberty is eroded slowly, people will get used to it. He added a caveat: it was possible the invasion of privacy would reach a critical mass and prompt a revolt.
If there is not much sign of that in Western democracies, this may be because most people rightly or wrongly trust their own authorities to fight the good fight against terrorism, and avoid abusing the data they possess. The prospect is much scarier in countries like Russia and China, which have embraced capitalist technology and the information revolution without entirely exorcising the ethos of an authoritarian state where dissent, however peaceful, is closely monitored.
On the face of things, the information age renders impossible an old-fashioned, file-collecting dictatorship, based on a state monopoly of communications. But imagine what sort of state may emerge as the best brains of a secret police force—a force whose house culture treats all dissent as dangerous—perfect the art of gathering and using information on massive computer banks, not yellowing paper.
Refuse the war against a noun and what is done in its name. Demand human rights. Refuse to be terrorised, and prevent the situation getting worse (block any further extension of the pre-charge detention period).
Murch: Well, there was a short film made a few years ago where the filmmaker had worked out the location of all the surveillance cameras along a cross-section of London, and how many of those cameras were operated by the municipal authorities. If the cameras were operated by the city, then he could get access to the footage. So he mapped out a pedestrian trip for himself across town knowing that, at every moment he would be on CCTV: as soon as he was out of range of one camera, he would come into focus on another. So he walked the walk, wrote to all the relevant authorities, got the footage, and then edited it all together into a continuous narrative. It’s very amusing in a dystopian, Warholian kind of way. You only “get” the joke after a few minutes of watching.As for the efficacy of cameras making us more secure, This is London just reminded us that ‘a comparison of the number of cameras in each London borough with the proportion of crimes solved there found that police are no more likely to catch offenders in areas with hundreds of cameras than in those with hardly any.’
But George Lucas’s THX-1138 was kind of like that, except it was made in 1971. Much of the action takes place on video surveillance cameras. In fact, the job of the girl in the film is to monitor banks of surveillance cameras. She eventually gets fed up, stops taking her Prozac, or whatever, and tries to escape this completely video-monitored world – which, it turns out, is completely underground because of some disaster that had happened on the surface many years earlier.
Vague spectres of menace caught on time-coded surveillance cameras justify an entire network of peeping vulture lenses. A web of indifferent watching devices, sweeping every street, every building, to eliminate the possibility of a past tense, the freedom to forget. There can be no highlights, no special moments: a discreet tyranny of “now” has been established. “Real time” in its most pedantic form.
